



# Three-Way Integration Framework

*A Practitioner-Grounded Governance Model for the Mutual Advancement of Immigrants, Indigenous Peoples, and Canadian-Born Canadians*

**Prepared by:**

Ui Heang Hur  
Founder & Lead Strategist, Hanité Inc.

**Published by:**

Hanité Inc.

**Publication Date:** April 13, 2026

**First Edition**

## About the Author

Ui Heang Hur is a South Korean Canadian and the founder of Hanité Inc., a governance, cross-cultural systems, and multinational integration consultancy based in Calgary, Alberta. His work focuses on immigration, reconciliation, and workforce integration in Canada's evolving demographic landscape.

He has worked across the immigration and settlement sector in frontline, community, and policy roles, and his approach is shaped by lived experience across multiple countries and languages. Ui Heang holds a Master of Arts in Political Science from the Université du Québec à Montréal and a Bachelor of Arts in International Relations and French from the State University of New York at Geneseo.

## Copyright and Publication Information

© 2026 Hanité Inc.

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, distributed, or transmitted in any form or by any means, including photocopying, recording, or other electronic or mechanical methods, without the prior written permission of the publisher, except in the case of brief quotations embodied in critical reviews and certain other non-commercial uses permitted by copyright law.

For permission requests, contact:

### Hanité Inc.

Calgary, Alberta, Canada

Email: [info@hanite.ca](mailto:info@hanite.ca)

Website: [www.hanite.ca](http://www.hanite.ca)

### Suggested citation:

Ui Heang Hur, *Three-Way Integration Framework: A Practitioner-Grounded Governance Model for the Mutual Advancement of Immigrants, Indigenous Peoples, and Canadian-Born Canadians*. Hanité Inc., 2026.

# Table of Contents

Preface: Why This Exists	7
Note to the Reader	20
A. Where This Work Sits in the Existing Literature	21
A.1 The Closest Institutional Parallel: Aotearoa New Zealand	21
A.2 The Closest Scholarly Parallel: Swedish Sápmi Research	22
A.3 The Canadian Municipal Trilateral: A Partial and Incomplete Overlap	22
A.4 The Australian Co-Design Model: Institutional Precedent Without Immigration Application	23
A.5 The Latin American Plurinational Models: The Most Structurally Ambitious Analogues	24
A.6 The Identity Literature: What Exists and What Is Missing	24
A.7 Contextual Timing for a New Governance Framework	25
B. The Global Dimension: A Framework for the Century	28
B.1 The Global Demographic Shift: Immigration as Structural Necessity	29
B.2 South Korea: The Canary and the Design Challenge	29
B.3 Japan: The Demographic Option Not Taken	33
B.4 The Common Pattern and the Framework's Transferable Logic	33
C. The Socioeconomic Dimension: Why Mutual Advancement Is the Core Objective	35
C.1 The Mutual Advancement Premise	35
C.2 What Structural Change Would Produce	36
For Immigrants	36
For Indigenous Peoples	38
For Canadian-Born Canadians	42
C.3 Canadian Identity Before Anglophone and Francophone Canada	47
C.4 Attempt to Reverse the Cost of Segmentation	50
1. Introduction: Three Groups, One Broken Architecture	52
1.1 The Three Grouped Identities: Definitions	54
Immigrants	54
Indigenous Peoples	56
Canadian-Born Canadians	57

1.2 What This Framework Is Not	57
1.3 Structure of This Document	59
2. The Conditions: What Has Actually Happened in Canada	60
2.1 Demographic Change at Scale	60
2.2 Economic Performance: The Per Capita Problem	63
2.3 Housing: A Structural Crisis, not a Cyclical Problem	66
2.4 The Collapse of Public Trust	69
2.5 What Canadian-Born Canadians Are Actually Experiencing	72
2.6 The Governance Architecture That Produced These Conditions	73
3. Analytical Framework: Understanding the Structural Root	76
3.1 The Structural Engine: Settler Colonialism as Ongoing Architecture	76
3.2 Supplementary Mechanism 1: Political Economy of Precarious Labour and the Productivity Trap	79
3.3 Supplementary Mechanism 2: Extraction Without Return	80
3.4 Supplementary Mechanism 3: Narrative Misalignment	82
3.5 Supplementary Mechanism 4: Identity Construction and Exclusion	83
3.6 The Causal Architecture in Summary: How the Mechanisms Connect	86
STRUCTURAL ENGINE:	86
MECHANISM 1 (Labour/Productivity):	86
MECHANISM 2 (Extraction Without Return):	86
MECHANISM 3 (Narrative Misalignment):	86
MECHANISM 4 (Identity Construction and Exclusion):	87
GOVERNANCE GAP:	87
PROPOSED RESPONSE:	87
4. Constitutive Tensions: Honest Navigation	88
4.1 The Risk of Recognition Politics	88
4.2 The Distinction Between Indigenous Rights and Immigrant Rights	91
4.3 The Challenge of Governance Diversity Among Indigenous Nations	92
5. The Governance Design	94
5.1 The Three-Actor Architecture	94
5.2 Five Core Governance Mechanisms	96

Mechanism 1: Territorial Impact Assessment	96
Mechanism 2: Regional Co-Governance Tables	96
Mechanism 3: Co-Designed Integration Programming	97
Mechanism 4: Labour-Economic Alignment	98
Mechanism 5: Honest Narrative	99
5.3 Entry Points: Where Implementation Starts	100
6. Comparative Cases: What Other Countries Reveal	102
6.1 Aotearoa New Zealand: The Waitangi Tribunal Citizenship Inquiry	102
6.2 Canada's Co-Management Precedents	103
6.3 The Nordic Sámi Framework	104
7. Theory of Change: What Would Actually Improve	105
7.1 The Causal Pathway	105
7.2 Key Assumptions	107
7.3 Measurable Indicators	108
8. Recommendations	110
8.1 Immediate (0–2 Years)	110
8.2 Medium-Term (2–5 Years)	112
8.3 Long-Term (5–10 Years)	113
9. What Remains to Be Done	115
9.1 The Legal Analysis	115
9.2 Direct Engagement with Indigenous Scholars and Governance Practitioners	115
9.3 A Practical Implementation Guide	116
9.4 Empirical Case Study	116
Bibliography	117
Primary Legal and Government Sources	117
Statistical and Survey Sources	121
Academic and Policy Sources	124



## Preface: Why This Exists

*I am South Korean-born.*

*I spent nine years of my adolescence in Hanoi, Vietnam.*

*I went to college in Upstate New York, in the United States.*

*I did my master's degree at a Francophone Québécois institution in Montreal.*

*I worked in Canadian immigration and settlement for eight years.*

*I became a Canadian citizen not long ago.*

My father had a unique career for 40 years as the best South Korean motorcycle race leather suit design specialist. He was often called the leader of the only five people in South Korea with comparable skills. As the director of production for a South Korean company, he managed factories first in the Philippines and later in Vietnam. He used to travel the world to meet his buyers. He was often absent from home until we joined him in Hanoi. Hence, for nine years, the streets of the Vietnamese capital were where I learned what it means to be a foreigner. It was not an academic concept but a daily fact. I sometimes felt like I was a monkey out in the open. I cannot pretend as if I know what it means to be a Vietnamese. I was not raised as a local. My world was an English international school and its Mekong River network, a Korean immigrant church, and my family. The small, oldest international school of Hanoi where I grew up offered a 13-year education, an international version of the British school system. I had to complete two years of IGCSE followed by two years of IB to graduate. Naturally, I went to university one year later than my childhood friends who moved to a larger, UN international school. But my 27 IB credits allowed me to graduate on time even when I had two majors and a semester of absence. My English, thus, was only "Americanized" through college that required lots of academic writing in their style. The past eleven years in Canada have again modified my English, now with some hints of French for being a Francophone immigrant. This is who I am.

As Koreans in Vietnam, my parents enjoyed the status, income, community, and stability that Vietnam made possible for foreigners back in the 2000s. They were welcomed in the same way that many foreign residents were in parts of Southeast Asia. They were accommodated, not assimilated. They built something there. They prospered.

When they eventually compared their experience to that of Korean immigrants of similar age and background living in the United States and Canada, the contrast was not subtle. Korean communities in Vietnam and across Southeast Asia have been well documented as among the most economically successful in the world, consistently reporting higher incomes and quality of life than comparable Korean diasporas in North America.<sup>1</sup>

That observation stayed with me. Not because it made Canada look bad, but because it revealed something structural. The same person, the same ambition, and the same work ethic can all have radically different outcomes depending on how a country chooses to receive the people who come to it. Vietnam was not more formally egalitarian than Canada. I was not blind to what I saw. But the informal architecture of daily life was much more favourable to foreigners there back then. The cost of housing relative to foreign income was far lower than the local population's average income. Most foreigners were paid in the U.S. dollars at the time, and the exchange rate was dramatic. The social standing available to someone who brought skills and energy to a new place as a foreigner was more accessible there at the time. It was easier, at least for most of the Koreans I knew back then, to build a life in Hanoi than in North America. When Canada spent considerable political capital presenting itself as the world's most welcoming destination for exactly those people, what do the results convey? Wealth and prosperity were relative terms, not what the government advertisements showed.

I moved through the world differently from most people I would later meet. A South Korean childhood, nine formative years in Hanoi, an undergraduate degree in International Relations in Upstate New York, a graduate degree in International Politics and International Law from UQAM in Montreal... By the time I entered the Canadian immigrant-serving sector in 2018, I had lived on three continents, spoken daily in at least three languages, and navigated institutions across four countries. Without any intention of my own, I had become the type of person described by the Three-Way Integration Framework (TWIF) as having an identity that does not fit into any of the governance categories used by states to manage their populations. Many of us are spread all around

---

<sup>1</sup> Korean diaspora economic performance in Southeast Asia is documented in: Korea International Trade Association (KITA), *Korean Business Communities in Southeast Asia: Economic Status and Challenges* (Seoul: KITA, 2022); Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), *International Migration Outlook 2023* (Paris: OECD, 2023).

the world. Our world order is not only changing because of technology, but also partially as a structural evolution of demographics following the international architecture of the post-World War II, post-Cold War, and post-globalization eras.

I am not elite and I want to make sure that it is known. I simply have a rare profile and rarity does not equal to superiority. The credential sorting of Canada has made it clear enough to me. Neither SUNY Geneseo nor UQAM carries any elitist banner, and they probably will not while we are alive. Hence, the following should serve as a small guide to understanding my worldview on top of my less usual childhood described above.

SUNY Geneseo is the state of New York's public honours college. It is a formal designation within the State University of New York (SUNY) system, the largest American public university system with more than 60 member institutions. Geneseo is the state's only member of the Council of Public Liberal Arts Colleges (COPLAC). It is a small, predominantly undergraduate college committed to interdisciplinary inquiry, civic formation, and the liberal arts as a core educational enterprise. The professors, thus, devote themselves to teaching and mentoring students. SUNY's own publications describe Geneseo as a public counterpart to selective private liberal arts colleges alongside Hamilton, Colgate, and Vassar, offered at a fraction of the price. In practice, students applying to Geneseo are self-selecting into a particular intellectual culture, which prizes analytical independence, produces nationally competitive fellowship recipients, and sends many graduates to the top graduate and professional programs in the country.

My International Relations/Political Science faculty were mostly trained in Ivy League schools or top 20 institutions for the political science discipline in the United States in the 2010s. The program curriculum was designed by my academic advisor, who was once a lead of some United Nations democratic development missions in parts of Africa. The faculty trained students through primary sources, rigorous seminar debate, and guided research rather than only on lectures and textbooks. Additionally, my French double major was advised by a scholar who served as the executive director of Pi Delta Phi, the National French Honour Society for universities in the United States. SUNY Geneseo is arguably a public institution whose cost or reputation did not signal its quality. Its name is rarely recognized by anyone outside its own small circles. However,

Geneseo was one of the right venues at the time in North America to nurture practices of multi-level analysis based on primary sources, an instinct to question rather than believe in naïve innocence, and a capacity to be critical in neutrality.

UQAM (Université du Québec à Montréal) carries a different kind of institutional significance. It was founded in 1969 by the government of Québec as part of the Université du Québec network, explicitly to democratize access to university education for Francophone Canadians in a Francophone province of Canada. Ironically, higher learning had historically been concentrated in institutions oriented toward clerical, Anglophone, or elite constituencies in the heart of the Francophone culture and identity of North America. UQAM is, in this sense, the people's university of Québec. It is the symbolic representation of the Québécois mentality. It is the institution that the Quiet Revolution built to ensure that working-class, Francophone, and socially engaged Québécois could access tertiary education of the highest quality in their language and on their own terms. Its political science department is shaped by that history: rigorously critical, theoretically sophisticated, and engaged with questions of power, sovereignty, and political economy that more established, traditional institutions tend to treat as settled once and for all. It was the opposite of what I learned in Geneseo. I was required to defend my American perspectives, to name the political interests behind institutional arrangements, and to produce original scholarship without the scaffold of elite consensus. This was where my mind was pushed to think beyond the accepted right answer and to look at the realities rather than the narratives reported about them.

What was more formative for my intellectual maturity about my experiences in Upstate New York and Montreal as an international student was meeting Korean diasporas whose identities differed from mine. Through the stories I heard from my Korean American friends whose parents settled mostly around Manhattan in places like Long Island, Flushing, or New Jersey around the late 1990s or early 2000s, I realized how much my life back in Vietnam had been more privileged. At times, it was difficult not to feel a kind of guilt every time I heard about their upbringing, compared to all that I had enjoyed back in Hanoi as a boy. For the first time, I could not connect with my own people outside of home. They shared a unique identity as Korean Americans from the East Coast of the United States that never resonated with me. To them, I was a F.O.B.

- a "fresh-off-the-boat". And to those who came directly from South Korea, I was not one of them either. I was neither a Korean nor a Korean-American. I was not one of them.

My relationships with the Korean diasporas changed once more in Montreal. Koreans in Montreal were different. Their challenges were less materialistic, as the government support for families with permanent status was far better in Québec. The questions there had less to do with putting food on the table and saving up to get medical care. For the Koreans in Montreal, French, pathways to permanent residency, and the Québécois mindset were often the main topics of conversations. From the outside, life looked beautiful, with everything one can ever hope for. From the inside, there were, again, some deep identity crises among many Koreans, although the strong Québécois nationalism was in full control, leaving less room for exploring and thus allowing more stability in a way. In Québec, it either worked for you, or it did not.

I did not enter Canada's immigration sector with a fancy title. I began by offering private language lessons to South Korean children and women who were either new to Montreal or caught in the immigration system and lost. Teaching English and French as a practitioner without a traditional credential in teaching is debatable. Nevertheless, they needed me. I knew what they needed, and I delivered. Today, children I taught all went to top CEGEPs and universities. Mentoring with maturity was far more important than teaching grammar, vocabulary, and correcting pronunciation. What they needed was confidence. Confidence to continue pursuing the goal they had when entering this country. Confidence to not lose themselves after being screamed at by some "trained" teachers at public schools and private language schools with zero cultural awareness to teach children and women of Korean origins. Confidence to stand tall, breathe, and go on in an environment far too foreign for someone carrying a South Korean identity. All I needed to do was to keep them on their feet. That was the real work. It was far more difficult and meaningful than anything else I did later with formal titles in institutions. It formed a foundation for my perspectives on today's Canadian immigration system. While waiting for my own permanent residency for more than three years, triple the processing time I was once told, I could put my trainings into real practice. For a young man whose rare skillset was not leveraged by institutions during the long credential recognition process, this field experience prepared my soul for what was to come.

The more I became a practitioner, I saw less alignment between what I observed and what the policy language led me to expect. I found a system that was, in structural terms, doing something quite different from what it claimed to be doing. It was not failing. It was working as designed. The system was fine as it was, but it was designed to function that way given the specific social, political, and identity formations of this country in the years when the system was designed. When social construction is less visible to the naked eye compared to data, statistics, and numbers in a point in history, it is not easy for the constituents of such a society to realize where they stand, what their actions lead to, and why they arrive at a point in life regardless of their own choices. What we have today in Canada is the result of what was intended by the very system that our 50-year-old settlement sector has been striving to uphold.

My first Canadian professional chapter began in Ottawa three months after I received my permanent residency, four years after my last lecture at UQAM. I worked as a bilingual project officer at the national level for the Centre for Canadian Language Benchmarks (CCLB), where language policy intersects with labour-market access and newcomer integration. CCLB administers the Canadian Language Benchmarks, the national standard for describing and recognizing the English and French language proficiency of adult immigrants and prospective immigrants for living and working in Canada.<sup>2</sup> This was where I was first exposed to the concept of Francophone communities in minority situations. Under the leadership of an ex-UN officer, our NCLC team produced training resources and guidebooks that addressed sensitive topics such as the linguistic insecurity of Francophone Canadians outside of Québec, who have distinct identities from their Québécois, Acadian, and French counterparts.

I then worked at the *Société de développement économique de la Colombie-Britannique* (SDECB) in Vancouver as an employer expert in the Economic Immigration Program. It was an IRCC-funded initiative designed to help Francophone permanent residents navigate the job market and integrate professionally in an Anglophone province. I never knew how difficult it was to convince Canadians in British Columbia, still in Canada, to even consider the importance of the French language and

---

<sup>2</sup> Centre for Canadian Language Benchmarks (CCLB), *Canadian Language Benchmarks: English as a Second Language for Adults* (Ottawa: CCLB, 2012). The CCLB mandate is described at: [www.language.ca](http://www.language.ca)

Francophone identity in this country. To me, my work at the SDECB was an extension of my previous work at CCLB. Moving to British Columbia for family reasons, I recognized in the SDECB an opportunity to continue that work – this time directly at the community level.

I was hopeful that I could contribute to helping Francophone immigrants in the Franco-minority context find jobs, find meaning in continuing in Canada, and find stability. In those rooms, across employer relations and political relations with provincial ministries, regulatory bodies, professional associations, and Local Immigration Partnerships (LIPs), I witnessed newcomers who used to be professionals in their countries of origin but were driving for ride-share platforms or doing whatever they could to survive for years while waiting to get their foreign credentials recognized by Canadian authorities. They were once told that they could continue their professional career in Canada directly upon arrival, entirely in French outside of Québec, because the bilingual country Canada was in such great need of their skills.

I saw it as a question of politics: the presence of power relations, an elite-centric reading of social dynamics, and keeping one's stability and economic hierarchy at the cost of delaying the status of those who were invited by the state to contribute using their skills here. It was not about the people who processed the credential recognition applications. But again, the system was designed that way. It was intended to protect not only the Canadian public but also those who enjoy higher socioeconomic hierarchy status in Canadian society as modern-day elites – those with credentials that many would look up to, resulting in prosperity and stability, and who are reluctant to share their spaces with foreigners due to fear, egoism, and lack of genuine interest in distributing what they dominate. We know not to judge a book by its cover.

On the other hand, my five years of volunteer experience in Indigenous relations back in Montreal kept echoing in my mind the more insight I developed in immigration and settlement.

*What about this other group who already has the innate right to this country? What are they getting when the whole country has developed a national sector serving, essentially, foreigners who are entitled of rights given by some expensive papers they obtained – that I obtained?*

I observed how Indigenous communities were absent from the integration architecture I was part of. The immigration system was not hostile to them, but it had been built without them. The bilateral model of the Canadian state, plus Canadians welcoming immigrants, simply did not include them. Their territories, their governance, and their economic priorities: none of it was structurally present in the decisions being made about who would settle in Canada. The work of the settlement sector was, in fact, helping newcomers to settle in Canada as today's settlers, without any connection to Indigenous communities, often ignoring their presence and strengthening the society constructed by the descendants of the colonial settlers. This is not an incidental gap. As the Truth and Reconciliation Commission's Calls to Action (2015) established, Indigenous Peoples have obligations owed to them across all domains of public policy. Yet, no TRC Call to Action explicitly addresses immigration governance as part of it. This is a structural omission that this framework attempts to name and correct.<sup>3</sup> I would not blame anyone identifying as an Indigenous person in Canada for arguing that the federal government has been investing too much in foreigners and that Indigenous Peoples have been experiencing opportunity costs as a consequence. They may not be wrong - what right do we have to criticize them?

Canada is not the only country on Earth where the rights of Indigenous Peoples are treated based on state-centric models of governance. As a longtime Christian, I often participated in Christian missions in Vietnam and Canada. I have been on short-term missions overseas in Mexico and Haiti as well. Most of the people that we were "trying to save" were placed far away from the city centres, either forced militarily or socially into villages, mountains, remote areas, or rural contexts, where the condition of living was unfavourable and the very prospect of their survival was questioned. Discussions over Indigenous rights, or the rights of the marginalized, sometimes result in claims of relative correctness. It is the argument that we live in better conditions than certain others in the world and that we should be grateful for what we have, rather than looking into the core. Being grateful is a significant aspect of the Christian faith. However,

---

<sup>3</sup> Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, *Calls to Action* (Winnipeg: TRC, 2015). Calls to Action 43, 44, and 57 are directly relevant to the governance gap this framework addresses. Calls to Action 93 and 94 specifically address newcomer orientation and citizenship education. None of the 94 Calls to Action explicitly address immigration governance; this is an omission that reflects the structural separation between reconciliation and immigration policy that this framework proposes to correct.

it is not to be an egocentric escape exit leveraged to manage around the core problems and to hope that they will all get better with time. If everything were to get better just with time, then what is the very definition of "better"?

Naturally, my observations became a question.

*Why can immigrants, Indigenous Peoples, and Canadian-born Canadians not simply live better together in this vast country? Canada needs people to occupy different spaces. Why not have an integration architecture that serves all of them?*

This question eventually became the framework.

But there was a second thread, running parallel to the first.

When I was a child in Hanoi, watching my father navigate the Korean business community in Vietnam, I had a dream that was entirely characteristic of someone who had grown up between countries: I wanted to work for the United Nations. When I was small, I simply had a romantic view of international institutions. Then, with time, a problem animated me: *How do people from different places with different beliefs and different cultures, all with different histories and different claims on the same territory and resources, learn to live together without undermining each other?* Conflict, displacement, post-conflict reconstruction, building of societies after violence, or innovative reforms – these were the concerns of someone who had watched, as a child and then as a young adult, how fragile the arrangements that make peaceful coexistence possible are. What is coexistence? Is it grouping people into their own areas on a large territory or having them interact as social entities, leading to sewing various cultural threads together that form an ever-evolving net of a society?

The path to the UN never materialized the way I had dreamed and instead, it materialized sideways. Through the Canadian immigration system, through years of my own immigration combined with front-line and policy work, through a naturalization process that changed my legal identity without changing my analytical orientation, I found myself trying to do in Canada what I had wanted to do at the global scale. I was helping groups of people with different histories navigate shared territory without reproducing the conflicts that had divided them.

Hanité Inc. was built from that convergence. It is, in my own framing, a private-sector version of what I had hoped to find in multilateral institutions. It is an organization devoted to the hard, specific, less glamorous work of guiding people with different histories and different claims to figure out how to advance together rather than at each other's expense. Immigration may not be the problem. Its platform might be.

In the meanwhile, my home country has been alarming me. South Korea has recorded a total fertility rate of just 0.75 in 2024. It was the lowest in the world and significantly below the OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development) average of 1.51.<sup>4</sup> Under median demographic projections, South Korea's population will fall from approximately 51.7 million today to between 11 and 30 million by the end of the century.<sup>5</sup> However, the political and cultural resistance to immigration in South Korea remains intense, rooted in the mono-ethnic national identity that has been reinforced over generations. The Employment Permit System (EPS), through which South Korea imports temporary labour primarily from Southeast Asia and South Asia, has been documented by the Korea Immigration Service and international human rights monitors to produce conditions of structural exploitation.<sup>6</sup> South Korea is importing labour without building a society for it. The prospective structural failure seems similar to what I observed in Canada, operating in an entirely different cultural register. We Koreans take pride in being Koreans. Not Chinese, not Japanese, not Asian, but Korean. I never saw as much ethnic unity in the whole of Canada. This is not a criticism; multiculturalism is a fundamental component of the Canadian national identity, which all new Canadians must remember to pass the citizenship test.

In this context, I built this framework first for Canada. Canada is where I have lived this problem most directly, where my professional experience is concentrated, and where the specific legal and governance architecture (Section 35,

---

<sup>4</sup> Statistics Korea (KOSTAT), *2024 Birth Statistics* (Seoul: Statistics Korea, February 2025). The OECD average fertility rate is reported in: OECD, *Family Database*, "SF2.1: Fertility Rates" (Paris: OECD, 2024), available at [www.oecd.org/els/family/database.htm](http://www.oecd.org/els/family/database.htm)

<sup>5</sup> Korea Development Institute (KDI), *Long-term Population Projection for Korea* (Seoul: KDI, 2023); Statistics Korea (KOSTAT), *Long-term Population Projection: 2020-2070* (Seoul: KOSTAT, 2021). The range of projections (11-30 million) reflects variance in fertility and migration scenario assumptions.

<sup>6</sup> National Human Rights Commission of Korea (NHRCK), "Report on the Human Rights Situation of Migrant Workers" (Seoul: NHRCK, 2022); Human Rights Watch, "'Caught in a Web': Migrant Workers Under South Korea's Employment Permit System" (New York: HRW, 2023). The Korea Immigration Service annual statistical yearbooks document the scale and composition of EPS recruitment.

UNDRIP, the TRC Calls to Action, the treaty framework) creates a distinct set of design requirements. But the underlying logic is not Canada-specific. Other countries might be facing a version of the same governance design problem. Any country moving toward a demographic dependence on immigration while carrying an unresolved relationship between an arriving immigrant population, a native-born population experiencing the pressures of rapid demographic change, and a foundational population whose relationship to the territory predates the state's current governance arrangements - that country might be another Canada.

This document is the analytical foundation for that work. It is not an academic paper. It is not a policy brief for a specific government audience. It is a framework document that presents a structured analytical record of thinking, research, and design work that underlies everything Hanité does. It is written in a way that can be used for teaching, for advocacy, for further development, and for the conversations that the framework is intended to initiate. It is time to have a trilateral talk between us.

The question it starts with is simple. It is the question my parents and I asked, implicitly, when we compared our years in Vietnam to the lives of our Korean contemporaries in Canada. It is the question my colleagues and I asked when we watched credential-bearing immigrants navigate a system that extracted their value without distributing it equitably. It is the question that anyone may ask after spending enough time inside a governance system and seeing what it is doing and what it is not.

Is this all we can do in the 21st century? World wars are behind us. The declarations of independence across the globe against former imperialist rules are now clearly written in history books. We have seen enough wars, enough separations, enough falls, and just enough.

We now have technology that is far better than what our previous generations ever had. States can no longer be simple; they can no longer be unitary blocs whose internal constituents, ideas, and identities can be wrapped around unified national interests. In other words, we now have access to enough information, enough tools, and enough intellectual maturity, which all can be better leveraged. I also used AI to do parts of the research and writing for this work, leveraging my own ideas and experiences as standards of quality and ingenuity. It is something that would have taken a couple of

years if I were to write it before the arrival of generative AI models. While the media is overpowered by interests in the development of AI and the future of humanity being at stake in a way or another, it is crucial to consider the questions of this work for the very sake of our humanity and our survival. Human lives matter.

We can do better.

We should do better.

Whatever the definition of "better" is according to you, my definition in this context is this: building a life, not merely surviving.

Canada promised a life, not survival.

Anyone can talk.

But we need to see.

This is just an attempt at a beginning.

*For every dear friend I met across this vast land that I have come to call my new home,*

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Ui Heang Hur', with a long horizontal stroke underneath.

**Ui Heang Hur**

Calgary, AB

April 2026

## Note to the Reader & Terms of Use

The sections that follow shift register deliberately.

- The preface speaks in the first person because the questions animating this framework are not separable from the life that generated them.
- The analysis that follows speaks in a more formal register because the argument must stand independently of its author's biography.
- Both registers are intentional. The personal account establishes the vantage point. The analysis establishes the claim.

This document is designed to be read at multiple levels.

- The Preface and Sections A through C establish the context and originality of the work for readers approaching it for the first time.
- A reader interested in the governance design can enter at Section 5.
- A reader interested in the evidence base can enter at Section 2.
- A reader interested in the theoretical foundation can enter at Section 3.

Disclaimers:

- The framework is an intellectual product of Hanité Inc., that reproduction requires attribution, and it does not constitute legal, policy, or professional advice.
- This document has not received feedback or contributions from Indigenous scholars or Indigenous authorities, and thus, this work does not represent or attempt to represent the views of Indigenous Peoples.
- This document has not been peer-reviewed and it is not an academic research work.
- This document does not represent ideas, positions, or perspectives of any specific groups or individuals other than the author himself.

## A. Where This Work Sits in the Existing Literature

Before presenting the framework itself, it is worth establishing honestly where it stands relative to existing research and policy. The question of this document has not had an answer elsewhere: *how immigration governance should be designed in a settler state so that Indigenous Peoples, immigrants, and the native-born population all advance together, rather than at each other's expense*. It has, however, been partially approached in several directions. None of them has yet arrived at a governance design of the kind proposed here. Understanding precisely where the existing work ends and where this framework begins is the most honest way to locate what is genuinely new.

### A.1 The Closest Institutional Parallel: Aotearoa New Zealand

New Zealand is the country that has come closest to asking the same question in formal policy terms but has not yet fully answered it. An extensive government-directed inquiry in 2022 found that Māori, as *tangata whenua* (people of the land), have had no formal opportunity to present their views on immigration policy since 1840.<sup>7</sup> That single finding is the most direct institutional statement anywhere in the world of the governance gap that this framework is designed to address.

The Waitangi Tribunal's ongoing Wai 3513 citizenship inquiry examines whether New Zealand's citizenship legislation adequately reflects the Treaty of Waitangi obligations, and it is the closest judicial analogue to the legal argument advanced in this document.<sup>8</sup> Māori scholars and advocates have argued consistently that the right for non-Māori to live in Aotearoa derives from the Treaty of Waitangi and that Māori must have a partnership role in determining immigration policy.<sup>9</sup> What New Zealand has, therefore, is the recognition that something is structurally wrong and the normative argument for what

---

<sup>7</sup> This finding emerged from the New Zealand government's immigration policy review process. See: New Zealand Parliamentary Debates, *Immigration Policy Review* (Wellington: New Zealand Parliament, 2022).

<sup>8</sup> The Waitangi Tribunal, *He Tangata, He Whenua: The Citizenship Report (Wai 3513)*, pre-publication copy (Wellington: Waitangi Tribunal, October 2025). The Tribunal examined whether the Citizenship Act 1977 adequately reflects Treaty of Waitangi obligations.

<sup>9</sup> See, for example, submissions by the Māori Party to the New Zealand Immigration Rewrite Programme (2021-2022); and academic commentary in Andrew Geddis and Miriam Lips, "Māori and Immigration Policy," in Joanna Mossop and Tony Angelo, eds., *New Zealand and International Law* (Wellington: VUW Press, 2022).

should change. What it does not have is the governance architecture of how to institutionalize that change. This framework proposes to provide that architecture. The distinction is precise: an aspiration exists in New Zealand, but an institutional design does not.

## A.2 The Closest Scholarly Parallel: Swedish Sápmi Research

The closest single published academic article to the analytical core of this framework is a 2020 article in *Ethnic and Racial Studies* titled "Revitalizing Indigenous, Integrating into the Colonized? The Banal Colonialism of Immigrant Integration in Swedish Sápmi," authored by Lawrence et al.<sup>10</sup> The article investigates how state-led immigrant integration policies connect to contemporary colonialism on Indigenous territory in Sweden. It applies settler-colonial analysis to the intersection of immigration and Indigenous governance in a way that parallels the structural engine of this framework.

What the Swedish Sápmi research does not do is propose a governance solution. It produces a diagnosis that treats immigrant integration in Sweden as if Sámi territories were simply another Swedish administrative region. However, it does not offer an institutional design for what a different arrangement would look like. It is a critical theory without a framework. This document is partially the logical continuation of that line of analysis: the governance response that the diagnostic work points toward but does not itself provide.

## A.3 The Canadian Municipal Trilateral: A Partial and Incomplete Overlap

Within Canada, the word "trilateral" has appeared in immigration policy in a fundamentally different sense. The 2005 Canada-Ontario Immigration Agreement included a Municipal Immigration Committee described as a trilateral forum comprising senior officials from the Association of Municipalities of Ontario and federal and provincial

---

<sup>10</sup> Rebecca Lawrence, Gunnar Åberg, and Rasmus Koss Hartmann, "Revitalizing Indigenous, Integrating into the Colonized? The Banal Colonialism of Immigrant Integration in Swedish Sápmi," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 43, no. 16 (2020): 1-19.

immigration departments.<sup>11</sup> While these agreements manifested an evolution of Canadian immigration policies that further recognized the need for provincial and municipal structures to support newcomer settlement, this "trilateral" refers to the three levels of government within the same state. It does not include Indigenous Peoples or immigrants. This framework argues that the existing bilateral governance architecture extended to municipalities must be redesigned. The coincidence of terminology should not be mistaken for a conceptual overlap.

#### A.4 The Australian Co-Design Model: Institutional Precedent Without Immigration Application

Australia has produced the most institutionalized model of Indigenous co-design in policy among comparable settler states. The National Agreement on Closing the Gap, developed in partnership between the Australian government and the Coalition of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peak Organizations and formally signed in 2020, establishes a framework for Indigenous co-governance in social policy that provides useful institutional precedents.<sup>12</sup>

In such a context, the Closing the Gap framework indicates that funded and structurally embedded Indigenous co-governance is feasible within a settler-state administrative apparatus. What the Australian case does not include is an immigration-specific application. The National Agreement addresses health, education, employment, and housing outcomes for Indigenous Australians. It does not address the issue of who settles on Indigenous territories or how demographic change intersects with Indigenous governance rights. The gap this framework identifies exists in Australia exactly as it does in Canada, and it has not been filled there either.

---

<sup>11</sup> IRCC, *Canada-Ontario Immigration Agreement 2005* (Ottawa: IRCC, 2005); see also the discussion in Harald Bauder, "Perspectives on Immigration Policy in Canada's Provinces," in Ryan Baber, ed., *Canadian Immigration Policy for the 21st Century* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2007).

<sup>12</sup> Council of Australian Governments (COAG), *National Agreement on Closing the Gap* (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2020). The Agreement was signed by the Commonwealth, all state and territory governments, the Australian Local Government Association, and the Coalition of Peaks representing Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander organisations.

## A.5 The Latin American Plurinational Models: The Most Structurally Ambitious Analogues

Bolivia and Ecuador have gone the furthest among comparable cases in constitutionally embedding Indigenous governance authority within the state structure. Bolivia's 2009 constitution recognized the plurinational character of the state, meaning multiple governing nations coexist within a single state structure.<sup>13</sup> These are the most structurally radical analogues to what this framework proposes. The difference, however, is critical: Bolivia and Ecuador are countries where Indigenous Peoples represent demographic majorities or near-majorities. The political conditions that enabled constitutional redesign in these countries are non-existent at the national level in Canada; they exist regionally, only in specific territories and provinces.

It is also important to note that the Latin American plurinational models do not address the immigration-specific dimension. The plurinationalism in Bolivia and Ecuador pertains to the relationship between Indigenous Nations and the mestizo settler population, not the governance of immigrants arriving from other countries. The integration of newly arrived migrants into a relationship with Indigenous governance is not a developed feature of any plurinational framework currently in operation. That is precisely the intersection this document addresses.

## A.6 The Identity Literature: What Exists and What Is Missing

The identity-based definition of the three groups in this framework, particularly the persistence of immigrant identity beyond legal status change and its dilution across generations, draws on an established body of sociological research. A substantial literature has documented the persistence of immigrant-origin identity among second and third generations and the conditions under which it strengthens or weakens.<sup>14</sup> Research

---

<sup>13</sup> Constitution of the Plurinational State of Bolivia (2009), Article 1. See also: Bret Gustafson, *New Languages of the State: Indigenous Resurgence and the Politics of Knowledge in Bolivia* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2009); and Rachel Sieder, ed., *Multiculturalism in Latin America: Indigenous Rights, Diversity and Democracy* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002).

<sup>14</sup> See, inter alia: Richard Alba and Victor Nee, *Remaking the American Mainstream: Assimilation and Contemporary Immigration* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003); Alejandro Portes and Rubén Rumbaut, *Legacies: The Story of the Immigrant Second Generation* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001); and for the Canadian context: Morton Weinfeld, *Like Everyone Else But Different: The Paradoxical Success of Canadian Jews* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 2001).

on the intergenerational transmission of dual identity has found that immigrant parents' dual identities correlate positively with those of their adult children, persisting even after the children have established independent households and lives.<sup>15</sup> With changing times and recent advancements of technology, much of the identity literature may require a second visit, as the identity formation of immigrant children today may have distinct characteristics compared to the pre-2010 era, with an unprecedented level of access to information, different cultures, and pluralistic ideas.

What the sociological literature does not do is connect this identity analysis to a governance framework. The diagnostics are strong, but the findings are less developed into institutional tools. The observation that immigrant identity persists beyond a change in legal status is well documented. The implication of that observation for institutional design, that integration governance should be structured around identity rather than on legal status alone, is not. This is the specific analytical contribution of the group definitions developed in this framework.

## A.7 Contextual Timing for a New Governance Framework

What essentially does not exist is a focus on the Indigenous-immigrant relationship with the intention to elevate the political, social, and economic conditions for all populations in a fixed territory ruled by a common state. Less than 100 years have passed since the end of the Second World War, resulting in the self-declarations of independence and the recognition of every state's sovereignty across the world. Countries have agreed to form a new international system to prevent another world war. Although a century is generally long enough to exceed most human lives, history is clear on how states can rise and fall at unexpected rates within a single century. While Canada is less likely to experience territorial threats leading to its dissolution, internal contradictions may lead to a fractured society and the permanent failure of systems. Decolonization is not a historical event that ended but a continued process that modern societies are addressing across various countries. In other words, different nations that are settled within the set borders are still in a period of finding

---

<sup>15</sup> Rubén G. Rumbaut, "The Crucible Within: Ethnic Identity, Self-Esteem, and Segmented Assimilation Among Children of Immigrants," *International Migration Review* 28, no. 4 (1994): 748-794. The persistence of dual identity across generations is also documented in: Philip Kasinitz, John Mollenkopf, Mary Waters, and Jennifer Holdaway, *Inheriting the City: The Children of Immigrants Come of Age* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008).

common ground for coexistence in a country that is declared sovereign. Canada has become a prime example through the recent decade's immigration policies that have invited tens of nations while the native nations of Canada are still finding terms with the governing state, and while the imported nations still remember colonization.

Timing is crucial. With technological acceleration focused on developing artificial intelligence capable of surpassing human intelligence without the need for a border or a territory, the attention to how a human society forms, evolves, and perishes attracts much less interest than before. What is humanity to expect about the marginalized people from the rapid development of new technology, whose capacity and limits are not yet fully revealed. Technology does not have emotions. Indigenous Peoples are still overcoming structural exclusions, and immigrants are navigating credential recognition and systemic barriers. Technology developed without governance addressing these problems structurally will not allow its architecture to catch up. It is timely to revisit a governance gap that has been noticed by many but for which a solution has not yet been developed. In this era of rapid technological developments whose speed exceeds the rate of any society's capacity to integrate changes, revise their systems, and respond in ways to preserve human dignity, filling this governance gap brings together divided people before some irreversible incidents force the vulnerable into accelerated marginalization.

Literature has shown that there has not been an attempt to elevate the status of Indigenous Nations to a co-governance authority in immigration policy decision-making and programming. Literature has produced diagnostics without a governance architecture. Empowering Indigenous Nations to a level that gives them a voice to shape who gets to enter, stay, and build a life on shared land, is considered the beginning of reversing the systemic barriers. Addressing these barriers by first looking at the root cause would not only provide an opportunity to rectify the past mistakes committed during the formation of a new country on this continent two centuries ago. Introducing a third party to the state-immigrant bilateral relations creates a balance of power as well. Some complications will arise, requiring meticulous adjustments and coordination that will be costly. However, humanity is entering a new era with technology where many will be left behind. We already have many who are left behind in our current system. This is an attempt to address this core question that is neglected for the convenience of administrative procedures, the

preservation of a fragile national identity, and the conservation of power among the powerful and the wealthy. Without addressing this question, our society can develop in a way that is irreversible when tools of unprecedented efficiency and capacity become leveraged to further deepen the divide and exacerbate the discrepancies that do not favour the weak and the vulnerable.

This framework is written by a practitioner with a hybrid vantage point; someone who has navigated the system first as a newcomer trained in political science and then as an immigration sector practitioner at both national policy-adjacent and provincial frontline delivery levels. However, this work is not a complete answer to the question. This work is for instigating serious contemplation, research, and policies that will develop comprehensive tools and structures for the human society of Canada. It is an effort to commence forming a unified country that can advance for the good of the people and not just for the selected, powerful proportions of the population.

## B. The Global Dimension: A Framework for the Century

Three-Way Integration Framework was designed in and for Canada. But the problem it addresses is not a Canadian problem. It is the defining governance challenge of the twenty-first century for a specific and growing category of countries that are :

- *moving toward demographic dependence on immigration;*
- *carrying unresolved or newly emerging tensions between an arriving immigrant population and a native-born population experiencing the pressures of rapid demographic change;*
- *having, but not all, an Indigenous or long-term resident population whose relationship to the territory predates the state's modern- day governance.*

Furthermore, the cases examined below were selected based on two criteria:

1. *Demographic pressure from below-replacement fertility that creates a structural immigration dependence;*
2. *An unresolved governance tension between a native-born population experiencing rapid demographic change and an arriving immigrant population without adequate integration architecture.*

They are intentionally selected because they illustrate a key convergence even when the Indigenous dimension of Canada is not shared. *What happens when the governance architecture fails to anticipate the permanence of the populations it imports?*

The comparison is structured as a most-different systems analysis on cultural and institutional dimensions, with immigration governance outcomes as the dependent variable.<sup>16</sup> The finding across all cases indicates that governance designed for temporary labour importation produces permanent governance failure when the temporary workers become permanent residents without an updated institutional framework that reflects the realities of the entire population, which has evolved over time with the integration of temporary and permanent residents.

---

<sup>16</sup> This analysis method is based on the Most Different Systems Design that is widely used for comparative politics research. It compares cases that have different characteristics (independent variable) but a common outcome (dependent variable), which in this case is the immigration governance outcomes. See: Albert J. Mills, Gabrielle Durepos, and Elden Wiebe, "Most Different Systems Design," *Encyclopedia of Case Study Research*, (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, Inc., 2010): 571-72. <https://doi.org/10.4135/9781412957397.n211>

## B.1 The Global Demographic Shift: Immigration as Structural Necessity

The demographic arithmetic of the next fifty years is clear. Fertility in the Global North fell below the replacement rate of 2.1 in the early 1980s and has not recovered.<sup>17</sup> Without immigration, population decline and substantial increases in average age will disrupt labour markets, threaten the fiscal sustainability of pension systems, and slow economic growth across the developed world. It is already being lived by the people. For most high-income countries, immigration is not a political choice. It is a structural demographic requirement for survival. The question is not whether these countries will choose to receive immigrants. It is a question of under what conditions, through what governance arrangements, and with what consequences for the people already inside them, those countries will welcome immigrants. They may choose not to receive immigrants at all like some Western European countries. Regardless of their chosen policy, immigration will nevertheless constantly appear on their agenda.

The OECD projects that the population aged 65 and over in member states will rise from 17.4 percent in 2017 to 27.1 percent by 2050, meaning that roughly one in ten people will be over 80 within the working lives of people currently entering the workforce.<sup>18</sup> The increasing fiscal pressure of this shift driven by growing pension obligations, rising healthcare costs, and a shrinking tax base is already driving immigration policy in countries that otherwise would not have considered it as a policy option for their demographic continuity.

## B.2 South Korea: The Canary and the Design Challenge

South Korea is the leading edge of the global demographic crisis.<sup>19</sup> With a total fertility rate of 0.75 in 2024, the lowest in the world and less than one-third of the 2.1

---

<sup>17</sup> OECD, *Society at a Glance 2024: OECD Social Indicators* (Paris: OECD, 2024), chapter on fertility trends; United Nations, *World Population Prospects: The 2022 Revision* (New York: United Nations, 2022).

<sup>18</sup> OECD, *Pensions at a Glance 2023: OECD and G20 Indicators* (Paris: OECD, 2023), chapter on old-age dependency ratios.

<sup>19</sup> The "canary in the coal mine" characterization appears in multiple sources, including Korea Economic Institute of America, "South Korea's Population Crisis," *KEI Policy Brief* (Washington, D.C.: KEI, 2023).

replacement rate, South Korea is on a noticeably negative trajectory.<sup>20</sup> The South Korean government spent the equivalent of far more than \$200 billion USD over fifteen years on fertility incentive programs with negligible impact.<sup>21</sup> The population peaked at approximately 51.7 million in 2024 and is projected, under median demographic scenarios, to fall to below 38 million by 2070, with the median age increased to around 62 and the size of the population aged 65 or more being larger than the working population.<sup>22</sup> As a country on the small, lower half of a peninsula that is even smaller than the province of Québec, with the majority of the population concentrated in its capital city, Seoul, and the immediate vicinity, such a decrease in the population will not only dismantle the country's socioeconomic balance but will also lead to dysfunctional rural communities, forcing a complete restructuring of the politics and the economy on the national scale. South Korea in half a century may not be the country we know today.

Foreign workers are already filling the structural gap. South Korea's Employment Permit System (EPS), established in 2004 under the Act on Foreign Workers' Employment, manages the importation of temporary labour primarily from sixteen designated sending countries in Southeast and South Asia.<sup>23</sup> Despite formal labour protections in the legislation, the EPS has been consistently documented by the National Human Rights Commission of Korea, international human rights monitors, and by the academic literature. Conditions of structural exploitation are criticized: employer-tied permits, wage theft, dangerous living and working conditions, and negligible pathways to permanent settlement.<sup>24</sup> As of 2023, South Korea's foreign worker population exceeded one million, while the formal integration infrastructure remains underdeveloped relative to the scale of the labour dependency.<sup>25</sup>

---

<sup>20</sup> Statistics Korea (KOSTAT), *2024 Birth Statistics* (Seoul: Statistics Korea, February 2025).

<sup>21</sup> Randall S. Jones, "Korean Policies to Reverse the Decline in the Fertility Rate Part 1: Balancing Work and Family," *The Peninsula*, Korea Economic Institute, June 22, 2023, <https://keia.org/the-peninsula/korean-policies-to-reverse-the-decline-in-the-fertility-rate-part-1-balancing-work-and-family/>

<sup>22</sup> Statistics Korea (KOSTAT), *Long-term Population Projection: 2020-2070* (Seoul: KOSTAT, 2021).

<sup>23</sup> Korea Legislation Research Institute, *Act on the Employment of Foreign Workers*, No. 6967 (2003), last amended on June 10, 2022, by Act No. 18929, Republic of Korea; Ministry of Employment and Labor (Republic of Korea), *Employment Permit System Annual Report 2023* (Seoul: MOEL, 2024).

<sup>24</sup> Human Rights Watch, *'Caught in a Web': Migrant Workers Under South Korea's Employment Permit System* (New York: HRW, 2023); National Human Rights Commission of Korea (NHRCK), *Status of Human Rights Violations Among Foreign Workers* (Seoul: NHRCK, 2022).

<sup>25</sup> Ministry of Justice (Republic of Korea), *Korea Immigration Service Statistics 2023* (Seoul: MOJ, 2024)

The Korean national identity is among the most cohesive and ethnically homogeneous across the globe. Constructed over centuries and reinforced by a decades-long educational and cultural apparatus that treated ethnic Korean-ness as a core national attribute, it creates conditions in which even Koreans who have lived abroad for extended periods find themselves perceived as different and non-Korean by the Koreans who never moved out of the country. The Korean diaspora in Canada, the United States, and across Southeast Asia is large and one of the most economically successful diasporas. Nevertheless, for various reasons, including the ongoing state of military conflict with North Korea, the South Korean state's relationship to that diaspora has been managed primarily through preferential visa categories for ethnic Koreans (H-2 visa) rather than through a general immigration framework that acknowledges non-ethnic immigration as a structural feature of South Korea's future.<sup>26</sup>

As such a homogeneous nation, the multinational integration challenge in South Korea today is primarily between the Korean state, the native population, and multicultural families. It is important to note that the size of the multiracial or multicultural Korean population has been increasing with the importation of a working population. South Korea does not have an Indigenous population in the sense that Canada does. The Korean people are the native inhabitants of the Korean Peninsula. Sometimes, Koreans are miscategorized as being in the same ethnic group as Chinese and Japanese people. Koreans are a distinct ethnic group, and for thousands of years, Koreans have resisted countless Chinese invasions, survived two detrimental Japanese attacks, and claimed independence after thirty-five years of brutal Japanese colonial rule at the end of the Second World War. Sandwiched between two powerful nations, their survival has engraved the conservation of ethnic identity as an uncompromising basis for a promising future for the Koreans.

However, the world is changing. While South Korea still has a deeply cohesive native-born population with a strong identity, there is a growing temporary foreign worker population that is structurally exploited and socially isolated and a governance architecture that has not resolved the tension between demographic necessity and cultural resistance.

---

<sup>26</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Republic of Korea), *Overseas Koreans Act* (Act No. 5955, 1999, last amended 2022); see also: John Lie, *Multiethnic Korea? Multiculturalism, Migration, and Peoplehood Diversity in Contemporary Korea* (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, UC Berkeley, 2014).

The framework's logic that the native-born population, the immigrant population, and the state cannot produce sustainable outcomes without a governance architecture that serves them all applies in South Korea with the adjustments necessary for the definition of the three engaged groups. In South Korea's case, in less than a decade, it could centre on building a governance structure embracing ethnically homogeneous Koreans, the families where one of the parents is a non-Korean individual, and the more recently imported foreign talent who needs a permanent home on the small, mountainous peninsula.

The precedent that matters most for South Korea's immediate situation is Germany's. West Germany, facing analogous demographic pressures in the 1960s and 1970s, built a *Gastarbeiter* (guest worker) model that assumed temporary labour importation without settlement. Communities of Turkish, Yugoslavian, and later North African origin who had been present in West Germany for two or three generations remained legally and socially marginalized until the formal recognition of Germany as an *Einwanderungsland* (immigration country) was encoded in law in 2000.<sup>27</sup> Around 12,000 South Korean women also moved to Germany to work as nurses as part of the *Gastarbeiter* model, and many settled there permanently.<sup>28</sup> The political cost of the delayed acknowledgement was substantial. The lesson is not that the guest worker model was wrong from the start. Rather, it is that the refusal to design governance for the reality the model produced, a permanent immigrant population, created decades of unnecessary fragmentation and social cost. South Korea may be at approximately the same turning point West Germany occupied in the early 1980s but in a world that is ever more technologically advanced, where information can hardly be fully controlled by the state beyond the central media and where K-culture has gained international attention at a scale that the country has never seen.

---

<sup>27</sup> Rita Chin, *The Guest Worker Question in Postwar Germany* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Ulrich Herbert, *A History of Foreign Labor in Germany 1880-1980* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1990); and for the basis of the 2000 reforms: Wolfgang Seifert, "Social and Economic Integration of Foreigners in Germany," in Peter Schuck and Rainer Münz, eds., *Paths to Inclusion: The Integration of Migrants in the United States and Germany* (New York: Berghahn Books, 1998).

<sup>28</sup> Hye-Sim Na, "South Korean Nurses to West Germany: Reassessing the Role of the State in Postwar Global Labour Migration," *Histoire Sociale/Social History* Vol. 52, No. 105 (2019). <https://doi.org/10.1353/his.2019.0009>

## B.3 Japan: The Demographic Option Not Taken

Japan presents a second variant of the same challenge. With a total fertility rate of approximately 1.20 in 2023 and a population that peaked at 128 million in 2008 and has been declining since, Japan faces a working-age population contraction projected to shrink the labour force substantially over the next three decades.<sup>29</sup> Japanese policymakers have officially maintained that Japan is not an immigration country while quietly importing hundreds of thousands of workers annually through technical training programs, student visa pathways, and specialized skilled worker categories that collectively function as de facto immigration without the governance infrastructure of an acknowledged settlement.<sup>30</sup>

Japan's foreign resident population reached approximately 3.96 million as of mid-2025, which accounted for 3 percent of the total population, growing at approximately 5 percent per year.<sup>31</sup> At current rates, foreign residents could comprise 10 to 15 percent of Japan's population by 2070. However, Japan's integration policies remain among the weakest in developed economies without a formal anti-discrimination framework covering nationality. Their educational support for foreign children is not strong, the political participation of foreign residents is negligible, and the social architecture is not adapting to embrace the permanent residence of the working population that it is importing.<sup>32</sup> This observation will need a serious reassessment as Japan's recent change of political leadership may lead the country to a completely non-immigration path that may deepen the existing gap of governance for settlement.

## B.4 The Common Pattern and the Framework's Transferable Logic

Across these cases of Canada, South Korea, Japan, Germany, and beyond, a

---

<sup>29</sup> Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (Japan), *Vital Statistics of Japan 2023* (Tokyo: MHLW, 2024); Statistics Bureau of Japan, *Population Estimates* (Tokyo: Statistics Japan, 2024).

<sup>30</sup> This characterization was made formally by Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga in 2018 (November 2, 2018, press conference) in response to the expansion of the Specified Skilled Worker visa category. It reflects longstanding official policy; see: Gabrielle Vogt, "Japan's Immigration Policy: Stagnation or Transformation?" in Erin Aeran Chung and Saadia Pekkanen, eds., *Immigration and Integration in East Asia* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2021).

<sup>31</sup> Immigration Services Agency of Japan, *Statistics on Foreign Residents* (Tokyo: ISA, July 2025).

<sup>32</sup> Kenji Ito, "Integration Without Multiculturalism: Japan's Approach to Immigration Governance," *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 48, no. 12 (2022): 2891-2908; OECD, *Recruiting Immigrant Workers: Japan 2024* (Paris: OECD, 2024).

common structural pattern is visible. Countries that need immigration for demographic survival tend to design governance for immigration as a labour supply mechanism rather than as a society-building process. They import workers with the assumption that they will leave once their work contracts terminate without addressing what those workers will need to become full participants in the society being built around them. They create categories of temporary or conditional membership that extract economic contribution without explicitly including those foreign workers in the distribution of social returns. Furthermore, they manage the tensions this produces through narrative rather than governance redesign, presenting immigration as an economic necessity, a humanitarian obligation, or a policy of multicultural enrichment, leaving the structural architecture unchanged for the maintenance of power, stability, and privilege rightfully enjoyed by the core, local populations.

TWIF proposes a different starting question. Instead of asking, "How do we manage immigration to serve our demographic and economic needs?" It asks, "How do we design the governance of immigration so that everyone who lives in this country, those arriving, those who were born here, and those whose governance predates the state can advance together?" It is not an attempt to find and construct a utopia. It is to see the core of all related problems by stripping off the layers of governance that stand on a pile of sand. It is a governance design question. It needs to be asked, developed into something implementable, and practiced before the society continues to build what is destined to collapse under the weight of the very energy put into its construction.

It is, with respect for the native norms and cultures of all those countries, better late than never. The world we knew post-World Wars and the Cold War is no longer the world we now live in post-globalization. Ethnic homogeneity has become less of a characteristic innate to a country's welfare than it was in the 2000s. With technical acceleration, unity among people beyond physical borders is becoming increasingly important. The world is evolving fast. But are the inhabitants of the world keeping pace with modern-day evolution that is currently led by a few multinational corporations with no humanitarian agenda?

## C. The Socioeconomic Dimension: Why Mutual Advancement Is the Core Objective

The Three-Way Integration Framework was designed in its early formulations as a socioeconomic integration framework. That design was accurate but incomplete. The framework was built around a question that is fundamentally economic in its motivation: *why can the three groups not live better together on this vast land wealthy in abundant natural resources?* It has grown since into something wider through analysis: a governance redesign that addresses not only economic outcomes but also the social, institutional, political, and identity conditions that the economic outcomes of a country depend on. This section examines the socioeconomic dimension specifically: what the framework may change in material terms and for whom.

### C.1 The Mutual Advancement Premise

The premise of the framework is that the three groups' economic conditions are not independent. They are produced by the same governance architecture, and they constrain each other. Indigenous economic exclusion is not separate from immigrant underemployment. Both are features of a system that extracts labour value without distributing returns equitably, operates without Indigenous co-governance on Indigenous territories, and misaligns demographic growth with productive capacity. Canadian-born Canadians' housing unaffordability and per capita income stagnation are not separate from these dynamics. They are downstream effects of the same governance failures: a labour market flooded with precarious workers who suppress wages across sectors, a housing market whose supply constraints are partly rooted in governance fragmentation over land use, and an economic model that grows its total output by adding people rather than by improving what each person already in the country produces.

The mutual advancement premise holds that addressing these structural roots produces simultaneous improvements across all three groups. This is not an argument that everyone benefits equally from every intervention. In fact, it may be hard to argue that immigrants will necessarily have any material benefits once the current governance

structure embodies the framework. It is not even certain that Canadian-born Canadians will enjoy any financial enhancements. However, it is an argument that the governance changes the framework proposes do not produce winners and losers in a zero-sum distribution. They expand the productive base that all three groups draw from. It may even fortify the Canadian national identity in a holistic manner so that less precarity may persist with the increasing number of immigrants, refugees, and asylum seekers in the country. Canadians might find it clearer what identity as a national would work best for them and, as such, have a stronger grounding for refusing the admission of those who may compromise domestic stability.

## C.2 What Structural Change Would Produce For Immigrants

The most direct socioeconomic impact of the framework's governance mechanisms, such as the labour-economic alignment mechanism and the co-designed integration programming mechanism, would be a reduction in immigrant underemployment and credential non-recognition. The OECD's *Settling In 2023* report found that Canadian immigrants with foreign credentials are among the most underemployed relative to their educational attainment of any OECD member state, with only 38 percent of internationally educated professionals working in their trained field.<sup>33</sup> In many European OECD states, the match rate for highly regulated professions is higher, as recruitment is more tightly coupled with certification. Canada's "points-as-human-capital" system often decouples admission from actual licensing, leading to a mismatch between imported high-skilled labour and the jobs available in Canada, where the credential recognition layer amplifies the complexity and worsens economic outcomes. Even among immigrants with foreign credentials hired, they earn 18 percent less than Canadian-born workers with equivalent education.<sup>34</sup> These gaps represent a substantial waste of human capital that suppresses both immigrant household income and the economy's overall productivity. If all the wasted talent decides to leave Canada together one day, what critiques can reasonably be made against them?

---

<sup>33</sup> OECD, *Settling In 2023: Indicators of Immigrant Integration* (Paris: OECD, 2023).

<sup>34</sup> OECD, *Settling In 2023*, chapter on labour market outcomes; see also: Statistics Canada, "Earnings of Immigrants and Canadian-Born Workers," *The Daily*, (Paris: OECD, April 2023).

Aligning immigration recruitment with regional economic needs would produce measurable improvements in immigrant employment outcomes. Considering Indigenous economic development priorities in the newcomer labour market integration programming would allow newcomers to enter the labour market with actual relationships to the regional economic actors who are hiring, rather than entering a generic national labour market with misaligned expectations. The framework does not eliminate credential barriers through administrative fiat. It creates governance relationships between the actors who determine the credentials that are valued and the immigrant communities whose credentials are systematically undervalued.

Beyond the labour market, the framework's honest narrative mechanism has an economic dimension that is rarely quantified. Immigrants who understand the actual governance structure of the country they are entering make better decisions about where to settle, what occupations to pursue, and what governance relationships to build – or whether to remain permanently or exit when they still have financial capital and the willpower to make a difficult, life-saving decision for only themselves. The mismatch between the recruitment narrative and the economic reality produces a form of structural disorientation that has real economic costs, such as onward migration, labour market exit, and the psychological toll of unmet expectations. Unless the credential recognition processes were intentionally designed to create local jobs and extract the financial and labour capital from the internationally trained professionals for national economic gains, the importance of the honest narrative mechanism is undeniable.

There is a deeper dimension that economic analysis alone does not capture. The immigrant experience in Canada is shaped not only by labour market conditions but also by the social architecture of the country: the frictions, political tensions, and unresolved governance conflicts between the two foundational groups – Indigenous Peoples (the owners of this land) and the Canadian-born population (the inheritors of the socially constructed state built upon it). Immigrants arrive in the space between these two groups, often without realizing the existence of this space or that its contested nature directly determines the room available for newcomers to establish themselves. The social distortions produced by the unresolved Crown-Indigenous relations (the litigation culture, the contested land decisions, the periodic crises of institutional legitimacy) narrow the

economic and civic space into which immigrants can integrate. Resolving the foundational governance tension, even partially, expands that space. A country that has achieved a working trilateral governance order has more social room for newcomers. More civic belonging is available, more institutional trust to draw on, and more regional economic development aligned with real labour demand manifesting in the real lives of all who occupy the same space. The immigrants already in Canada would benefit from this expanded space as much as those yet to arrive. The framework does not ask immigrants to carry the burden of resolving that tension. It asks the Canadian state to restructure governance so that the tension can be productively managed, providing the space immigrants were promised when they chose this country.

## For Indigenous Peoples

First, it is important to note that the following view is not an Indigenous-informed view. This is the view of the author who does not self-identify as an Indigenous Canadian. The framework concentrates its socioeconomic impact for Indigenous Peoples in two domains: economic development alignment and governance cost reduction. The foundational estimate comes from Sharpe and Arsenault's work at the Centre for the Study of Living Standards (CSLS), whose 2009-2010 modelling demonstrated that closing the education and labour-market gaps between Indigenous and non-Indigenous Peoples would generate approximately \$36.5 billion in additional annual economic output.<sup>35</sup> This figure has since become a central benchmark in Canadian inequality and inclusion research as well as the cost-of-doing-nothing logic. The Assembly of First Nations and CSLS have updated the methodology using 2016 and 2021 Census data, confirming that the economic losses associated with persistent gaps remain substantial.<sup>36</sup> The National Indigenous Economic Development Board (NIEBD) has adopted the same gap-closure logic in its national progress reports, framing these losses as the measurable cost of systemic

---

<sup>35</sup> Andrew Sharpe and Jean-François Arsenault, *Investing in Aboriginal Education in Canada: An Economic Perspective*, CSLS Research Report 2010-03 (Ottawa: Centre for the Study of Living Standards, 2009).

<sup>36</sup> Assembly of First Nations and Centre for the Study of Living Standards, *Closing the First Nations Education Gap in Canada: Assessing Progress and Estimating the Economic Benefits - An Update* (Ottawa: AFN/CSLS, 2022); Assembly of First Nations and Centre for the Study of Living Standards, *Closing the First Nations Education Gap in Canada: 2021 Census Update* (Ottawa: AFN/CSLS, 2024).

exclusion.<sup>37</sup> Indigenous Services Canada (ISC) uses the Sharpe-Arsenault framework to track socio-economic disparities across education, employment, income, and housing.<sup>38</sup> Meanwhile, national bodies such as Engineers Canada apply the model to quantify the economic impact of Indigenous underrepresentation in skilled professions and regional labour markets.<sup>39</sup> The consistent conclusion across these works is that Canada forfeits tens of billions of dollars annually because Indigenous Peoples remain structurally excluded from the economic development occurring on or near their territories. Maximizing utility is fundamental to increasing productivity, and yet, Canada continues to undermine its own growth by failing to align Indigenous human capital with the natural resources and economic opportunities situated on Indigenous lands.

The labour-economic alignment mechanism through which Indigenous economic development plans inform immigration recruitment in affected territories creates a particular governance relationship. Indigenous communities gain access to the labour skills their development plans require, rather than watching those skills be imported for the benefit of non-Indigenous enterprises operating on their territories. The framework does not argue that this unambiguously guarantees Indigenous economic development, especially with the absence of Indigenous contributions in the framework. However, it does remove a specific governance obstacle that has been present in the current bilateral state-Indigenous relations. It removes the absence of Indigenous input in regional labour recruitment, leveraging immigration that currently prevents Indigenous development plans from being aligned with the demographic and labour strategies of the state.

The territorial co-governance mechanism further addresses a critical economic and legal gap in Canadian federalism by reducing the litigation and conflict costs that currently stem from Crown decisions made without adequate Indigenous consent. Nigel Bankes (2016) argues that the current legal architecture upheld by the current legal architecture upheld by the "wait and see" approach of the courts systematically excludes

---

<sup>37</sup> National Indigenous Economic Development Board, *National Indigenous Economic Progress Report* (Ottawa: NIEDB, 2019; 2024).

<sup>38</sup> Indigenous Services Canada, *An update on the socio-economic gaps between Indigenous Peoples and the non-Indigenous population in Canada: Highlights from the 2021 Census* (Ottawa: ISC, 2023): <https://www.sac-isc.gc.ca/eng/1690909773300/1690909797208>

<sup>39</sup> Engineers Canada, *Engineers Canada's Operational imperative 9: Indigenous access to engineering* (Ottawa, 2019) and *Indigenous engineering in Canada* (Ottawa, 2021): <https://engineerscanada.ca/reports/indigenous-engineering-in-canada#-executive-summary>

Indigenous Nations from the legislative design phase, treating reconciliation as a reactive hurdle rather than a proactive partnership.<sup>40</sup> This structural exclusion forces Indigenous communities to rely on the courts to halt projects after they have already been greenlit, a process the Canada Energy Regulator (CER) has documented as a primary cause of multi-year infrastructure delays and "deadweight" economic loss.<sup>41</sup> Moving toward a co-governance model that achieves consent at the design stage, rather than a consultation that is challenged in court, fundamentally derisks the Canadian economy. The resulting reduction in friction costs flows broadly, securing the fiscal stability needed to fund services for Indigenous communities, investors, and the broader native-born Canadian population alike.

The deepest benefit the framework offers Indigenous Nations is not economic. It is constitutional. The history of Crown-Indigenous relations in Canada since Confederation has been, in structural terms, the progressive erosion of Indigenous governance authority over decisions affecting Indigenous territories. Immigration governance is one of the most significant of those decisions. It is a matter of who settles on Indigenous lands, in what numbers, with what cultural expectations, and oriented toward what economic relationships. The bilateral state-immigrant model has managed this question entirely without Indigenous input for 158 years (1867-2026). The framework proposes the restoration of Indigenous governance authority over this dimension of territorial management. Not as a gift from the Crown, but as the exercise of rights that were never legitimately surrendered. An increase in the size of the immigrant population in the absence of Indigenous participation means, in other words, a direct diminution of the proportionate Indigenous presence on Canadian territory.

This raises a question that must be addressed directly. Why would Indigenous Nations choose to engage with immigration governance at all, rather than asserting complete sovereignty over their territories and refusing participation in a colonial governance architecture? The question is legitimate. Glen Coulthard's analysis of the politics of recognition and Audra Simpson's politics of refusal both represent intellectually serious responses to

---

<sup>40</sup> Nigel Bankes, "The Duty to Consult and the Legislative Process: But What About Reconciliation?" ABLawg, (December 20, 2016). <https://ablawg.ca/2016/12/21/the-duty-to-consult-and-the-legislative-process-but-what-about-reconciliation/>

<sup>41</sup> Canada Energy Regulator (CER), *2023–24 Annual Report of the Commission of the Canada Energy Regulator* (Calgary: CER, 2024), Appendix C.

this question. The framework does not dismiss those responses.<sup>42</sup> Rather, it proposes a different answer, grounded in the distinction between recognition politics and sovereignty assertion. Engaging with immigration governance through a co- governance model in which Indigenous Nations hold decision-making authority, not advisory roles, is not a concession to the Canadian state. It is the reassertion of a governance function that Indigenous Nations held before contact, which was never legitimately extinguished. Indigenous Nations rightfully have the authority to determine the terms on which newcomers settle on Indigenous territories. Pre-contact Indigenous Nations managed relationships with newcomers through complex diplomatic and governance protocols. The colonial period suppressed this governance tradition but did not eliminate its legal or moral foundation. What this framework proposes is the restoration of that function in a contemporary institutional form. It is not asking Indigenous Nations to legitimize Canadian sovereignty but asking the Canadian state to acknowledge that its immigration authority cannot be legitimately exercised without Indigenous co- governance of the territorial dimensions of that authority.

The practical benefits of this restoration are real and measurable. A governance architecture in which Indigenous economic development plans inform regional immigration recruitment creates a direct pathway that allows Indigenous communities to shape the demographic and labour conditions of their territories to align with their own development priorities. It converts immigration from a process that simply takes place on Indigenous territories into a process that Indigenous Nations participate in designing. Through practice rather than declaration, it produces the principle that the Canadian state's authority over settlement is bounded by Indigenous governance rights. This principle extends far beyond immigration into the challenging question of what Indigenous sovereignty means in a 21st-century context, which may serve as an important pillar of reconciliation in Canada.

---

<sup>42</sup> Audra Simpson, *Mohawk Interruptus: Political Life Across the Borders of Settler States*, (Durham: Duke University Press, 2014).

## For Canadian-Born Canadians

Although Canada is constructed on Indigenous land, the contributions of generations of Canadians to building this country are not disputable. Canadians have built this country, and this fact should not be undermined. It is not a question of who has done more of what. It is wrong to ignore the hard work of Canadians simply to acknowledge the large contributions of immigrants as well. In fact, the settlers and their initial descendants were, technically, immigrants. Customary practice is a fundamental element in constructing and supporting international law, a regime that legitimizes Canadian sovereignty without a challenge. The absence of Indigenous contributions to the customary practice in the international norm is true. Nevertheless, this framework does not rebuke the legitimacy of the Canadian state or degrade the centuries of investments, efforts, and devotion of the Canadian-born Canadians. Canada has become a country today where immigrants and Indigenous Peoples can live in relatively high security and respect for human rights compared to some other places around the globe – this is thanks to the Canadians. Furthermore, today's Canadians are not the settlers who initially conquered this land, and the distinction is crucial. This framework argues for the mutual advancement of the three groups in a single country, not in a divided land of multinational substates. The latter is not the way for Canada.

Overall, the core argument is that empowering the marginalized populations does not only maximize the utility of capital but also reduces the political tensions overwhelming the society and thus makes administrative processes for building Canada more seamless. What good is there in holding on to a political superiority if it means fracturing society, the economy, and communities? Such fractures inevitably damage the entire population inhabiting the land, although a significantly small number of beneficiaries would always exist. The core argument rests on three subarguments.

First is the realization of per-capita income growth. As documented in Section 2 of this framework, Canadian real GDP per capita grew by just 1.9 percent in total between 2014 and 2023. It was the worst performance in the G7 and one that the OECD projects will remain near the bottom of its member states through 2060.<sup>43</sup> This stagnation is directly related to an immigration model that adds population faster than it adds productivity. However, this does not

---

<sup>43</sup> John T. Phelan, "The Frozen North: Canada's Economic Stagnation," *The Daily Economy*, (April 3, 2025); *OECD Economic Surveys: Canada 2025* (Paris: OECD, 2025).

mean that removing a percentage of the newly admitted population will eventually remedy the situation beyond some short-term thin patches. While decreasing the size of the immigrants may lessen the burden put on the core infrastructure (health, education, housing, etc.), there will be a sudden reduced inflow of capital that previously benefited from the large influx of immigrants. When communities welcome more people, the number of providers of goods and services naturally increases, meaning that an unexpected, not curated drop in the size of immigrants inevitably leaves a vacuum of demand that results in harm to the suppliers and the economy further. Thus, rather than severely reducing the size of beneficiaries of social services, it is crucial to strengthen the structure that is already in place first. A governance architecture that aligns immigration with Indigenous economic development is one example of maximizing what Canada already has, while it would also reduce immigrant underemployment. This builds institutional relationships between demographic growth and absorptive capacity, improving per capita output rather than simply increasing the aggregate size of the economy.

Second, housing pressure. An aggressive increase in the arrival of immigrants has not been the only factor contributing to housing unaffordability. Recent findings show that the failure to build adequate housing relative to population and income growth in large metropolitan areas like Toronto and Vancouver was already signalled in 2003-2004.<sup>44</sup> Today's problem of limited social housing stock is a result of conditions created prior to 1996; 87 percent of the social and affordable housing stock was created back then.<sup>45</sup> Thus, housing pressure was caused by another governance failure. Today, as CMHC has documented, Canada would need to build 430,000 to 480,000 homes annually by 2035 to restore affordability, against current completions of approximately 259,000 units per year.<sup>46</sup> A sudden reduction in the number of demands for housing supply will not solve the larger economic problem; again, the existence of demand for housing also suggests that there are suppliers of goods and services who are meeting other demands besides housing for these increased populations. Instead, a framework that aligns regional immigration targets with housing

---

<sup>44</sup> Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation (CMHC), "Canada's Housing Supply Shortages: Estimating what is needed to solve Canada's housing affordability crisis by 2030," *The Housing Observer* (June 22, 2022). <https://www.cmhc-schl.gc.ca/observer/2022/canadas-housing-supply-shortage-restoring-affordability-2030>

<sup>45</sup> Office of the Parliamentary Budget Officer, *The Evolution of Canada's Social Housing Stock*, (Ottawa, 2025): <https://www.pbo-dpb.ca/en/additional-analyses--analyses-complementaires/BLOG-2425-008--evolution-canada-social-housing-stock--evolution-parc-logements-sociaux-canada>

<sup>46</sup> Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation (CMHC), "Housing Starts Up 5.6% in 2025 from 2024," News Release (January 16, 2026). <https://www.cmhc-schl.gc.ca/media-newsroom/news-releases/2026/housing-starts-december-2025>

supply capacity and that connects demographic planning to Indigenous land governance in ways that unlock co-development, rather than blocking it, would produce better housing supply trajectories in the medium term. Moreover, Indigenous co-governance would appease certain relations with some of Indigenous Nations across the country, easing the process for development plans – again, a simultaneous take on reconciliation.

Third, institutional trust. As Environics Institute tracking data has documented, the proportion of Canadians who felt immigration levels were too high rose from 27 percent in 2022 to 58 percent in 2024.<sup>47</sup> This was the most rapid shift in public opinion on this question since surveying began in 1977. Although opinions have eased slightly, with 56 percent responding that Canada was accepting too many immigrants in 2025,<sup>48</sup> this collapse of public confidence is not primarily a reaction to immigrants themselves. Abacus Data's 2023 and 2025 surveys found that the underlying concern is a "scarcity and precarity mindset," a perception that the governance system is running out of capacity.<sup>49</sup> Governance that is visible, aligned with stated objectives, and demonstrably producing improvements for all three groups would restore the institutional legitimacy that the current architecture has spent a generation eroding.

There is a fourth argument for Canadian-born Canadians that transcends domestic economics. It is an argument about Canada's position in the world and the national maturity required to occupy that position credibly. Canada's population is aging. Without sustained immigration, Canada faces the same demographic trap as Japan and Italy: an inverted population pyramid in which a shrinking working-age population supports an expanding retired population, producing declining productivity, strained public services, and long-term economic contraction. Immigration is not optional for Canada's demographic future. It is structurally necessary.

---

<sup>47</sup> Environics Institute for Survey Research, *Canadian Public Opinion About Immigration and Refugees - Fall 2024* (Toronto: Environics Institute, 2024). Available at: <https://www.environicsinstitute.org/projects/project-details/canadian-public-opinion-about-immigration-and-refugees---fall-2024>

<sup>48</sup> Environics Institute for Survey Research, *Canadian Public Opinion About Immigration and Refugees - Fall 2025* (Toronto: Environics Institute, 2025). Available at: <https://www.environicsinstitute.org/projects/project-details/canadian-public-opinion-about-immigration-and-refugees---fall-2025>

<sup>49</sup> Abacus Data, *Thresholds and Tensions: Unmasking Public Unease with Canada's Immigration Goals*, survey conducted November 9-12, 2023 (Ottawa: Abacus Data, 2023); Abacus Data, *Canadians' Views on Immigration Remain Largely Unchanged from Last Year*, survey conducted October 2025 (Ottawa: Abacus Data, 2025).

The question is not whether to receive immigrants but on what governance terms. If the domestic conditions of Canada cannot be stable while the population continues to age to a point where the younger generation can no longer support seniors and provide for the vulnerable, Canadian sovereignty will inevitably be threatened, and its place within the international society will be weakened.

Canada currently ranks among the world's top nations for global soft power. The Brand Finance Global Soft Power Index 2026 placed Canada eighth overall, third for overall reputation, behind only Switzerland and Japan, and first globally for being seen as tolerant and inclusive.<sup>50</sup> [40] Ipsos polling of more than 23,000 respondents across 30 countries in 2025 found that 80 percent of global respondents expected Canada to have a positive influence on world affairs, which is the highest rating of any country surveyed.<sup>51</sup> This reputational capital is genuinely rare and valuable. It attracts talent, investment, international partnerships, and the kind of diplomatic influence that no military or economic spending can buy. The external world's view of Canada as the country of polite, safe streets and magnificent nature is one distinguishing factor that allows Canada to be competitive in the international migration scene. Again, people are a valuable resource, and Canada must retain its comparative advantages in attracting human capital.

More specifically, that reputation rests on a widely accepted promise that Canada is a country that has learned, better than most, how to manage differences among various nations: how to build a functioning, prosperous society from people of different origins, languages, cultures, and histories that began before Confederation, all taking space in Canada. The immigration crisis of the 2022-2024 period demonstrated that this promise is under pressure. Public trust declined. The credibility of the multicultural model weakened. The gap between the narrative and the reality of governance became visible. If Canada resolves that gap by building a governance architecture that succeeds in delivering on the promise of equitable, trilateral, territory-conscious integration, Canada will be the first to have made an achievement in the world. It will have built the first model of trilateral integration governance that other demographically challenged OECD countries can study,

---

<sup>50</sup> Brand Finance, *Canada ranks 8th, recognised for ease of business, appealing lifestyle, and political stability in Global Soft Power Index 2026* (20 January 2026). <https://brandfinance.com/press-releases/canada-ranks-8th-recognised-for-ease-of-business-appealing-lifestyle-and-political-stability-in-global-soft-power-index-2026>

<sup>51</sup> Ipsos, *Canada Viewed as Most Positive Leader on World Stage*, (14 November 2025): <https://www.ipsos.com/en-ca/canada-viewed-most-positive-leader-world-stage>

adapt, and adopt. South Korea, Japan, Germany, and Australia are all navigating versions of the same or similar governance problem. They are watching what Canada does. Canada already has the institutional infrastructure. Our 45 years of settlement sector experience, a national language benchmarking system, provincial nominee programs, and a sophisticated civil, democratic society are what makes Canada different and ahead.

What Canada lacks is an efficient governance architecture connecting this infrastructure to the territorial and sovereignty questions the bilateral model cannot address. It is an irony that is being revealed, since such a bilateral model has been constructed for the safety of the Canadian public, for protecting the Canadian sovereignty, and for ensuring Canada's continued advancements. But changes in today's world have been outpacing Canada's old governance systems. A revision of the governance system is now required. For Canadian-born Canadians, this is not an abstract benefit. It is a matter of living in a country that is either managing its demographic transition efficiently or one that is helplessly overtaken by the negative consequences. It is not a question only for the vulnerable. This question is for everyone, and those who are most rooted in Canada will benefit the most eventually.

## C.3 Canadian Identity Before Anglophone and Francophone Canada

The governance failures it identifies are not only economic. They are political in the exclusion of Indigenous Nations from decisions that implicate their sovereignty. They are social in the narrative misalignment that leaves all three groups without an accurate shared understanding of the country they inhabit. They are institutional in the bilateral governance architecture that cannot accommodate the trilateral political reality of Canada.

They are, at their deepest level, about identity: about who owns and belongs to Canada, in what ways, and on whose terms.

Canada is a unified state of ten provinces and three territories. Each province and territory is unique, and what it means to be a Canadian can be drastically distinct. A Canadian in Québec is a Québécois. A Québécois is not an Albertan. An Albertan is not a British Columbian, even though they are both Anglophones. But from a Québécois's point of view, perhaps all Albertans, British Columbians, Ontarians, and every other anglophone Canadian may seem like one group. The Anglophone-Francophone divide within the country is real, and it has been further complicated by recent immigration priorities of the federal government. When multiculturalism is part of the Canadian identity, this Anglophone-Francophone divide does not belong to that category. Being an Anglophone and a Francophone means having two separate ethnic roots. Even worse, recent Francophone immigration prioritization across Canada, outside of Québec, has added extra ethnic layers to Francophone Canada. While recent Francophone immigrants are admitted through privileged selection criteria for their French language competencies, their ethnic, historical, and cultural backgrounds have not been taken into consideration. It has been a simple method of increasing the numbers that mean something to the state. It has not been, though, a careful construction of a population base that will share a common identity. Francophone immigrants come from around the world, and the complexity cannot be simplified under a language category. Even the French language has various versions and linguistic politics involved that need careful understanding more than quantification for the purpose of precise policy enactment. It is another governance failure that needs to be addressed in another research work, for which this framework will provide a foundation to

build. When the definition of being a Canadian is shifting radically, a problem that has existed for a far longer period in the country needs to be addressed first to lay the groundwork for state growth and maturity. Let us not forget the French and British conflicts that shaped this country before Confederation without a full integration of the two groups.

TWIF began as a socioeconomic integration concept. It has grown, through analysis, into something broader. The socioeconomic framing remains valid and important. It is the most politically accessible entry point for the framework that avoids areas of political sensitivity to a degree that becomes unmanageable. This would be the language that persuades the largest number of people that a governance redesign serves their interests. This is not to create a political divide. It is an effort to begin something that may soothe the rising political tensions that we see in Canada between the three groups. Turning the energy of those tensions to productive research, policies, and programs for Canada's development is one of the goals of this framework.

However, the framework cannot be reduced to pure economics either. It is a governance design for a country that has not yet built the institutional architecture adequate to what it has been becoming: a multinational state on contested territory, receiving immigrants from across the world, where the question of equal distribution of opportunity and support is not answered by the market or by demography. It is being answered, badly, by a governance architecture that was built for a simpler, less honest version of that country that would have worked for the previous generation who had less access to technology, information, and cultural dilemmas. The world was more binary back then. Now, it has become ever more interconnected, and the Canadian demography we see today is a prime example. Culture is no longer part of some identity. Culture has solidified its place as an element of soft power at a level that was not foreseen by mainstream political scientists who relied more on the structural analysis of state relations.

Eventually, decisions are made by human beings. At least, they still are. Human beings are emotional beings. Personal preferences, ideas, and interests do matter when making decisions for the public. Even the public develops its own variations of preferences. Culture plays a key role in the formation of such preferences. When the state has welcomed millions of newcomers into this country of vast land and ambiguous national identity, it has opened doors for pluralistic multicultural identity formations established

through relationships between those who entered and the ones who were already in the country, as well as lasting communion among those who arrived to achieve their own life goals based on the premises pronounced by the Canadian state. What this framework suggests at the core is the benefit of advancing beyond the recognition of diversity. By creating a platform of scholarship on ways of achieving an actual integration of the three groups, Canada may have a chance at developing a national identity that will fortify the country's foundation for advancements.

Think of Chinatowns and the people who self-identify as being of Chinese origin by place of birth or ethnicity. Chinatowns add significant cultural aspects to North American cities that are often vibrant and touristic. Nevertheless, with all respect, the question is whether the Chinese populations spread across the North American continent and parts of Europe have been a manifestation of the integration or relocation of one great nation into foreign lands. By having those culturally rich and symbolic Chinatowns in every major Canadian city, are we coexisting on the land with the Chinese people, or are they left to form their own societies on this vast land? In other words, are we really occupying the same space together, or are we setting up physical divides marked by cultural heritage buildings and intangible lines in our cities for maintaining cultural comfort zones? Growing social concerns and criticisms about how certain ethnic groups are overtaking parts of the vast Canadian territory, setting up their own businesses run entirely in their own language for customers who speak their language, and practicing religious activities out in the streets regardless of the Canadian cultural norms – all of this may have had some precursors that serve as culturally legitimizing agents for such practices to be accepted into Canadian society. The question is not whether ethnic communities should exist. They are legitimate and valuable expressions of cultural continuity. More precisely, the question is whether their existence represents the integration architecture working or the integration architecture's absence.

The framework proposes something more honest and more functional. It is a gift for the new generation that is maturing into adulthood all the while technological advancements have begun to raise fundamental questions about education, employment, ethics, and myriad components that build a human society. Without addressing the core problems, advancements made will result in consequences that may further deepen social

inequalities. It is not purely an economic question. It is about human identity. This is the right time to seek cohesion, if it is not too late.

## C.4 Attempt to Reverse the Cost of Segmentation

Canada's social policy architecture is built around separate streams. There is one stream for immigrants: settlement programming, language training, credential recognition pathways, and employment bridging programs. There is another stream for Indigenous Peoples: the ISC-funded community services, reconciliation programming, and economic development initiatives. There is another for Canadian-born Canadians: mainstream labour market programs, housing supports, and social services. These streams were designed with specific populations in mind. But they were not designed for the reality that these populations inhabit the same territories, compete for the same housing, enter the same labour markets, and are governed by the same fiscal architecture. Separation into segmented budgets and funding streams has led to duplications and inefficiencies that can be reduced for the good of all involved.<sup>52</sup>

Such separation fosters exactly what it claims to prevent. When immigrant settlement organizations are funded to serve newcomers and Indigenous organizations are funded to serve their communities, with no structural relationship between the two mandates, the result is inefficient misunderstandings and growing distance. It is pointless competition for the distribution of the same tax money, duplication of administrative overhead, and a policy landscape in which a Francophone immigrant in Treaty 7 territory and a Tsuut'ina Nation economic development officer are both navigating federal funding processes without any mechanism for their interests to align. Although it was not intended to compartmentalize them on a similar horizon, the system is designed to stimulate unnecessary tensions.

The Three-Way Integration Framework proposes that this segmentation is not a design oversight. It is a structural feature of the bilateral model. When the state manages immigrants and manages Indigenous Peoples through separate departmental silos with no interdepartmental coordination mechanism linking their mandates, it administratively

---

<sup>52</sup> Suggested reading: Herman Bakvis and Luc Juillet, *The Horizontal Challenge: Line Departments, Central Agencies and Leadership*. (Ottawa: Canada School of Public Service, 2004).

reproduces the same exclusion that it produces constitutionally. Indigenous Peoples are not present in the immigrant settlement architecture. Immigrants are not present in the Indigenous economic development planning. Canadian-born Canadians experience the downstream consequences of both gaps without a policy instrument that names the connection.

Holistic advancement is not a rhetorical aspiration. It is a governance design requirement. Canada cannot afford the administrative luxury of segmentation. Canada needs immigration for demographic survival, with unmet Indigenous economic development capacity continuing alongside immigrant underemployment, all the while watching Canadian-born Canadians lose confidence in institutions that cannot explain why the system produces outcomes no one designed it to produce. The framework proposes coordination not as an idealistic gesture toward inclusion. It is not a question of diversity, inclusion, and equity. It is a fiscally and socially rational response to a fragmentation that is costing all three groups simultaneously. The group that will benefit from the framework the most could, in fact, be the Canadian-born Canadians, who undeniably contribute the most to the country's government budgets.

# 1. Introduction: Three Groups, One Broken Architecture

Canada is not managing a diversity problem. It is managing a governance problem. The country has accumulated, over several decades, a set of demographic and economic arrangements that serve aggregate statistics well and serve most of the people within them poorly. The Three-Way Integration Framework is an attempt to diagnose that governance failure at its structural root, proposing a design correction that is specific enough to be implemented, honest enough to acknowledge what it cannot do, and grounded enough in the actual conditions of Canadian life to be taken seriously by the people it is meant to help.

The framework identifies three grouped identities whose situations are structurally connected, even though they are almost never discussed in relation to each other. The first group is immigrants. The framework defines this term broadly and in identity terms, not merely in legal ones. Immigrants include everyone who has come to Canada from outside with some degree of promised residence: people on study permits, work permits, and open work permits; candidates for permanent residence through provincial nominee and federal pathways; permanent residents; sponsored family members; refugees; and naturalized citizens. It does not include visitors.

This definition requires some notes on a few elements:

First, while all temporary resident visas are issued to the successful applicants based on the premise of leaving Canada before the visa's expiration date, the complexity of population management, retention of the best talent, and the personal relationships built between the foreign nationals and this country all add to an important assumption that this framework makes - when someone arrives in Canada legally and refrains from illegal and harmful activities, that individual is welcome to stay, live in, and root themselves in Canada and become a new Canadian. Second, legal status changes over time, but immigrant identity does not flip with the issuance of a citizenship certificate. First-generation immigrants remain immigrants in their self-understanding and in how they are perceived by others, regardless of legal status. Their children born in Canada are, however, Canadian-born Canadians and they do not share the

same identity as their parents, and thus, they are grouped separately. Nevertheless, the immigrant identity dilutes across generations and it does not disappear overnight with naturalization. This distinction is important and another framework will be needed.

The second group is Indigenous Peoples: First Nations, Métis, and Inuit. These are the peoples whose governance systems predate the Canadian state, whose territories are the physical ground on which all immigration policy unfolds, and who have been structurally excluded from decisions about who settles on their lands and how. This group is internally diverse across governance traditions, territorial relationships, legal statuses, and cultural communities. What they share, for the purposes of this framework, is that their relationship to Canada is fundamentally different from both immigrants and Canadian-born Canadians: it is the relationship of peoples whose sovereignty preceded the state that now governs their territories.

The third group is Canadian-born Canadians: every person born in Canada who is not Indigenous and not a naturalized citizen. Again, this includes the children and grandchildren of immigrants, who carry a different identity from their parents even if those parents are still living. It includes descendants of early settlers, descendants of twentieth-century immigration waves, and second-generation Canadians whose parents arrived as immigrants but who were themselves born here. This group is not culturally homogeneous. What it shares is a particular relationship to Canada as the country they were born into. They are de facto Canadians by birth, and it is nearly impossible to separate their identity from the country itself. The national narrative was presented to them as their inheritance, and they experience its failures not as the betrayal of a promise they were recruited with but as the deterioration of something they were simply born expecting.

These three groups find themselves navigating core problems in modern-day Canadian society, which are considered proof that the system is broken. These include economic stagnation, housing unaffordability, declining institutional trust, and a political discourse that offers simple narratives about who is to blame but not enough structural accounts of what went wrong and how to fix it. Fixing a broken system is not only about creating what it lacks. Having the confidence and belief to revisit the core failures – the governance system that is not suited to realize what narratives have long promised – is an important step to be taken.

The framework's central argument is this: these three situations are not separate. They are produced by the same bilateral immigration model, a governance architecture in which the Canadian state manages the flow of people onto territories it does not unambiguously own, without the participation of Indigenous Nations whose jurisdiction is implicated, without the systemic alignment of demographic growth with economic capacity, and without an honest account of what Canada actually is. Canada, a multinational country with unresolved constitutional relationships, is being offered to immigrants as a country of hope and stability as they arrive and taught to Canadian-born Canadians as they come of age within it.

## 1.1 The Three Grouped Identities: Definitions

The framework operates with three grouped identities. These are not legal categories, though they interact with legal categories. They are identity groupings – a description of how people relate to Canada, to each other, and to the governance structures that shape their lives. Each group contains internal variations. Groupings are analytical tools, not social prescriptions.

### Immigrants

The framework defines immigrants as everyone who has come to Canada from outside, regardless of their current legal status. This includes international students on study permits; temporary foreign workers on employer-specific or open work permits; provincial nominee candidates and federal economic immigration candidates awaiting permanent residence; refugees at all stages of their protection claims; permanent residents; and naturalized citizens. Legal status changes across this trajectory, but immigrant identity does not change at the same rate or in the same way. A person who arrived in Canada at age 30, spent five years on a work permit, obtained permanent residence, and was naturalized at age 40 does not cease to be an immigrant on the day of their citizenship ceremony. Their self-understanding, their social networks, their experience of the Canadian labour market and housing system, and their relationship to Canadian institutions all carry the marks of the immigrant condition. This identity does not disappear with naturalization. The title changes, but the inner being does not change overnight with

announcements. In fact, it dilutes across generations: the children of immigrants, born in Canada after their parents obtained permanent residence, are not immigrants in this framework. They are Canadian-born Canadians. The grandchildren are more so. The identity fades with generational distance from the original immigration event.

Within the immigrant group, there is significant internal variation by origin country, history, culture, language, racialized identity, credential background, socioeconomic status, legal pathway, and regional settlement pattern, among others. Again, the complexity of Francophone immigrants arriving in this country cannot be simplified under a categorization using French as the single standard. This categorization simply ignores the long histories of French colonial rule that left a tremendous legacy but also remnants of discrimination, exploitation, and social divides that continue in many of the origin countries from which the modern-day Francophone immigrants come. They are not all French. The meaning of "Francophone" shall be revisited in immigration policy, unless the state is intentionally building another imperialist approach favouring specific nationals from the "French Motherland."

These subvariant identities matter for policy design. A Francophone immigrant from Senegal navigating a minority-language labour market in Manitoba has a different experience from a Mandarin-speaking engineer on a work permit in Vancouver, even if both are captured by the same legal and identity category. The framework acknowledges such intersectionality while maintaining grouping for the purposes of governance design that targets the foundation of Canadian identity.

The choice to organize this framework around identity rather than legal status requires explicit justification. Legal status is administratively tractable but inadequate for sound governance. A person who arrives at age 30, holds a closed work permit for three years, obtains permanent residence, and naturalizes at age 36 moves through four distinct legal categories. Their governance needs, their structural position in the labour market, their relationship to credential recognition barriers, and their experience of the integration architecture do not reset at each legal threshold. Organizing governance around legal status would require designing four distinct governance relationships for the same person across a decade. Organizing it around identity, which persists, dilutes gradually, and shapes behaviour across all legal stages, produces a more accurate

account of the governance challenge and a more coherent institutional response. The cost of this choice is reduced administrative legibility. That cost is acknowledged and is addressed in the implementation mechanisms using legal status as a proxy for determining which governance mechanisms apply at each stage.

## Indigenous Peoples

The framework uses Indigenous Peoples to describe First Nations, Métis, and Inuit, which constitutes the full range of Indigenous Peoples in Canada, not only the federally recognized First Nations. These are the peoples whose governance predates the Canadian state, whose territorial relationships are recognized (partially and imperfectly) in Section 35 of the Constitution Act (1982) and in UNDRIP as implemented through Bill C-15 (2021), and whose position in relation to immigration governance is categorically different from that of both immigrants and Canadian-born Canadians. Indigenous Peoples are not being integrated into Canada. They are the original governance authorities on whose territories Canada was built. They are the identities that existed on this land, and they can contribute to the founding block of true integration beyond recognizing diversity.

Within this group, internal variation is substantial across governance traditions, territorial scope, legal relationships with the Crown, linguistic communities, and urban versus land-based residence patterns. First Nations, Métis, and Inuit each have distinct governance structures, histories, and relationships with federal and provincial governments. Métis governance, through organizations like the Métis National Council and the Métis Nation of Ontario, operates under different legal frameworks than First Nations band governance. Inuit governance, through Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and regional organizations like Nunavut Tunngavik Inc., operates in distinct territorial contexts. The framework does not treat Indigenous Peoples as a unified actor. It treats them as a grouped identity with shared governance significance in relation to immigration, while requiring that specific applications of the framework engage the specific governance bodies whose territorial and jurisdictional authority is at stake.

## Canadian-Born Canadians

Canadian-born Canadians are everyone born in Canada who is not Indigenous and not a naturalized citizen. This definition is straightforward with one important nuance: the second generation. The children of immigrants, born in Canada after their parents obtained permanent residence, are Canadian-born Canadians in this framework, even though they must navigate hyphenated cultural identities, perhaps live in primarily immigrant-community social environments, and often experience racialized barriers throughout their lives. The extent, nature, and material conditions of their experiences as a subcategory of the Canadian-born Canadian group have similarities to those of the first-generation immigrants but are sufficiently distinct enough to be treated separately. They were born into Canada when their parents chose to settle in this country, which mimics the early-day settler generations who eventually established their own statehood after years of coexistence with Indigenous Peoples.

Canadian-born Canadians are internally heterogeneous. They include people whose ancestors arrived centuries ago as settlers; people whose grandparents arrived in the early twentieth-century immigration waves and whose origins have largely dissolved into a generalized Canadian identity; people whose parents arrived more recently and who carry strong cultural connections to those origins; and people across every income, regional, and linguistic profile. What they share is not a unified cultural identity but a birthright relationship to Canada, a country they were born into, whose governance structures they inherited rather than chose, and whose failures they experience as the deterioration of something they were born expecting rather than the betrayal of a promise that recruited them.

### 1.2 What This Framework Is Not

This framework is not a theory of Canadian multiculturalism. The multicultural framework already exists, embedded in law through the Canadian Multiculturalism Act (1988), and has produced genuine social goods alongside the structural problems identified in this work. This framework does not replace it. It supplements it by addressing the governance gap that multicultural policy was never designed to fill: 1) The absence of Indigenous Nations from the institutional architecture through which immigration and

integration are managed; 2) The increasing cultural complexity of the populations admitted under linguistic categorizations without an understanding of their intertwined history, identity differences, and cultural tensions that already exist; 3) The modern-day Canadians who have better access to information, technology, and cultural interactions with the outside world that diminish their trust in the government's immigration and integration policies.

This framework is not primarily a critique of any political party or government. The structural conditions it describes have developed over decades and across governments of different political affiliations. The Trudeau era (2015-2025) is examined in detail because it represents the period of most rapid demographic change and the most visible misalignment between immigration policy objectives and governance reality. However, the governance architecture that produced those conditions was not created by one government and will not be simply fixed by changing the government in power without addressing the social complexities that cannot be merely removed physically.

This framework is not a critique of those who developed existing legal frameworks. It is, however, an argument that Canada's core constitutional arrangements in immigration governance are structurally inadequate given UNDRIP's adoption in 2021, the Kebaowek decision of 2025, and the Tsilhqot'in precedent of 2014. The frameworks in place were designed for a legal and political context that no longer fully exists. Updating governance architecture in response to constitutional evolution is not radical. It is what legitimate states do.

This framework is not an academic argument that requires a university affiliation to advance. It is a practitioner's framework that is developed by someone who has lived and worked inside the system first as a Francophone international graduate student in political science in Québec; as a South Korean applicant who waited 3.5 years for the Canadian permanent residency through COVID; as a bilingual project officer for national language projects supporting newcomers outside of Québec; and as an economic immigration expert who worked in the field, developing relations with authorities, employers, regulatory bodies, community organizations, and those who would not pay attention to the value in addressing Francophone integration in the Anglophone province of British Columbia. This multidimensional vantage is not incidental to the framework's design. This is not a

development of a theory. This is an insider account with an intention to contribute to improving a country, the vast land the author has spent more than a decade navigating across four provinces as a visible outsider.

### 1.3 Structure of This Document

Section 2 documents the conditions that make the framework necessary: the scale of demographic change, the economic stagnation on which it has been layered, the collapse of public trust, and the housing and affordability crisis that is the most immediate expression of governance failure. Section 3 develops the theoretical engine: a focused, monolithic analytical architecture rather than a library of frameworks. Section 4 addresses the constitutive tensions the framework must navigate honestly. Section 5 presents the institutional design of the three-way governance architecture. Section 6 examines comparative cases. Section 7 develops a theory of change. Section 8 presents recommendations. Section 9 identifies the research and development work that remains and needs to be further developed. The bibliography provides full citations for all sources.

## 2. The Conditions: What Has Actually Happened in Canada

This section sets out the context by documenting the empirical conditions – demographic, economic, and social – that the Three-Way Integration Framework is responding to. The data are drawn from Statistics Canada, the OECD, IRCC (Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada), CMHC, and independent survey research organizations.

### 2.1 Demographic Change at Scale

Between 2015 and 2025, Canada underwent one of the most rapid demographic transformations in its modern history.<sup>53</sup> According to recent Statistics Canada data, the country admitted a total of 3,589,613 new permanent residents during this decade.<sup>54</sup> Annual permanent resident admissions rose from 323,188 in 2015/2016 to a peak of 493,236 in 2021/2022, before beginning a planned descent to 435,421 in 2024/2025. While the government initially set a target of 500,000 for 2025, this was revised downward to 395,000 in October 2024,<sup>55</sup> with subsequent targets of 380,000 for 2026 and 365,000 for 2027.<sup>56</sup>

The most dramatic shift occurred within the temporary resident population, where the rapid scaling of channels such as study permit holders – who grew from 353,000 in 2015 to over one million by 2023 – and temporary foreign workers, who exceeded 605,000 by 2022,

---

<sup>53</sup> LIPdata.ca, *Permanent Residents Arrivals 2015 to July 2025*, the Local Immigration Partnership data portal, available at: [https://lipdata.ca/indicator/newpermanentresidentsarrivals2015toJuly2025/#~:text=PermanentResidentsArrivals2015toJuly2025,\(2024ranking\)20January2015%E2%80%93July2025](https://lipdata.ca/indicator/newpermanentresidentsarrivals2015toJuly2025/#~:text=PermanentResidentsArrivals2015toJuly2025,(2024ranking)20January2015%E2%80%93July2025)

<sup>54</sup> Statistics Canada. *Table 17-10-0008-01 Estimates of the components of demographic growth, annual*, release date: 2025-09-24. Available at: <https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/t1/tbl1/en/cv.action?pid=1710000801>; last accessed on April 3, 2026

<sup>55</sup> IRCC, *Notice – Supplementary Information for the 2025-2027 Immigration Levels Plan*, (24 October 2024). Available at: <https://www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/news/notices/supplementary-immigration-levels-2025-2027.html>

<sup>56</sup> IRCC, *SOCI – 2026–2028 Immigration Levels Plan – November 17, 2025*. Available at: <https://www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/corporate/transparency/committees/soci-nov-17-2025/levels.html>

fuelled unprecedented growth.<sup>57</sup> Net non-permanent residents (NPRs) surged from 35,448 in 2015/2016 to a high of 781,075 by 2023/2024. This contributed to Canada adding approximately 1.25 million people in 2023 alone, marking the fastest population growth rate since 1957.<sup>58</sup> However, the 2024/2025 data reflect a significant policy pivot, resulting in a net decrease of 14,954 NPRs as annual outflows (691,114) began to outpace inflows (676,160).

The 2026-2028 Immigration Levels Plan confirmed a sustained policy pivot. Permanent resident targets were stabilized at 380,000 annually through 2028, while temporary resident targets were reduced from 673,650 in 2025 to 385,000 in 2026, showing a reduction of more than 40 percent in a single year.<sup>59</sup> As of January 1, 2026, Statistics Canada estimated 2,676,441 non-permanent residents in Canada.<sup>60</sup> The scale of the temporary resident reduction reflects a belated acknowledgement that the governance architecture for temporary populations had expanded beyond the absorptive capacity of the housing, credential recognition, and labour market systems it was designed to complement.

As of 2021, immigrants represented approximately 23 percent of Canada's total population, more than 8.3 million people, marking the highest proportion since Confederation and the highest share among G7 countries.<sup>61</sup> This demographic reliance is underscored by the fact that between 2016 and 2021, 80 percent of the growth in the Canadian labour force was driven by immigration. By 2023, immigration, primarily through temporary channels, accounted for nearly 90 percent of total population growth, as the gap between annual births (368,928) and deaths (334,699) continued to narrow.

---

<sup>57</sup> Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), *Settling In 2023: Indicators of Immigrant Integration*, (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2023).

<sup>58</sup> Statistics Canada, *Population Estimates, Fourth Quarter 2023. Table 17-10-0008-01*, (Ottawa, 2024).

<sup>59</sup> IRCC, *2025 Annual Report to Parliament on Immigration*, (Ottawa: Government of Canada, 2025) <https://www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/corporate/publications-manuals/annual-report-parliament-immigration-2025.html>

<sup>60</sup> Statistics Canada, "Estimate of the Number of Non-Permanent Residents (January 1, 2026)," *Immigrants and Non-Permanent Residents Statistics* (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 2026). [https://www.statcan.gc.ca/en/subjects-start/immigration\\_and\\_ethnocultural\\_diversity/immigrants\\_and\\_nonpermanent\\_residents](https://www.statcan.gc.ca/en/subjects-start/immigration_and_ethnocultural_diversity/immigrants_and_nonpermanent_residents)

<sup>61</sup> Statistics Canada, *Immigration and Ethnocultural Diversity: Key Results from the 2021 Census. Catalogue No. 98-200-X2021001*, (Ottawa, 2022).

<b>Table 1. Summary of Key Demographic Changes (2015-2025)</b>		
<b>Category</b>	<b>Key Metric / Period</b>	<b>Data Value</b>
<b>Permanent Resident</b>	Total Admissions (2015–2025)	3,589,613 residents
	Peak Annual Admissions (2021/2022)	493,236
	2025 Revised Target (Oct 2024)	395,000
<b>Temporary Residency</b>	Net NPR Surge (2023/2024)	+781,075
	Policy Pivot (Net NPR 2024/2025)	-14,954 (Net decrease)
	Study Permit Holders (2023)	1,000,000+
	Temp. Foreign Workers (2022)	605,000+
<b>Population Growth</b>	Total Growth (2023 Calendar Year)	~1.25 million
	2023 Growth Rate	3.2% (Fastest since 1957)
	Migration Contribution to Growth	90%
<b>Historical Context</b>	Immigrant Share of Population (2021)	23% (Highest since Confederation)
	<b>Natural Increase (Births minus Deaths)</b>	<b>Narrowing (Births: ~369k vs. Deaths: ~335k)</b>

## 2.2 Economic Performance: The Per Capita Problem

Aggregate economic statistics presented by the federal government during this period were misleading in a specific and consequential way. Total GDP did grow; Canada achieved the second-fastest total GDP growth in the G7 between 2014 and 2023. However, GDP per capita told a completely different story as the measure of economic output per person, which more closely reflects living standards.

Between 2014 and 2023, Canadian real GDP per capita grew by just 1.9 percent in total, being the worst performance in the G7 and less than a third of Germany's growth over the same period.<sup>62</sup> Canadian GDP per capita was lower in 2023 than it was in 2018. By 2023, Canada's GDP per capita had slipped below the OECD average for the first time.<sup>63</sup> The wealth gap between the US and Canada widened. The OECD's long-range projection placed Canada dead last among OECD member states for per capita GDP growth from 2020 to 2060, with one of the least favourable economic recoveries after COVID.<sup>64</sup> In 2023, Canada's GDP per capita declined by roughly 1.7 percent, the worst performance in the G7 despite total GDP growing by 1.1 percent. This indicates that 100% of the growth was driven by a larger population rather than increased efficiency. Consequently, while the national 'economic pie' expanded, the individual 'slice' for the average Canadian has retreated to 2017 levels, effectively wiping out six years of improved living standards.

The deterioration continued into 2025. In the fourth quarter of 2025, Canada's economy contracted, making it the only G7 nation to see negative growth in that period.<sup>65</sup> The OECD's updated projections now place Canada 39th out of 39 OECD member states for economic growth through 2030, confirming that the per capita stagnation documented above is not a temporary condition but a structural trajectory.<sup>66</sup>

---

<sup>62</sup> John T. Phelan, "The Frozen North: Canada's Economic Stagnation," *The Daily Economy* (3 April 2025).

<sup>63</sup> CBC News, "Canada is getting poorer when compared to its wealthy peers, data shows," (12 September 2024). Available at: <https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/canada-gdp-per-capita-rich-1.7318989>; Statistics Canada. *GDP per Capita: Perspectives on the Return to Trend*. Economic and Social Reports (April 2024).

<sup>64</sup> TD Economics, *Mind the Gap: Canada Is Falling Behind the Standard-of-Living Curve* (Toronto: TD Bank Financial Group, 2023); Business Council of British Columbia, "Canada's Post-Pandemic Economic Recovery Was the 5th Weakest in the OECD." *Insight* (2024).

<sup>65</sup> Statistics Canada, "Gross Domestic Product, Income and Expenditure, Fourth Quarter 2025," *The Daily* (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, February 27, 2026). <https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/daily-quotidien/260227/dq260227a-eng.htm>

<sup>66</sup> Niagara Independent, "A Look at Canada - by the Numbers," (March 2026). <https://niagaraindependent.ca/a-look-at-canada-by-the-numbers/>; OECD, *OECD Economic Surveys: Canada 2025* (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2025). [https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/oecd-economic-surveys-canada-2025\\_28f9e02c-en.html](https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/oecd-economic-surveys-canada-2025_28f9e02c-en.html)

In practical terms, Canada was growing its economic pie while giving everyone inside it a smaller slice. Real incomes stagnated. The economic landscape for Canadian households has faced significant headwinds in the post-pandemic era. According to the Canadian Income Survey (CIS), the median after-tax income of Canadian families and unattached individuals was \$70,500 in 2022.<sup>67</sup> When adjusted for inflation, this represents a 3.4% decline in real terms compared to 2021, where the inflation-adjusted median was \$73,000 (in 2022 constant dollars). This downturn marks a pivot from the 2021 baseline of \$68,400 in current dollars, a period characterized by significant government transfers. The subsequent erosion of purchasing power is further evidenced by Statistics Canada reports published in 2024, which indicate that nearly half of Canadians now struggle to meet day-to-day expenses due to rising prices. This data suggests that while nominal wages may be rising, they have failed to keep pace with the inflationary pressures and the cessation of pandemic-era supports, leading to a measurable contraction in the standard of living for the median Canadian household. Young Canadians under 35 were the only age group whose income growth failed to keep pace with inflation between 2020 and 2025, falling roughly 8 percentage points below the national average, creating a “generational income divide.”<sup>68</sup>

The distinction between total GDP growth and per capita growth is not a technicality. When a government reports strong economic growth driven by population expansion through immigration, while per capita incomes stagnate and living costs rise, it is presenting the performance of the economy in a way that systematically obscures the experience of the people inside it. This is not an argument against immigration, and it only shows correlation, not the full causation. It is an argument that purely immigration-driven population growth is not a substitute for structured state governance and policies for stimulating productivity growth. In fact, conflating the two damages public trust in both economic management and immigration policy. The failure of the state’s governance lies in the absence of meticulously orchestrated cross-departmental policy design that

---

<sup>67</sup> Statistics Canada, *The Daily – Canadian Income Survey, 2022*, Catalogue no. 11-001-X, released on 26 April 2024, available at: <https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/daily-quotidien/240426/dq240426a-eng.htm>; Statistics Canada, *The Daily – Canadian Income Survey, 2021*, Catalogue no. 11-001-X, released on 2 May 2023: <https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/daily-quotidien/230502/dq230502a-eng.htm>.

<sup>68</sup> RBC Economics, "Stagnating Income Threatens Wealth Gains for Young Canadians," (November 2025). <https://www.rbc.com/en/economics/canadian-analysis/featured-analysis/insights/stagnating-income-threaten-wealth-gains-for-young-canadians/>

prioritizes the prosperity of the host population while assuring the preservation of immigrants' dignity.

<b>Table 2. Summary of Key Economic Figures Presented</b>		
<b>Category</b>	<b>Key Metric / Statistic</b>	<b>Data Value / Detail</b>
<b>Aggregate vs. Per Capita</b>	Total GDP Growth Rank (2014–2023)	2nd Fastest in the G7
	Real GDP Per Capita Growth (Total)	1.9% (Worst in G7)
	Comparison to Germany	Less than 1/3 of Germany's growth
	2023 Per Capita GDP Change	-1.7% (Decline)
<b>Living Standards</b>	Real GDP Per Capita Level (2023)	Retreated to 2017 levels
	OECD Average Comparison	Slipped below OECD average in 2023
	Median After-Tax Income (2022)	\$70,500
	Real Income Change (2021–2023)	-3.4% (Inflation-adjusted decline)
<b>Generational Divide</b>	Under-35 Income Growth (2020–2025)	Failed to keep pace with inflation
	Under-35 vs. National Average	8 percentage points below average
<b>Long-Term Forecast</b>	OECD Growth Projection (2020–2060)	38th (Dead last) among member states
<b>Growth Drivers</b>	Population-Driven Growth (2023)	100% of total GDP growth

## 2.3 Housing: A Structural Crisis, not a Cyclical Problem

No single material condition has done more damage to public confidence in Canadian governance in the 2020s than housing. The collapse of housing affordability is structural in origin, long in development, and not amenable to short-term correction. For a country of 41.6 million people that has most of its population spread across only five large metropolitan areas,<sup>69</sup> the housing crisis is structural with various factors involved that must be addressed in further detail, and it is not a cyclical problem related to immigration alone.

Since 2004, Canada's home price-to-income ratio has risen by over 80 percent, and it was the largest deterioration of any country in a 13-country OECD comparison over the same period.<sup>70</sup> Real house prices outpaced real disposable income growth by approximately 60 percent since the Global Financial Crisis.<sup>71</sup> In Vancouver, the homebuying affordability ratio (measuring mortgage costs as a share of gross household income) reached 99 percent by 2024, meaning a median Vancouver household would spend virtually all of its gross income on housing.<sup>72</sup> The national ratio was 54 percent in 2024, up from 39 percent in 2019. CMHC estimates that Canada would need to build 430,000 to 480,000 homes annually by 2035 to restore pre-pandemic affordability (2004-2015 levels), meaning an additional 3.5 million units beyond the current projections. This is a rate significantly higher than the approximately 259,000 units completed in 2025.<sup>73</sup>

More than one in five Canadian households (22 percent) spent over 30 percent of their income on shelter costs in 2022.<sup>74</sup> For renters, the figure was 33 percent, more than double the rate for homeowners. Homelessness increased by 38 percent between 2018 and late 2022, according to point-in-time counts.<sup>75</sup> In the Toronto metropolitan area, 19.6

---

<sup>69</sup> OECD defines large metropolitan areas as having a population of 1.5 million or more: OECD, *Urban population by city size*, last accessed on April 9, 2026. <https://www.oecd.org/en/data/indicators/urban-population-by-city-size.html>

<sup>70</sup> Missing Middle Initiative, "Canada vs. the World: The Worst Record on Housing Affordability Since 2004." (November 3, 2025). <https://www.missingmiddleinitiative.ca/p/canada-vs-the-world-the-worst-record>

<sup>71</sup> OECD, *OECD Economic Surveys: Canada 2025*, (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2025).

<sup>72</sup> CMHC, *Canada's Housing Supply Shortages: Moving to a New Framework*, (Ottawa: CMHC, 2025).

<sup>73</sup> CMHC, "Housing Starts Up 5.6% in 2025 from 2024," *News Release* (January 16, 2026). <https://www.cmhc-schl.gc.ca/media-newsroom/news-releases/2026/housing-starts-december-2025>

<sup>74</sup> Statistics Canada, "Housing Challenges Related to Affordability, August 2 to September 15, 2024," *The Daily* (November 19, 2024).

<sup>75</sup> Housing, Infrastructure and Communities Canada, *Homelessness Programs and Point-in-Time Counts*, (Ottawa: Government of Canada, 2023).

percent of rental units were in payment arrears by 2023.<sup>76</sup> Nearly half of Canadians (45 percent) reported being very concerned about their ability to afford housing in 2024.<sup>77</sup> Eighty-two percent said that lack of affordable housing was contributing to a shrinking middle class, while seventy-four percent of the survey respondents believe that this has negative impacts on the integrity of communities.<sup>78</sup>

CMHC's 2026 Housing Affordability Composite Index, released in February 2026, confirmed that the affordability crisis has spread beyond Toronto and Vancouver to Ottawa, Montreal, and Halifax.<sup>79</sup> This is showing a geographic expansion that further demonstrates the structural rather than local character of the governance failure. While modest improvements in homeownership affordability have been observed since 2023, the index shows that affordability has eroded across three distinct waves since 2001, and conditions remain at historically poor levels in most major markets.<sup>80</sup>

Rapid immigration-driven population growth is one of many contributing factors to housing pressure. However, it is incorrect to claim that immigration is the only reason for Canada's housing crisis. Housing supply constraints are rooted in zoning policy, municipal approvals processes, construction productivity, and decades of underinvestment in social housing. None of this is caused by immigration; these are administrative processes that have not incorporated increasing population growth that has been stewarded by the federal government at the national level. The problem lies in the discrepancy between national policies and municipal practice, often supplemented by the lack of efficient communication and top-down policy design that are insufficiently informed by local realities.

Thus, it is a failure of the federal government's decision to expand immigration targets dramatically without a coordinated housing strategy informed by municipal hearings and regional consultations that reflect the needs and realities of specific areas, such as economic profiles, Indigenous governance, and available infrastructure at a time when housing supply already failed to meet existing demand. It produced a pressure that

---

<sup>76</sup> OECD, *OECD Economic Surveys: Canada 2025*, (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2025).

<sup>77</sup> Statistics Canada, November 19, 2024.

<sup>78</sup> Habitat for Humanity Canada, *2024 Affordable Housing Survey* (Toronto: Habitat for Humanity Canada, 2024). <sup>79</sup> CMHC, "Beyond Toronto and Vancouver: Housing Affordability Challenges in Canada," *CMHC Observer* (February 25, 2026). <https://www.cmhc-schl.gc.ca/observer/2026/beyond-toronto-vancouver-affordability-challenges-spread-across-canadian-cities>

<sup>80</sup> Ibid.; CMHC, "Housing Starts Up 5.6% in 2025 from 2024."

was predictable and was not adequately addressed. This is again a governance failure, not a problem caused by the people who entered this country without being properly informed before making decisions that would have a lasting impact on their own lives as well as those of the host population.

<b>Table 3. Summary of Key Figures Related to Housing Crisis</b>		
<b>Category</b>	<b>Key Metric / Statistic</b>	<b>Data Value / Detail</b>
<b>Market Affordability</b>	Home Price-to-Income Rise (since 2004)	+80% (Largest deterioration in 13-OECD study)
	Real Price vs. Disposable Income Gap	Prices outpaced income by ~60% (since GFC)
	Vancouver Affordability Ratio (2024)	99% of gross household income
	National Affordability Ratio (2024)	54% (Up from 39% in 2019)
<b>Social &amp; Shelter Impact</b>	Shelter-to-Income Stress (All Households)	22% spend over 30% of income on housing
	Shelter-to-Income Stress (Renters)	33% (More than double the rate for owners)
	Increase in Homelessness (2018–2022)	+38% (Based on point-in-time counts)
	Rental Arrears (Toronto, 2023)	19.6% of units
<b>Public Sentiment</b>	Concern over Housing Affordability (2024)	45% of Canadians "very concerned"
	Impact on Middle Class Stability	82% believe it is shrinking the middle class
	Impact on Community Integrity	74% believe it negatively impacts communities
<b>Future Requirements</b>	Required Annual Builds (to 2035)	430,000 – 480,000 units
	Total Supply Gap	3.5 million additional units
	Current Completion Rate	~259,000 units per year

## 2.4 The Collapse of Public Trust

Public attitudes toward immigration in Canada shifted with unusual speed and breadth between 2022 and 2024. The proportion of Canadians agreeing that there is "too much immigration" declined steadily from 45 percent in 2000 to a historic low of 27 percent in 2022 that showed exceptional support for immigration. It then reversed by 31 percentage points in two years, reaching 44 percent in 2023 and 58 percent by 2024, the most rapid change in public opinion on this question since surveying began in 1977 and the highest level of opposition since 1998.<sup>81</sup>

By October 2025, 49 percent of 2,922 Canadian adults expressed negative views of immigration overall.<sup>82</sup> Over two-thirds (67 percent) said that federal targets of 380,000 immigrants for 2026 were still too high, even after the government had already substantially reduced its earlier targets. Concern about immigration's impact on housing costs reached 69 percent, on healthcare 60 percent, and on social services 58 percent. Importantly, survey research consistently found that these concerns were driven by what Abacus Data characterized as a "scarcity and precarity mindset," a belief that the system is running out of space, rather than by cultural or xenophobic sentiment. This distinction matters, as it shows that the public's negative views on immigration are not mainly from cultural standpoints. It means that the underlying public concern is about governance capacity and economic management, not about the increasing presence of immigrant individuals occupying the same space.

By late 2025, public concern about immigration levels had stabilized rather than continued escalating, partly reflecting the federal government's visible reduction of admission targets and partly because US trade policy and tariff pressures displaced immigration as the dominant public concern.<sup>83</sup> However, stabilization of concern is not

---

<sup>81</sup> Environics Institute for Survey Research, *Focus Canada: Canadian Public Opinion About Immigration and Refugees - Fall 2024*, (Toronto: Environics Institute, 2024); Andrew Parkin, "Five Public-Opinion Trends to Watch in 2025." *Policy Options* (December 30, 2024).

<sup>82</sup> Abacus Data, "Canadians' Views on Immigration Remain Largely Unchanged from Last Year," Survey conducted October 2025, (Ottawa: Abacus Data, 2025).

<sup>83</sup> Environics Institute for Survey Research, *Canadian Public Opinion About Immigration and Refugees - Fall 2025* (Toronto: Environics Institute, 2025). Conducted September 8-21, 2025.

<https://www.environicsinstitute.org/projects/project-details/canadian-public-opinion-about-immigration-and-refugees---fall-2025>; Abacus Data, "Canadians' Views on Immigration Remain Largely Unchanged from Last Year and Overly Negative." Survey conducted October 24-29, 2025. (Ottawa: Abacus Data). <https://abacusdata.ca/canadians-views-on-immigration-remain-largely-unchanged-from-last-year-and-overly-negative/>

the same as restored confidence. A January 2026 IRPP analysis of 40 years of Environics survey data found that the 2023-24 shift in opinion was demographically distinctive: it was primarily an Anglophone phenomenon, women had become more skeptical than men for the first time, and more interestingly, younger Canadians were now among the most skeptical of immigration levels, reversing a decades-long pattern in which young Canadians had been among the most supportive.<sup>84</sup> This generational inversion is not a cultural shift. It is the predictable consequence of a governance failure whose material costs are borne most heavily by Canadians under 35.

Trust in Canadian institutions more broadly has also deteriorated through the period of globalization that includes international migration as one of the key elements. The proportion of Canadians expressing an optimistic view of globalization fell from 52 percent in 1999 to 14 percent in 2023. Confidence in government and in large business has declined substantially over the same period. Indigenous Canadians expressed lower trust in most people (37 percent, compared to a national average of 46 percent), a reflection of specific historical and ongoing governance relationships, not a general social trend.<sup>85</sup>

This data reveals more of how Canadians have lost faith in the system than how much dislike of immigrants has increased. Canadians who were previously pro-immigration have not necessarily become anti-immigration. Most still support immigration in principle and recognize its economic and cultural importance. The public has concluded over time with high accuracy that it is a systems problem resulting from management failures – housing is not being built adequately, the labour market is not absorbing people effectively, services are strained, and infrastructure is stretched. The government's framing of rapid demographic growth as measurable, most efficient, and straightforward success for all Canadians has not been lived by its own people for more than a decade. People are saying to the state that they have endured enough of a rule that has not met what it has promised them. Immigrants are neither the constituents nor part of the state. Again, correlation is shown between the decrease of public trust for the government and the increase in immigration, but it clearly does not explain the full causation that deserves further research.

---

<sup>84</sup> Randy Besco and Natasha Goel. 2026. "Who Changed Their Minds? Two Shifts in Canadian Public Opinion on Immigration: 1995-2005 and 2023-24." Centre of Excellence on the Canadian Federation, Institute for Research on Public Policy. January 29, 2026. <https://centre.irpp.org/research-studies/canadian-opinion-immigration/>

<sup>85</sup> University of Waterloo Trust Research Network, *Trust in Canada: Recent Trends in Measures of Trust*, (Waterloo: UWaterloo, 2024).

Table 4. The Collapse of Public Trust		
Category	Key Metric / Statistic	Data Value / Detail
Immigrant Volume Sentiment	"Too Much Immigration" (2022)	27% (Historic Low)
	"Too Much Immigration" (2024)	58% (Highest since 1998)
	Rate of Opinion Shift (2022– 2024)	+31 percentage points (Rapidest since 1977)
	Views on 2026 Target (380k)	67% believe this reduced target is still "too high"
Drivers of Concern (2025)	Impact on Housing Costs	69% of Canadians concerned
	Impact on Healthcare	60% of Canadians concerned
	Impact on Social Services	58% of Canadians concerned
Institutional Trust	Optimism Toward Globalization (1999)	52%
	Optimism Toward Globalization (2023)	14%
	General Trust in People (National)	46%
	General Trust in People (Indigenous)	37% (Reflects specific governance history)
General Outlook	Overall Negative View of Immigration	49% (As of October 2025)
	Core Motivation for Negative Views	"Scarcity & Precarity" (Systemic capacity concerns)

## 2.5 What Canadian-Born Canadians Are Actually Experiencing

Canadian-born Canadians also need help. They need help clarifying the myths and how the governance architecture has resulted in real, negative impacts on their own lives as the rightful citizens of this country because of immigration policies. They need assistance in clearly picturing where they stand in Canada today, beyond as numbers of the population statistics, but as the people who are also affected by the larger game. This framework uses the term "Canadian-born Canadians" to describe everyone born in Canada who is neither Indigenous nor a naturalized citizen. This is not a definition representing their unified identity. The diversity within Canadian-born Canadians is naturally complex due to the long history of immigration from the arrival of settlers, and each group deserves to project its own voice. Thus, Canadian-born Canadians, for the purpose of this work, are grouped to represent one reality: they share a specific material condition regardless of their cultural background. Over the decade of dramatically increased immigration in Canada, they have been trying to access housing they increasingly cannot afford, healthcare systems that are more strained than before, and labour markets in which wages and the number of jobs have not kept pace with the skyrocketing cost of living.

The generational divide among the Canadian-born Canadians also deserves mentioning. Fifty-four percent of Canadians aged 18 to 29 believed in 2024 that they would be worse off than their parents, up 32 percentage points since 2012.<sup>86</sup> Nearly one-third of Canadian millennials said they would consider relocating to another country to find affordable housing.<sup>87</sup> These specifically point to a conclusion that strips off all the romantic claims of immigration policies: the Canadians who will continue to build Canada are suffering, living in worse conditions than their previous generations that led unprecedented technological advancements; they are increasingly less inclined to favour life in their own country – an irony that the state must resolve. These are not symptoms of a cultural crisis. They are symptoms of a governance failure.

---

<sup>86</sup> Environics Institute for Survey Research, *Focus Canada: Canadian Public Opinion About Immigration and Refugees - Fall 2024*, (Toronto: Environics Institute, 2024).

<sup>87</sup> Habitat for Humanity Canada, 2024.

The Three-Way Integration Framework takes the conditions of Canadian-born Canadians seriously. This is not because their concerns are more important than those of immigrants or Indigenous Peoples. This is because most of the Canadian-born Canadians are also the constituents of the government. In a representative democracy, that means that the voters have direct influence over how the country is governed, in principle. Nevertheless, the political reality of a human society is far more complex than the theory suggests. It is not fair to place the entire weight of the state's governance failure upon Canadian-born Canadians. It is true that the constituents have the choice to vote for their political leadership. However, not all information is shared with all constituents in any political system across the globe.

In this work, Canadian-born Canadians are treated as an equally important group of the population that needs to benefit from the mutual-advancement premise. Simply put, the TWIF is not another tool to instill further social divides. TWIF attempts to provide an angle that does not yet exist but may provide ground for policies, programs, and projects that will consider all three groups of our Canadian population in their design and execution, with the purpose of advancing Canada as a single country, not a conglomerate of divided, multiple nations within.

## 2.6 The Governance Architecture That Produced These Conditions

The conditions documented in this section were not produced by immigration itself. They were produced by a governance architecture that managed immigration as if it were a dial that could be turned up or down to serve aggregate economic objectives, without adequate attention to the distributional consequences, the institutional capacity requirements, or the governance rights of the nations on whose territories immigration unfolds.

Three specific governance failures are identifiable:

First, immigration levels were set without formal coordination with housing, healthcare, or labour market absorption capacity that requires serious orchestration between the federal, provincial, and municipal governments that co-design this country. The result was a structural mismatch that produced the housing crisis and the per capita income stagnation documented above, among others.

Second, immigration governance never included Indigenous Nations as governance partners when large parts or the entirety of the Canadian territory have never been ceded by Indigenous Peoples. The land that is required for new Canadians to settle with dignity was never prepared in advance. Not even in regions where Indigenous governments hold substantial territorial authority and where immigration directly affected Indigenous economic and social conditions were there closely knit Indigenous-relations processes that benefited all three groups – Indigenous Peoples holding rights over their territories; the Canadian-born Canadians living on or near those territories by birth; and the immigrants who were introduced to those areas by the state without much information on the real political complexity that they were entering. It takes years for the immigrants to realize that they may be part of a political mandate that they might never understand.

Third, immigrants were integrated into a national narrative that Canada is a welcoming, opportunity-rich, peaceful country. The large landmass, which has never been efficiently leveraged, has cultivated an illusion that this huge country has a huge economy. Canada is a small country in a huge body – its population is even smaller than the South Korean population, while the former's territory is even smaller than the province of Québec. Its large physical size does not contain enough economic capacity to produce a good number of decent, professional jobs that pay more than enough salary for immigrants to thrive rather than merely survive after all the financial capacity they have depleted during the process of immigration, credential recognition, and landing.

It takes a long time for immigrants to understand that they have made a financial and life transaction for political peace and high cultural norms that were far more expensive than the PR application fees. It does not take long for the immigrants to face the colonial foundations of the state that may be repeating its exertion of power relationships over the newly admitted permanent residents of foreign origin, similarly to how it has been exerted over the people whose rightful ownership predates Confederation, the treaty relationships that structure the land for the promised success, or the economic constraints that the labour market imposed. Immigrants were not informed enough on the invisible structural barriers and the multiple layers of systemic constraints that were to affect their daily lives after landing. They have never had a chance to fully understand what it means to join a country that is perpetually executing decolonization – the settler-colonial paradox that is used as the

encompassing theoretical frame for this work – a country that is internationally respected as one of the more trustworthy, the fairer, and the more transparent.

All three failures are correctable. None of them are inevitable features of immigration as a policy instrument. All of them require serious attention if Canada is to continue to build and not deteriorate its once world-class economic, political, and social structure that has been constructed over the unceded territories of Indigenous Nations.

## 3. Analytical Framework: Understanding the Structural Root

This framework uses a single structural engine and three supplementary mechanisms to provide an implementable theory rather than a contribution to academia. As such, the framework does not explicitly iterate every single theory that is used, which may confuse readers who do not share similar academic backgrounds related to political science. Simply put, the engine identifies the root cause, and the three following mechanisms explain how it operates through specific policy instruments.

### 3.1 The Structural Engine: Settler Colonialism as Ongoing Architecture

Canada is undoubtedly a settler state. This is not a political statement; it is a description of the country's constitutional and historical structure. The Canadian state was built on the occupation of territories governed by Indigenous Nations, whose sovereignty predates Confederation and whose governance rights are recognized partially and imperfectly in Section 35 of the Constitution Act (1982) and through treaty obligations that vary significantly across regions.

Patrick Wolfe's formulation that settler colonialism is "a structure, not an event" is the most useful theoretical framing for understanding why this matters for immigration governance today.<sup>88</sup> Settlement is not a historical mistake that ended when the last territory was claimed. It is an ongoing structural condition that operates through continuous mechanisms: demographic expansion that increases the non-Indigenous population on Indigenous territories, economic arrangements that extract value from those unceded territories without structurally distributing it to Indigenous communities, governance designs that locate authority in state institutions rather than in the nations whose

---

<sup>88</sup> Patrick Wolfe, "Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native.," *Journal of Genocide Research* 8 (4), (2006): p388.

jurisdiction is implicated, and narrative frameworks that present the settler state's authority as natural, rightful, and complete.

Immigration, understood within this structural framework, is one of those continuous mechanisms. It is how the settler state replenishes and expands its population on Indigenous territories. This does not make immigration wrong as a policy implemented for the country's survival. In fact, even though Indigenous People's rightful ownership of the land must be respected in full, it is undeniable that the demolition of the country currently standing on the territory would harm all people within, including Indigenous Peoples. By all means, immigration is a necessary tool for the country's survival and continued development.

It does mean, however, that immigration governance in Canada cannot be legitimately designed without the participation of Indigenous Nations on whose territories it unfolds. The current bilateral state-immigrant model treats Canada as a holistically sovereign entity with unambiguous, uncontested authority over its entire, massive territory. Legally and constitutionally, this is not fully accurate. Moreover, its complexity hinders clear comprehension among non-Canadians before deciding to immigrate. Governance designed on this assumption that immigration is a bilateral relationship will continue to produce fragmentation, conflict, and misalignment documented in Section 2.

The settler-colonial framework also explains the position of Canadian-born Canadians in this analysis. Canadian-born Canadians, including second-generation immigrants, did not choose to settle on Indigenous territory. They were born into a structure that was already built centuries ago. They are not directly responsible for the original dispossession of Indigenous Peoples. But they inhabit a country whose governance architecture continues to reproduce that dispossession through the mechanisms described in this section, while consequently bearing real costs from the resulting dysfunction without being correctly informed of the dysfunctional mechanisms.

The housing crisis is a concrete example. It is partly rooted in the exclusion of Indigenous lands from productive co-governance arrangements. This is not because Indigenous Peoples are unwilling to develop or share their territories, but because the existing governance framework makes that development subject to conflict, litigation, and delay rather than coordination and consent for efficiency. Canadian-born Canadians

certainly do not benefit from that exclusion. Many of them bear its costs directly, in the form of housing scarcity and ever-increasing unaffordability, so a better-governed land-use architecture might reduce and improve access to housing for all who are in need. In fact, in 2023, more than eighty-seven percent of the total emergency shelter users were citizens, while only less than one-third self-identified as Indigenous and around five percent were refugees or refugee claimants.<sup>89</sup> Housing is not a unique problem for minority groups; it is a national problem that affects more Canadian-born Canadians than others.

Immigrants occupy a different position in this analysis. They enter a country with a structure they did not design, carrying an immigrant identity that shapes their navigation of that structure for years or for the rest of their lives, regardless of whether they obtain citizenship. Many immigrants come from countries with their own histories of colonization and dispossession, which means the settler-colonial framework of Canada is not simply abstract to them. In fact, it may resonate with their own national histories that built stronger national identities than Canada in numerous instances. This further complicates immigration governance, as historical ties and conflicts among the newcomers' origin countries are not included as factors affecting their admissions, meaning that historically troubled groups of nations are entering a country with a far weaker national identity.

Furthermore, it is important to note that immigrants' relationship to Canadian Indigenous Peoples is not the same as that of Canadian-born Canadians. Immigrants did not inherit Canada. They chose it, or were compelled toward it, under specific circumstances. When they arrived, they were exposed to this complexity of Indigenous-Canadian relations without having the lens to perceive it with fairness and an intellectually objective standpoint. Upon arrival, they were slowly revealed the other side of the story. In the larger sense, they are joining Canadian societies with mixed feelings and an inaccurate concept of Indigenous communities. Modern-day immigrants are joining to become new Canadians, which, to some degree, fortifies the settler-colonial presence that may otherwise extinguish in less than a century if it were not for the new Canadians.

---

<sup>89</sup> Housing, Infrastructure and Communities Canada, *Homelessness Data Snapshot: The National Shelter Study 2023 Update*, (Ottawa: HICC, 2023), last modified: 29 November 2024. Available at: <https://housing-infrastructure.canada.ca/homelessness-sans-abri/reports-rapports/data-shelter-2023-donnees-refuge-eng.html>

## 3.2 Supplementary Mechanism 1: Political Economy of Precarious Labour and the Productivity Trap

The political economy of Canada's immigration model explains why rapid demographic growth has failed to generate the productivity gains necessary for rising living standards. Far from a theoretical concern, Canada's growth strategy has structurally functioned as an 'extensive-growth' model, relying on extreme labour market flexibility to mask underlying economic stagnation.

By leveraging a massive influx of temporary workers, international students, and high-skilled arrivals trapped in credential-recognition queues, the state has created a surplus of 'elastic' labour. As documented by the Bank of Canada (2024) and the C.D. Howe Institute (2025), this reliance on the Temporary Foreign Worker Program (TFWP) and employer-tied permits has allowed firms to fill roles at wages and under conditions that domestic workers would not accept.<sup>90</sup>

Critically, this availability of low-cost labour has created a 'productivity trap': rather than investing in capital intensity such as automation and technology that are required to drive per capita prosperity, businesses have instead substituted capital for abundant labour. This documented structure of the study-to-PR pathway and the two-step immigration system has ultimately prioritized short-term aggregate GDP expansion at the expense of long-term productivity as well as the dignity of the Canadian workforce.

The result, as the per capita GDP data in Section 2 documents, is an economy that is adding population faster than it is adding productivity. Between 2014 and 2023, GDP per person employed grew by just 0.1 percent in real terms, at a rate better only than Japan in the G7, which has far more rigid immigration policies, ironically, and one of the lowest records in Canadian economic history for a decade-long period.<sup>91</sup> Investment per worker declined after 2006 and has not recovered. R&D spending as a share of GDP has fallen while every other G7 country increased it.

---

<sup>90</sup> TD Economics, "Popping Canada's Population Bubble: The Shift from Labour to Capital," *Economics Report* (January 2025). <https://economics.td.com/ca-popping-population-bubble>; C.D. Howe Institute, *How We Subverted our Skills-Based Immigration System*, (Toronto, December 2025). <https://cdhowe.org/publication/how-we-subverted-our-skills-based-immigration-system/>.

<sup>91</sup> John T. Phelan, "The Frozen North: Canada's Economic Stagnation," *The Daily Economy* (April 3, 2025).

This labour market mechanism connects to the settler-colonial engine in a specific way. The labour that fills the low-wage, high-flexibility sectors of the Canadian economy is disproportionately drawn from two sources: 1) immigrants operating under conditions of legal precarity (such as closed work permits); 2) Indigenous Peoples operating under conditions of structural exclusion developed throughout the history of Canada.

This indicates a profound commonality between immigrants and Indigenous Peoples as two groups who could better contribute to the Canadian economy that will increase the overall living standards for everyone, including Canadian-born citizens. Instead, research suggests that both populations are held in positions of economic dependency.<sup>92</sup> They generate significant "surplus value" for the broader economy, with immigrants often earning 13-23 percent less than native-born workers for the same productivity levels, yet the system does not provide equitable returns.<sup>93</sup>

This structural extraction leads to "talent exit," as more recent research indicates a spike in onward migration; highly skilled immigrants, facing permanent "survival jobs" and credential barriers, are increasingly leaving Canada for more equitable markets.<sup>94</sup> Simultaneously, Indigenous Peoples are not encouraged to participate with dignity or potential for personal growth, as their territorial and economic jurisdiction remains marginalized. The failure to allow these two groups to participate meaningfully in the long term only exacerbates economic discrepancies and social divisions, slowing down the country's real economic growth.

This framework does not argue that these conditions are the result of a conspiracy. It argues that they are a structural failure that must be identified, named, and fixed through governance redesign.

### 3.3 Supplementary Mechanism 2: Extraction Without Return

---

<sup>92</sup> Maryse Picard, *From Exclusion to Shared Prosperity: The Vital Role of First Nations in Canada's Economic Future*, IRPP (2025), available at: <https://centre.irpp.org/research-studies/first-nations-canada-economic-future/>; Stephen Tino, "Labour Market Power, Firm Productivity, and the Immigrant-Native Pay Gap," *Clef WP 88*, (2025).

<sup>93</sup> *Statistics Canada, A Canada–U.S. Comparison of the Economic Outcomes of STEM Immigrants*, Catalogue no. 11F0019M - No. 453, (Ottawa, 2020).

<sup>94</sup> Conference Board of Canada, *The Leaky Bucket 2025: Retention Challenges in Highly Skilled Immigrants and In-Demand Occupations*, (Ottawa: The Conference Board of Canada, 2025).

Canada recruits migrants mostly from countries across the Global South (sub-Saharan Africa, South and Southeast Asia, the Caribbean, and Latin America) whose educational and professional development has been financed by those countries' institutions and public investment. Those migrants arrive in Canada, contributing labour, tuition payments, and consumer spending to the Canadian economy. The returns they immediately receive are another set of requirements forcing unexpected endeavours: credential recognition, labour market access, permanent residence pathways, and social inclusion. They are systematically delayed, reduced, or denied no matter the investments of those foreign nationals and the economic loss of their home countries caused by these nationals choosing Canada over them.

International students pay international tuition rates two to four times higher than domestic rates,<sup>95</sup> sustaining university operating budgets across the country.<sup>96</sup> Forty-five percent arrived in the five-year period from 2018 to 2023 through private career colleges with limited educational value and nearly nonexistent post-graduation employment in trained fields.<sup>97</sup> As documented in Section C.2, internationally educated professionals in Canada face among the highest underemployment rates in the OECD, with significant credential-related wage penalties persisting regardless of legal status.

This mechanism operates differently from the settler-colonial mechanism while still reinforcing it. Indigenous dispossession concerns the removal and containment of governance authority over land and territory. By contrast, the extraction-without-return mechanism functions through labour markets and credentialing systems. It affects immigrants who arrive under diverse circumstances, hold varying legal statuses, and are formally included within Canada's institutional framework, yet encounter a persistent gap between formal inclusion and substantive participation. The two mechanisms are distinct: 1) one is rooted in territorial and constitutional relations, and 2) the other is in economic and institutional design. Nevertheless, they interact in ways that sustain the broader

---

<sup>95</sup> Statistics Canada. *Table 37-10-0045-01 Canadian and international tuition fees by level of study (current dollars)*, accessed on April 3, 2026, available at: <https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/t1/tbl1/en/tv.action?pid=3710004501>

<sup>96</sup> Hannah Liddle, "Budget cuts international student permit targets by 49 per cent in 2026", University Affairs (4 November 2025), available at: <https://universityaffairs.ca/news/budget-cuts-international-student-permits-by-65-per-cent-in-2026/#:~:text=Universities%20have%20long%20relied%20on,provincially%20mandated%20domestic%20tuition%20freezes>

<sup>97</sup> Office of the Auditor General of Canada, *Report 1 - Immigration Processing*, (Ottawa: Reports of the Auditor General of Canada, 2023).

structure of the settler state. Both are real, and both matter. The recurring error in much of the policy literature is to collapse them into a single problem or attempt to resolve them through the same policy instrument, despite their fundamentally different origins and operational logics.

### 3.4 Supplementary Mechanism 3: Narrative Misalignment

The third mechanism is not economic but communicative. Canada presents itself to immigrants considering arrival and to Canadian-born Canadians who are locally institutionalized through a specific national narrative: a welcoming, multicultural, peaceful country with vast natural resources and abundant opportunity. For immigrants, this narrative functions as a recruitment tool. It shapes aspiration before arrival and determines expectations that the structural economy often cannot meet. For Canadian-born Canadians, the same narrative functions as a civic inheritance – a story about the kind of country they live in that, when it diverges sharply from material experience, produces disillusionment and institutional distrust.

The gap between the narrative and the reality is not accidental. It serves specific interests: universities recruiting international students at premium tuition rates primarily for their revenues, employers recruiting temporary workers at below-market wages to be economical, and governments meeting demographic targets without investing adequately in the housing, credentialing systems, and labour market absorption capacity that would be required to make the narrative accurate. The narrative also performs a specific function in relation to Indigenous governance: by presenting Canada as a unified, multicultural state, it obscures the fact that the country's territory is governed through contested, treaty-structured, and partially unresolved relationships with Indigenous Peoples. Immigrants cannot realize this complexity right at the gate. Canadian-born Canadians have not been taught it substantively unless they chose to be educated in a related discipline. The narrative gap is experienced differently by each group but is produced by the same institutional choice.

The narrative-misalignment mechanism explains a phenomenon that pure economic analysis cannot: why public trust has collapsed so rapidly despite economic statistics that looked, in aggregate terms, positive. When a substantial proportion of the national population

has been told one story about the country they are entering or living in and then directly experience a different reality, the result is not just disappointment. It is a generalized loss of confidence in institutions and authority. That loss of confidence is what the polling data in Section 2.4 is measuring.

### 3.5 Supplementary Mechanism 4: Identity Construction and Exclusion

Immigration policy is not only an economic instrument or a demographic tool; it is one of the most powerful mechanisms through which the Canadian state constructs and reproduces national identity. Political theorists from Benedict Anderson to Will Kymlicka have emphasized that immigration policy is, fundamentally, a nation-building device that determines who is invited into the political community, who is recognized as belonging, and how the boundaries of the nation are imagined and maintained. In a settler state, this identity-forming function is inseparable from the constitutional architecture described in Section 3.1. The Canadian state compounds “Canadian identity” through continued immigration while structurally excluding Indigenous Nations whose sovereignty predates Confederation and whose jurisdiction remains unresolved.

This exclusion is not incidental. As Patrick Wolfe argues, settler colonialism is a structure that reproduces itself through demographic, territorial, and symbolic means. Immigration is one of those means. By selecting who becomes a “new Canadian,” the state continually replenishes the settler population on Indigenous territories, reinforcing the demographic and political foundations of the settler polity. However, Indigenous Nations, whose land, governance authority, and treaty relationships form the constitutional basis of the country, are not included in shaping the criteria for membership in the political community that is expanding on their territories. This is a form of what Audra Simpson describes as “nested sovereignty”: Indigenous Nations exist within the state but are structurally excluded from decisions that define the state’s future composition.<sup>98</sup> Canada,

---

<sup>98</sup> Audra Simpson, *Mohawk Interruptus: Political Life Across the Borders of Settler States*, (Durham: Duke University Press, 2014), p11.

as a sovereign member state of the international society, is a treaty-structured political formation in domestic terms. Immigration policy excludes this complexity, when it targets foreign nationals who cross the borders and enter the domestic politics of Canada.

Immigrants, for their part, enter Canada through a narrative of multicultural inclusion that obscures the constitutional reality of Indigenous-Crown relations. They are incorporated into a civic identity that presents Canada as a unified, benevolent, post-colonial nation, rather than a treaty-structured, partially unresolved political formation. This narrative positions immigrants as “new Canadians” joining a multicultural society while leaving them without the conceptual tools to understand the Indigenous constitutional order they are entering. Their inclusion is real, but it is a form of inclusion into a partial story.

Canadian-born Canadians occupy a third position. They inherit a national identity they did not choose, the one that is built on a settler-colonial foundation that is rarely taught in full. Their civic identity is shaped by institutions that present Canada as a single sovereign entity with uncontested authority over its territory. This narrative is comforting but incomplete. When the material realities of housing, labour markets, and governance fail to align with the national story, the result is disillusionment and institutional distrust that erode the story's explanatory power.

The identity mechanism therefore produces a three-way misalignment:

- Indigenous Peoples are excluded from shaping the future population that will inhabit their territories.
- Immigrants are included in a national identity that obscures the constitutional order they are joining.
- Canadian-born Canadians inherit a partial identity that does not equip them to understand the structural roots of contemporary governance failures.

This misalignment is not merely symbolic. It has material consequences for governance, policy design, and social cohesion. When the identity foundations of the state are fragmented, policy instruments built on those foundations, such as immigration, housing, labour markets, and education, all become misaligned as well. This implies that the entire system Canada functions upon is fractured intentionally and that today's generation and the generations to come will all suffer from it.

Nevertheless, this mechanism also reveals a path forward - a three-way integration model that includes Indigenous Nations as constitutional partners, immigrants as informed participants in a treaty-structured country, and Canadian-born citizens as inheritors of a complete national story. This model would strengthen Canada rather than weaken it. It would align identity with governance, narrative with reality, and demographic growth with constitutional legitimacy. It would allow immigration to support not only economic development but also political reconciliation and social cohesion. In this sense, addressing identity construction is not a matter of symbolic politics – it is, in fact, a structural requirement for building a more stable, prosperous, and unified Canada.

## 3.6 The Causal Architecture in Summary: How the Mechanisms Connect

### STRUCTURAL ENGINE:

Settler colonialism continuously reproduces settler authority on Indigenous territories through demographic expansion, economic extraction, legal centralization, and narrative construction. Immigration is one of the state's primary instruments for sustaining this structure by replenishing the settler population and reinforcing the state's unilateral authority over the land and membership.

### MECHANISM 1 (Labour/Productivity):

Immigration policy is designed to maximize labour flexibility rather than productivity growth. By generating a surplus of precarious labour (temporary workers, international students, and credential-stalled skilled migrants), the system suppresses wages, discourages capital investment, and produces long-term per capita stagnation. This mechanism reinforces the settler-colonial structure by maintaining economic dependency among both Indigenous Peoples and immigrants.

### MECHANISM 2 (Extraction Without Return):

Immigrants are recruited across status categories, from temporary permits to citizenship, under conditions that extract their human capital, tuition, and labour while providing delayed, reduced, or uneven returns. Credential barriers, labour segmentation, and persistent underemployment reflect a structural gap between formal inclusion and substantive participation. This mechanism transfers the global value to the Canadian state without redistributing power or opportunity to the immigrants.

### MECHANISM 3 (Narrative Misalignment):

Canada presents itself through a national narrative (multicultural, prosperous, peaceful) that does not align with the lived reality of newcomers, Indigenous Peoples, or Canadian-born residents. This narrative obscures the treaty-based constitutional

structure, masks economic stagnation, and legitimizes the ongoing reproduction of settler authority. The resulting gap between narrative and experience produces a generalized loss of trust in institutions.

#### MECHANISM 4 (Identity Construction and Exclusion):

Immigration policy constructs the future Canadian population base while structurally excluding Indigenous Nations from shaping who becomes Canadian on their territories. Immigrants are incorporated into a partial national identity that obscures unresolved Crown-Indigenous relations, while Canadian-born citizens inherit a settler identity they did not choose. This three-way identity misalignment stabilizes the settler state symbolically while weakening social cohesion, economic stability, and constitutional legitimacy.

#### GOVERNANCE GAP:

The bilateral state-immigrant model naturalizes all four mechanisms by treating Canada as a single, uncontested sovereign entity and excluding Indigenous Nations from immigration governance. This exclusion prevents the alignment of immigration with per-capita growth, credential equity, Indigenous jurisdiction, and honest integration, leaving structural failures unaddressed.

#### PROPOSED RESPONSE:

A trilateral governance redesign that introduces Indigenous co-authority aligns immigration with productivity and absorption capacity and presents an accurate account of Canada's constitutional structure to Indigenous Peoples, immigrants, and Canadian-born citizens that enhances social cohesion among the various identities and public security. This three-way integration model strengthens economic outcomes, restores institutional trust, and advances Canada as a more coherent, legitimate, and resilient country.

## 4. Constitutive Tensions: Honest Navigation

It is important to acknowledge the tensions that this framework must respond to. Three tensions are built into the structure. They cannot be dissolved. They must be managed, and the management strategy must be transparent.

### 4.1 The Risk of Recognition Politics

Glen Sean Coulthard's analysis in *Red Skin, White Masks* (2014) identified a recurring pattern in Crown-Indigenous relations: the state offers Indigenous Nations a recognition of their culture, governance structures and rights, which, in fact, domesticates the Indigenous Peoples while appearing to honour Indigenous claims. It absorbs Indigenous governance demands within a state framework that the state itself defines and controls in ways that serve settler interests while appearing to serve Indigenous ones. Coulthard argues that, consequently, Indigenous Peoples will continue to be governed by the Canadian state by accepting the recognition.

The Three-Way Integration Framework proposes institutional mechanisms through which Indigenous Nations would participate in immigration governance. The risk Coulthard identifies is directly applicable: if those mechanisms create advisory roles rather than decision-making authority, consultation rights rather than consent requirements, and cultural programming rather than governance participation, the framework will produce a more elaborate version of the recognition politics that it is designed to replace. This risk is not hypothetical. It is the predictable default of state institutions engaging Indigenous claims.

The framework's design response to this risk is to insist on a specific test at every institutional mechanism: Does this mechanism give Indigenous Nations the authority to say no to a specific decision that affects their territory? This is important, as refusal for self-protection and preservation of their own culture has not been an option that Indigenous Nations have had since Confederation. As mentioned in the preface, the Canadian state's rule over Canada itself can be contested by Indigenous Peoples. In this context, any reasoning defending their right to say no could indeed signal a continuum of colonialism,

leading to endless discussions. Thus, it is important to ensure that Indigenous Peoples have not only the authority to comment, advise, or register concern, but also the authority to refuse and to have that refusal carry legal and administrative weight. Where the answer is no, the mechanism is consultation, not co-governance. The distinction is the difference between the recognition politics and a structural governance reform.

The present document acknowledges a gap between its stated ambition, co-governance, and the specific mechanisms described in Section 5, which are designed to be capable of producing co-governance but do not guarantee it. The political conditions of implementation, not the design of the mechanisms alone, will determine whether this framework produces structural governance reform or a more sophisticated version of the recognition trap. That gap is named here so that it cannot be hidden and so that any departure from the binding-authority standard in implementation is politically legible as a failure of the Canadian state's commitment, not a limitation of the framework's design.

There is a prior question that this framework must answer directly that any Indigenous reader may raise:

*Why should Indigenous Nations engage with immigration governance at all, rather than asserting complete sovereignty over their territories and refusing participation in the colonial governance architecture that has managed their dispossession for nearly two centuries?*

Coulthard's critique of recognition politics and Audra Simpson's theory of refusal as sovereignty assertion both represent intellectually coherent answers.

The framework does not dismiss those answers. It proposes a different one:

*Engaging with immigration governance through a co-governance model in which Indigenous Nations hold decision-making authority rather than advisory roles is not a concession to the Canadian state. It is the reassertion of a governance function that Indigenous Nations held before contact, which is the authority to determine how newcomers would settle on their territories.*

Pre-contact Indigenous Nations managed relationships with newcomers through complex diplomatic and governance protocols. The colonial period suppressed these traditions without extinguishing their legal or moral foundation. What TWIF proposes is the restoration of that function in a contemporary institutional form. It is not asking Indigenous

Nations to legitimize Canadian sovereignty. It is, in fact, asking the Canadian state to acknowledge that its immigration authority cannot be legitimately exercised without the co-governance of the nations on whose territories immigrants need to settle.

The framework is not neutral on the question of Canada's foundational legitimacy. It is, in its deepest logic, against the root of Canada's foundational existence as currently constituted. Not in the sense of seeking the dissolution of the Canadian state, but in the sense that it requires Canada to become something different from what it has been. Canada's foundational existence as a state rests on the progressive extinguishment of Indigenous governance authority over territory. That foundation has been partially dismantled by the courts, from *Calder* through *Delgamuukw* through *Tsilhqot'in*, but never replaced with a complete alternative constitutional order.<sup>99</sup> Canada is in a liminal state: the old foundation has been challenged, and the new foundation has not been built. TWIF proposes one element of what that new foundation might look like in the specific domain of immigration governance. Indigenous co-governance of settlement on Indigenous territories is not the end of Canada. It is the beginning of Canada becoming what its own constitutional commitments, from Section 35 through UNDRIP's adoption into Canadian law through Bill C-15 in 2021, require it to be.

Audra Simpson's politics of refusal adds a further dimension: Indigenous Nations have the option not to engage with state governance frameworks at all, and that option is itself a form of sovereignty assertion. The framework must be designed so that Indigenous Nations can choose their level and form of engagement. They must have authority to choose from full co-governance to limited advisory participation to non-participation, and each of those choices must be respected rather than treated as a problem to be managed.

---

<sup>99</sup> *Calder v British Columbia (AG)* [1973] SCR 313: This landmark decision was the first to recognize that Aboriginal title is a legal right based on Indigenous Peoples' historic occupation of their lands, existing independently of any colonial legislative act; *Delgamuukw v British Columbia* [1997] 3 SCR 1010: The Court further defined Aboriginal title as a right to the land itself, not merely a right to hunt or fish, and ruled that Indigenous oral histories must be given equal weight to written evidence in legal proceedings; *Tsilhqot'in Nation v British Columbia* [2014] 2 SCR 257: This historic ruling resulted in the first-ever judicial declaration of Aboriginal title in Canada over a specific territory, affirming that title applies to broad areas of land regularly used and occupied by a Nation, rather than just specific village sites.

## 4.2 The Distinction Between Indigenous Rights and Immigrant Rights

This framework addresses three grouped identities. This risks incorrectly equating Indigenous dispossession, immigrant precarity, and Canadian-born Canadian disillusionment as parallel forms of the same problem requiring the same remedy. They do not.

Indigenous Peoples are nations with inherent governance rights recognized under Section 35 of the Constitution Act (1982) and UNDRIP as implemented through Bill C-15 (2021). These rights are not delegated by the Canadian state. They predate it. The remedy for the governance failures affecting Indigenous Nations is not improved services, better inclusion programs, or cultural recognition. It is the restoration and exercise of governance authority in domains where it has been excluded.

Immigrants are individuals and communities across the full spectrum from study permit holders to naturalized citizens whose identity as immigrants persists beyond their legal status. First-generation immigrants remain immigrants in self-understanding and in social perception throughout their lives; their legal status as permanent residents or citizens does not completely overturn their identity. The remedy for the governance failures affecting immigrants is structural: honest pathways, credential recognition, labour rights, and an integration architecture that gives them an accurate picture of the political structure they are entering. It includes Indigenous governance relationships that structure the territories they are settling on.

Canadian-born Canadians hold neither Indigenous governance rights of the first group nor the immigrant identity of the second. They are citizens by birth in a state that is structured in ways that currently serve them poorly. Their remedy is better governance, which the redesign would produce better outcomes for all three groups, including the rightful citizens by birth.

These distinctions are not hierarchies of suffering. They are distinctions of political status, legal claim, and lived identity that must be built into the governance architecture. Collapsing them, treating Indigenous Peoples, immigrants, and Canadian-born Canadians as variants of "diverse Canadians" navigating the same problems, is precisely the error that liberal multicultural frameworks make through which Indigenous sovereignty

claims are diluted.<sup>100</sup> It also erases the specific conditions of immigrants whose identity and experience are not equivalent to those of Canadian-born Canadians even when both groups hold Canadian citizenship.

### 4.3 The Challenge of Governance Diversity Among Indigenous Nations

Canada has over 630 First Nations, plus Métis governments and Inuit organizations with varying governance capacities, territorial scopes, treaty relationships, and political orientations. The framework cannot be applied uniformly to "Indigenous Nations" as if they constitute a single governance actor. This is not just a technical implementation problem. It reflects a genuine political reality where Indigenous Nations disagree with each other on governance questions, hold different relationships with federal, provincial, and municipal governments, and have legitimate reasons to engage or decline engagement with any specific governance framework.

If Indigenous Peoples had a unified identity, Canada might have evolved into a completely different country today. But Indigenous Nations are not one unified nation. For this framework, as for any other policy vehicle, Indigenous Peoples must never be treated as a single, unified identity. Relationships built and pursued with each Indigenous Nation must be based on respect, understanding of the Nation's unique history, relationships with other Indigenous Nations, etc. As such, this framework does not suggest one single approach as a model to all invitations for Indigenous co-governance.

The framework addresses this through two principles. First, the relevant governance unit for any specific application is determined by the territorial scope of the immigration decision being made. Immigration decisions affecting Treaty 7 territory in Alberta are governed by the consultation, co-design, and consent requirements that apply to the nations of that treaty, who are primarily the Siksika, Piikani (or Peigan), Kainai, Tsuut'ina, and Stoney Nakoda First Nations, operating collectively through Treaty 7 Management Corporation. This requires, as a prerequisite, the territorial and treaty

---

<sup>100</sup> Glen Sean Coulthard, *Red Skin, White Masks: Rejecting the Colonial Politics of Recognition*, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2014); Leanne Betasamosake Simpson, *As We Have Always Done: Indigenous Freedom Through Radical Resistance*, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2017).

mapping that the framework identifies as Phase 1 of any implementation process. Second, participation in the framework is voluntary for Indigenous Nations. The framework creates institutional conditions for meaningful participation. It does not demand Indigenous Nations exercise that participation in any way independent of their own interests. If participation is refused, then it must be respected, which reveals an inevitable weak point of this entire framework.

Nevertheless, in practical terms, such weakness can also be a strength of this framework's approaches. As the First Nations have hundreds of different national identities, if the principle of participation by independent will of each Indigenous Nation is respected fully, the results of each participation can be documented to provide ground to either encourage more participation or modify and improve the framework. One documented success can be more convincing of the benefits of participating to nonparticipating Indigenous Nations.

The diversity of Indigenous governance is not a problem. Recognizing their diversity is only a small step. What is required to follow is a structural approach that respects the differing perspectives as legitimate social structures of the rightful nations that predate Canadian systems. Recognizing the diversity and not engaging in a respectful manner is a shallow way to reinforce settler colonialism.

This tension is constitutive, not incidental. The framework cannot resolve it from the outside. It can only create the conditions under which Indigenous Nations make a genuinely informed choice about participation, with full knowledge that non-participation is equally legitimate and will not be treated as a governance failure of the framework. What the framework offers is not a solution to the recognition trap. It is a structure designed to make the recognition trap visible and avoidable if Indigenous Nations choose to engage on their own terms.

## 5. The Governance Design

A governance framework is only as useful as its institutional design. This section specifies the architecture through which trilateral governance would operate, the legal vehicles that would establish it, and the institutional design questions that must be answered for implementation to be feasible. The mechanisms described here are informed by the author's lived experiences at both the national policy level and the provincial delivery level. The problem with most governance proposals is that they are designed from one end of the system only: either by people who write policy and cannot see how it distorts in delivery, or by frontline practitioners who see the distortion but cannot name the structural source. This framework attempts to hold both simultaneously.

### 5.1 The Three-Actor Architecture

The framework positions three distinct actors in a governance relationship. The actors are not equal in their constitutional status or historical position. The governance architecture reflects their differences rather than flattening them.

Indigenous Nations hold governance authority that the Canadian state cannot unilaterally override. Their participation in immigration governance is grounded in Section 35 rights, UNDRIP obligations (particularly Article 19, FPIC),<sup>101</sup> and the evolving duty-to-consult jurisprudence from Haida Nation (2004) through Tsilhqot'in (2014) to Kebaowek (2025 FC 319).<sup>102</sup> The Federal Court's 2025 Kebaowek decision established that FPIC informs the standard of Crown consultation in ways that require genuine consent-seeking, not merely information provision. Applied to immigration governance, this means that

---

<sup>101</sup> FPIC is an abbreviation for Free, Prior and Informed Consent. Read: CIRNAC, *Appearance before the Standing Senate Committee on Aboriginal Peoples: Bill C-15, An Act respecting the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, May 31, 2021*, (Ottawa: The Standing Senate Committee on Aboriginal Peoples, 2021). Available at: <https://www.rcaanc-cirnac.gc.ca/eng/1624906622343/1624906649093#chp11> (last modified: 28 September 2021), last accessed on April 9, 2026.

<sup>102</sup> *Haida Nation v British Columbia (Minister of Forests) [2004] 3 SCR 511*: The Court articulated that the "honour of the Crown" gives rise to a legal duty to consult and, where appropriate, accommodate Indigenous Peoples when the Crown has knowledge of a potential right or title that may be adversely affected; this duty exists on a spectrum - ranging from deep consultation to mere notification depending on the strength of the claim - and remains a non-delegable responsibility of the government rather than third-party proponents.

decisions with material effects on Indigenous territories must be pursued through processes designed to achieve consent, not to document having consulted.

Immigrants hold rights under Canadian law that accrue over time. The framework treats immigrants not only as a legal category moving through a queue but also as people navigating a new political, economic, and social structure. Immigrants have their own identity that gets shaped and transformed into new ones through the immigration process. Integration programming must therefore introduce immigrants to the actual political structure of Canada: the multinational character of the country, the treaty relationships that govern the lands they are settling on, and the governance rights of Indigenous Nations in their regions. This is not simply a moral requirement. It is a practical one. Those immigrants who understand the political structure they are entering are better positioned to navigate it, build relationships within it, and contribute to its governance. Thus, immigrants will no longer be treated as numbers but as people who are invited to take part in the formation of society, Canadian identity, and the advancement of Canada as a single country.

The role of immigrants in this framework is explicitly dual. They are, simultaneously, people navigating structural precarity and a group of political actors whose informed participation strengthens the trilateral governance architecture. Integration programming designed only for the first role produces dependency. Integration programming designed only for the second role ignores material reality. The co-designed curriculum in Mechanism 3 must hold both functions deliberately.

The Canadian federal and provincial governments hold administrative authority over immigration under the *Immigration and Refugee Protection Act* (2001) and provincial nominee frameworks. The framework does not eliminate that authority. It proposes that the exercise of that authority be redesigned in two ways: first, to include Indigenous co-governance mechanisms as a standard component of regional immigration planning; and second, to introduce Canadian-born Canadians to the actual constitutional structure of the country they inhabit through revised civic education and public communication, including the unresolved Indigenous governance relationships that the current national narrative elides.

## 5.2 Five Core Governance Mechanisms

These five mechanisms constitute the operational core of the Three-Way Integration Framework. Each mechanism is described, the legal vehicle for establishing it is identified, and the test for distinguishing genuine co-governance from recognition politics is stated.

### Mechanism 1: Territorial Impact Assessment

Before regional immigration planning decisions are made, including provincial nominee program allocations, regional labour recruitment programs, and major settlement funding decisions, a territorial impact assessment is conducted that maps Indigenous Nations whose territories are affected, identifies the applicable treaty obligations and Section 35 rights, and initiates a formal consultation process with the appropriate governance authorities. This involves analyzing the economic capacities of Indigenous Nations, mapping all communities involved, and understanding Indigenous- Canadian-newcomer relations present in the region in consultation with the authorities. This mechanism does not require Indigenous consent to every immigration decision. It requires that the decision-making process be structured to identify when consent is required and to pursue it in good faith, assuring that the results of the process will reflect the realities of the region, including the realities of Indigenous Peoples.

Legal vehicle: IRCC's UNDRIP Action Plan commitments under UNDA (2021).

Test: Are Indigenous Nations' authorities to object and say no respected? Does the process have a defined mechanism for recording Indigenous objections and explaining how they were addressed and not overridden?

### Mechanism 2: Regional Co-Governance Tables

In regions with active Indigenous governance infrastructure and significant immigration flows, formal co-governance tables are established within provincial nominee programs. These tables include Indigenous governance representatives with defined decision-making authority (not advisory roles) over specific elements of regional immigration planning: labour recruitment alignment with Indigenous economic

development plans, settlement patterns relative to Indigenous territorial priorities, and orientation curriculum contents. These tables also include settlement sector representatives and regional Canadian actors such as professional organizations, economic development agencies, employers, and think tanks, among others, with defined advisory roles over the specified elements above to ensure inclusion of a trilateral perspective.

Legal vehicle: Federal-provincial PNP bilateral agreements, amended to include co-governance table requirements as a condition of federal funding.

Test: Can Indigenous representatives at the table block a specific decision? If not, the table is a consultation, not co-governance. Are the representatives of immigrants and Canadian-born Canadians invited with an advisory mandate and not decision-making authority? A clear distinction in the role must be made between Indigenous and non-Indigenous participants in the governance structure to ensure that the different rights of the groups are respected. Canadian representatives have different standpoints, as there are two tiers in the Canadian representation: 1) governments who have governance authority and 2) regional actors that hold expertise, not constitutional authority.

### Mechanism 3: Co-Designed Integration Programming

Immigrant orientation curricula, settlement programming, and citizenship preparation materials are co-developed with Indigenous organizations in the regions where they operate. This means introducing immigrants across all stages of their status trajectory, from initial arrival through permanent residence and naturalization, to the treaty relationships, land histories, and Indigenous governance structures of the regions they are settling in. This content is not cultural heritage programming. This content is governance and constitutional content. It is current political reality. It serves both groups directly: Indigenous Nations whose governance rights are routinely obscured in integration materials and immigrants, including international students and temporary foreign workers, who need an accurate picture of the political structure they are entering in order to navigate it, build relationships within it, and eventually contribute to the advancement of the country should they decide to remain and settle permanently after having been informed of the complex dimensions of reality in Canada. Hence, as these

two groups are served in a more coherent manner, the core population group, Canadian-born Canadians, also benefits from engaging with the vulnerable populations who will have gained a more profound understanding of Canadian society. As a result, all three groups will mutually benefit from living in a country where economic and social developments are further fostered by more efficient participation of immigrants and Indigenous Peoples.

Legal vehicle: IRCC Settlement Program contribution agreement framework, restructured to include Indigenous co-design requirements as a standard condition for all settlement organizations receiving federal funding.

Scope: The revised programming should address immigrants across the full status spectrum, not only new arrivals but also those transitioning through status changes and those preparing for citizenship. The immigrant identity and its associated governance challenges do not end at the threshold of permanent residence.

Test: Does the Indigenous organization have editorial authority over the content of orientation materials and not just the right to provide input?

#### Mechanism 4: Labour-Economic Alignment

Immigration programs for labour recruitment, including sectoral TFWP allocations, PNP occupational streams, and international student post-graduation work permits, are aligned with Indigenous economic development plans in affected territories. This means that Indigenous economic development corporations and band councils in regions where labour programs operate have a formal role in identifying the skills, sectors, and conditions that labour recruitment should serve. This alignment serves the interests of employers, Canadian businesses in the region, and immigrants as well: better-aligned labour recruitment reduces underemployment, improves regional economic performance, and reduces the economic displacement that contributes to community tension. This also instigates early discussions between businesses and Indigenous Nations in the region that create opportunities to agree on mutually beneficial developmental projects, business activities, investment opportunities, and urban or rural planning that directly connect to clarifying the workforce needed for the specific region and are fillable by immigrant talent.

Legal vehicle: Interdepartmental coordination mechanism linking IRCC, Crown-Indigenous Relations and Northern Affairs Canada (CIRNAC), and ISC, with formal Indigenous economic development input into the regional labour program design.

Test: Are Indigenous economic development priorities reflected in the program design and not just acknowledged in the program preamble?

### Mechanism 5: Honest Narrative

Federal immigration communications are revised to present Canada accurately as a multinational, treaty-structured country rather than as a culturally diverse but politically unified multicultural state. This includes promotional materials, settlement guides, and citizenship study resources. This distinction is essential. Indigenous Nations are not cultural communities within a mosaic; they are rights-holding political entities with governance authority, treaty relationships, and constitutional standing that newcomers must understand to navigate the country they are entering.

This narrative correction serves immigrants and Canadian-born Canadians simultaneously. Immigrants who receive an accurate account of Canada's constitutional structure are better equipped to build relationships, make informed decisions about long-term residence, and participate meaningfully in the economy and civic life. Accurate information reduces the resentment and disillusionment that arise when expectations shaped by idealized narratives collide with structural realities. It also supports more informed decisions about permanent residence, ensuring that those who choose to remain do so with a clear understanding of the social and political context, reducing the long-term mismatch between expectations and opportunities.

Canadian-born Canadians also benefit from this narrative realignment. A civic education that reflects the actual constitutional architecture of the country, rather than a simplified multicultural story, equips them to understand the policy choices their governments make, the governance redesign this framework proposes, and the role of Indigenous Nations as constitutional partners rather than cultural participants. A more accurate national narrative strengthens institutional trust and supports a more coherent national identity.

Legal vehicle: Truth and Reconciliation Commission Calls to Action 93 and 94, which explicitly require the revision of newcomer integration and citizenship materials to include Indigenous histories, treaty relationships, and governance structures.

Test: Does the revised content clearly distinguish Indigenous nationhood from multicultural diversity, presenting Indigenous Peoples as constitutional rights holders with governance authority rather than as one cultural, homogeneous group among many? If not, the narrative remains inaccurate and continues to reproduce the structural misalignment this mechanism is designed to correct.

### 5.3 Entry Points: Where Implementation Starts

The five mechanisms above describe a fully institutionalized framework. Full institutionalization is a long-term objective. Implementation starts through these entry points: regional and sectoral pilots that demonstrate feasibility and build the evidence base for broader adoption while minimizing unpredictable errors.

Treaty 7 territory in Alberta is the strongest initial candidate for a regional pilot. The Treaty 7 Management Corporation provides an established collective governance mechanism for the Siksika, Piikani, Kainai, Tsuut'ina, and Stoney Nakoda First Nations. The Alberta Advantage Immigration Program provides the provincial policy vehicle. The oil sands and agricultural sectors provide active labour recruitment contexts in which Indigenous economic alignment is both necessary and politically feasible. The positive impact expected for the local businesses representing the oil and gas industry with energy development projects is non-negligible. The overall benefits of a regional pilot for the Canadian-born Canadians in Alberta are evident and have an overarching effect on the entire Canadian economy, as Alberta produces more than 83 percent of Canadian crude oil as of 2024.<sup>103</sup>

University campuses on unceded or treaty territories with large international student populations provide a second entry point. The University of British Columbia on Musqueam,

---

<sup>103</sup> Canada Energy Regulator, *Market Snapshot: Canada sets new record in crude oil production in 2024 and first half of 2025*, (Ottawa, 2025). Available at: <https://www.cer-rec.gc.ca/en/data-analysis/energy-markets/market-snapshots/2025/market-snapshot-canada-sets-new-record-in-crude-oil-production-in-2024-and-first-half-of-2025.html>

Squamish, and Tsleil-Waututh territory; Lakehead University on Robinson Superior Treaty territory; and the University of Calgary on Treaty 7 territory each have existing Indigenous governance partnerships that could anchor a campus-level three-way integration pilot focused on orientation, community engagement, and labour pathway alignment. More transparent information provided to the international students who chose Canada over other countries for their tertiary education provides them an experience that is unique and beneficial for their intellectual growth. This would become a valuable distinction that Canadian universities can leverage in the competition for international student recruitment in the post-AI era based on values and ethics, especially against American universities that have more internationally pronounced academic prestige but are based on a more radical capitalist image by design.

The settlement sector provides a third entry point, through organizations in regions with established Indigenous organizational partnerships that are willing to co-design orientation programming. Namely, the provincial nonprofit umbrella organizations that represent the immigrant-serving organizations in their respective regions can take the lead. This does not require legislative change; it only requires willingness from settlement organizations and Indigenous partners and funding flexibility from IRCC's Settlement Program. It is the lowest-barrier entry point and the most immediate demonstration of feasibility.

## 6. Comparative Cases: What Other Countries Reveal

The Three-Way Integration Framework is first designed to be implemented in Canada, but with an ambition to be replicated across the globe for countries that do not yet have an implementable solution to comparable problems in immigration governance. As such, its institutional design draws on precedents that function in adjacent governance contexts, and understanding those precedents is as important as understanding what is new. What other countries have done, and where they have stopped short, helps define precisely what this framework proposes to go further.

### 6.1 Aotearoa New Zealand: The Waitangi Tribunal Citizenship Inquiry

The closest international analogue to the governance gap identified in the Three-Way Integration Framework is currently being examined by the Waitangi Tribunal in Aotearoa New Zealand. In 2025, the Tribunal released a prepublication report (titled *He Tangata, he Whenua: The Citizenship Report*) on the Wai 3513 inquiry into citizenship law.<sup>104</sup> The Tribunal found that the Citizenship Act 1977 contains no reference to the Treaty of Waitangi and no acknowledgement of Māori as tangata whenua. It concluded that the Crown breached multiple treaty principles, including partnership, active protection, rangatiratanga (chieftainship/sovereignty), good government, equal treatment, and options by maintaining citizenship legislation that disconnects overseas Māori from their tūrangawaewae (place to stand/home).

The inquiry examined whether citizenship law adequately reflects Treaty obligations in determining who belongs to New Zealand. The Tribunal recommended that the Crown co-design amendments with Māori to incorporate Treaty obligations, acknowledge Māori as the tangata whenua, and establish a tikanga-based (rights-based) pathway to citizenship.

---

<sup>104</sup> The Waitangi Tribunal, "Tribunal releases report on citizenship," (October 31, 2025), available at: <https://waitangitribunal.govt.nz/en/news/tribunal-releases-report-on-citizenship#:~:text=The%20Waitangi%20Tribunal%20has%20released,%20in%20pre%2Dpublication%20format>.

It also recommended immediate interim actions, including amending section 8(2)(e) to include te reo Māori (Indigenous language), extending citizenship by descent to two generations for Māori, and granting citizenship to the claimant.

The parallels with the Canadian situation are direct: a settler state has constructed citizenship and immigration law as if the governance rights of Indigenous Peoples are not implicated by decisions about who enters and belongs. The Waitangi Tribunal's inquiry demonstrates that this gap is legally addressable and how treaty obligations can inform immigration and citizenship governance in ways that create enforceable requirements on the state. The New Zealand precedent does not translate directly to Canada, because the Treaty of Waitangi is a single national instrument while Canada's treaty landscape is fragmented across hundreds of distinct agreements. But the legal logic of immigration governance being subject to Indigenous treaty obligations is directly applicable.

## 6.2 Canada's Co-Management Precedents

Canada's own governance history provides the most practically useful precedents. Co-management agreements in fisheries, forestry, and water governance have established institutional templates for shared governance between Indigenous Nations and federal/provincial authorities. The 1982 Sparrow decision (*R v. Sparrow*, [1990] 1 SCR 1075) established the constitutional protection of Indigenous fishing rights, prioritizing Indigenous rights over federal regulations, and ultimately produced co-management frameworks in Pacific salmon fisheries that give Indigenous Nations defined authority over fish harvesting decisions. The *Tsilhqot'in* decision (2014 SCC 44) went further. It confirmed that Aboriginal title is a beneficial interest in the land itself, extending over broad territories traditionally used by Indigenous Peoples rather than only small, intensively occupied sites. It affirmed that Indigenous Nations holding title have the right to decide how the land is used and that any Crown infringement must meet a strict constitutional justification test.

The institutional template from co-management is specific:

- defined territorial scope;

- defined decision-making authority (not advisory);
- adequate resourcing for Indigenous governance participation;
- dispute resolution mechanisms;
- and adaptive management processes.

These conditions provide a design checklist for the governance mechanisms the Three-Way Integration Framework proposes in immigration contexts. The consistent failures in co-management (under-resourcing of Indigenous participation, Crown agencies treating co-management as consultation, and erosion of terms through bureaucratic administrative reinterpretation) are equally instructive as design warnings.

### 6.3 The Nordic Sámi Framework

The Sámi Parliaments established in Norway (1989), Sweden (1993), and Finland (1996) provide institutional precedents for Indigenous governance bodies with defined advisory and co-governance authority within national policy processes. The Norwegian Sámi Parliament's formal consultation right requires the Norwegian government to consult the Sámi Parliament before making decisions that directly affect Sámi interests. This standard has been interpreted to include regional development, land use, and labour policy. The Nordic framework's limitations are instructive: the Sámi Parliaments hold advisory authority without hard veto powers, and their consultation rights have been imperfectly honoured. The lesson is that formal mechanisms are necessary but insufficient without enforcement and adequate resourcing.

# 7. Theory of Change: What Would Actually Improve

What would improve if this framework were implemented? A theory of change is presented not as a bureaucratic requirement but an intellectual obligation since the framework is the first of its kind. It forces clarity about the causal pathway from governance inputs to measurable outcomes, and it requires that the assumptions holding that pathway together be stated honestly rather than left implicit. The following theory of change is grounded in the empirical conditions documented in Section 2.

## 7.1 The Causal Pathway

<p><i>GOVERNANCE INPUTS</i></p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Territorial impact assessments for regional immigration decisions</li> <li>2. Regional co-governance tables with defined Indigenous decision authority</li> <li>3. Co-designed orientation curricula</li> <li>4. Labour-economic alignment with Indigenous development plans</li> <li>5. Honest narrative in government communications</li> </ol>
<p><i>INTERMEDIATE OUTPUTS (1–3 years)</i></p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Indigenous Nations participate formally in at least one regional immigration planning process</li> <li>2. At least three campus/sector pilots of co-designed orientation curricula</li> <li>3. IRCC Settlement Program contribution agreements include Indigenous co-design requirements</li> <li>4. One territorial impact assessment methodology developed and piloted</li> <li>5. Regional actors such as businesses participate in the decision-making process as employers and discussions are held with the participating Indigenous Nations</li> <li>6. Reconciliation is instigated through immigration decision-making process, showing respect for</li> </ol>

	Indigenous authority and regional Indigenous economic needs
<i>MEDIUM-TERM OUTCOMES (3–7 years) *</i>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Reduced Crown-Indigenous conflict in regions with co-governance frameworks (measured by litigation reduction)</li> <li>2. Improved retention of permanent residents and temporary foreign workers queued for permanent residency in regions with Indigenous governance integration</li> <li>3. Labour programs in pilot regions better matched to Indigenous economic priorities</li> <li>4. Reduced underemployment among internationally educated professionals in pilot regions</li> <li>5. Increased satisfaction of Canadian-born Canadians regarding immigration in pilot regions (measured by municipal or regional survey)</li> </ol>
<i>LONG-TERM OUTCOMES (7–12 years)</i>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Measurable reduction in Indigenous employment gap in sectors with aligned labour recruitment</li> <li>2. Improved per capita economic performance in regions where governance alignment reduces productivity drag</li> <li>3. Stronger public trust in immigration governance (measured by IRCC tracking surveys)</li> <li>4. Reduced housing pressure in regions where demographic growth is governed with absorption capacity alignment</li> <li>5. Reduced pressure on the existing infrastructure in pilot regions</li> <li>6. A measurable increase in the overall production output of Canada translated to increased GDP per capita</li> </ol>

\*The causal logic connecting governance inputs to medium-term outcomes operates through three pathways. First, consent-based processes would reduce litigation by removing the grounds for legal challenges that inadequate consultation creates. When Indigenous Nations hold decision-making authority rather than advisory roles, they would have less incentive to challenge the decisions legally, as they are the co-governance

authority over the outcome. Second, alignment of labour recruitment with Indigenous economic development plans would reduce the structural mismatch between immigrant skills and regional labour demand, improving employment outcomes through better information rather than through administrative intervention in individual employment decisions. Third, accurate orientation curricula would reduce the expectation-reality gap that produces disillusionments among immigrants that cause early departures, and this would improve retention rates through informed consent to their long-term settlement rather than through more costly retention incentives applied after the disillusionment has set in.

## 7.2 Key Assumptions

The theory of change rests on assumptions that must be tested through implementation. Four are critical.

First, that enough Indigenous Nations in relevant regions have sufficient governance capacity and political will to participate in formal immigration governance mechanisms. This is the most empirically uncertain assumption, and the absence of Indigenous input in this framework is acknowledged. It reveals that this framework is non-Indigenous in nature, requiring critical feedback from Indigenous scholars and practitioners. Furthermore, governance capacity varies enormously across nations, and many nations are managing multiple competing priorities with limited administrative resources. Pilot design must be responsive to this constraint, starting in regions where governance infrastructure is strongest and building outward. If possible, contributions and support from Indigenous Service Canada in coordination with IRCC involvement are desirable. Nevertheless, it is still questionable if such information is readily available to the Canadian state or those willing to test this framework.

Second, that federal and provincial governments will establish the legal and administrative vehicles for formal Indigenous participation in immigration governance. The UNDA Action Plan creates a mandatory alignment requirement, but alignment requirements do not automatically produce the necessary institutional change. Political will, administrative capacity, and sustained advocacy are required. These requirements cannot be satisfied in a short period of time, meaning that the context in which this

framework applies will have shifted measurably, potentially decreasing the framework's legitimacy and requiring a careful update.

Third, that improved governance alignment will produce the economic improvements the theory of change predicts. The structural basis for this projection is documented in Section C.2. These are structural data points, not projections. Whether governance reform would close these gaps depends on the implementation quality and scale, as well as continuous adjustments and developments of the implementation components with experimentation.

Fourth, that improved public trust will follow from demonstrable governance improvement rather than from communication strategies. Public skepticism of immigration governance in 2024-2025 is grounded in material experience: housing unaffordability, income stagnation, and strained services. Those material conditions cannot be addressed through narratives alone. Moreover, the changes will not happen overnight, and the public may not have the patience. The theory of change assumes that genuine governance improvement is necessary to restore public confidence. Simple rebranding without any structural change will not earn back the lost public trust. The structural change required in reality will have many more factors than what this framework mentions.

### 7.3 Measurable Indicators

- Indigenous employment rates in resource, construction, and service sectors in regions with active immigration recruitment, disaggregated by treaty territory (Statistics Canada, Labour Force Survey (LFS)).
- Immigrant retention rates at five years in regions with and without Indigenous co-governance frameworks, measured across the status categories including permanent residents and naturalized citizens, not only recent arrivals (Statistics Canada/IRCC - Longitudinal Immigration Database (IMDB)).
- Number of regional immigration planning processes with formal Indigenous co-governance participation with unambiguous decision-making authority (IRCC administrative tracking).

- Proportion of IRCC Settlement Program funding flowing to Indigenous organizations as co-designers versus subcontractors (IRCC contribution agreement data).
- Volume of Crown-Indigenous litigation related to inadequate consultation on labour and immigration decisions in pilot regions (Department of Justice administrative data).
- Underemployment rates among internationally educated professionals in pilot versus control regions (Statistics Canada, LFS).
- Public support for immigration governance management (not immigration in principle) in regions with and without pilot implementation (Environics Institute Focus Canada, regional disaggregation).

## 8. Recommendations

The framework developed in the preceding sections points toward a specific set of governance changes that are legally grounded, institutionally feasible, and calibrated to the actual political conditions of Canada in 2026 and beyond. What follows is not an ideal scenario. It is a sequenced agenda: what can be done now, what requires two to five years of institutional development, and what is a decade-long structural project. Each recommendation names who needs to act and why it is actionable in the current political and legal environment.

### 8.1 Immediate (0–2 Years)

#### Commission a legal opinion on immigration governance and the duty to consult

The federal government has never assessed whether immigration governance – including level setting, regional labour program design, and settlement funding allocation – engages the Crown’s constitutional duty to consult Indigenous Nations under section 35 or under UNDRIP as implemented through the UNDRIP Act (Bill C-15). The 2025 Kebaowek Federal Court decision clarified that all federal decision-makers must apply UNDRIP as an interpretive framework when assessing consultation obligations, significantly raising the legal standard for Free, Prior, and Informed Consent (FPIC). A legal opinion commissioned by PCO (Privy Council Office) or CIRNAC would determine whether current immigration practices are legally defensible and identify required reforms. This is a low-cost, high-value first step.

#### Establish an interdepartmental coordination mechanism: IRCC-CIRNAC- ISC

The siloed departmental structure is itself a structural barrier to the governance integration the framework requires. The lack of an interdepartmental coordination mechanism among the three federal departments is one of the reasons for social fragmentation

regarding immigration and reconciliation in Canada. IRCC manages immigration without adequate Indigenous governance input. CIRNAC manages Crown- Indigenous relations without adequate immigration policy input. ISC manages Indigenous services without adequate connection to settlement programming. An interdepartmental working group with a mandate to produce a UNDRIP-aligned immigration governance framework within a set period, such as 18 months, is the administrative prerequisite for all other recommendations. This can be set up initially at the director-general level.

### Identify and resource one regional pilot

A regional co-governance pilot in Treaty 7 territory in Alberta involving Treaty 7 Management Corporation, the Alberta Advantage Immigration Program, and IRCC's settlement funding stream would demonstrate feasibility, generate evidence, and create a model that can be adapted to other regions. The region also has strong regional Canadian non-state actors, such as multinational energy businesses, who may create measurable high-impact outcomes. This would produce some solid evidence for the framework's adoption in other regions with necessary adaptations. The pilot must be co-designed and co-governed by the participating Indigenous Nations. It should not be simply designed and orchestrated for them. Federal and provincial resourcing should cover Indigenous governance participation costs as a primary expense, not an administrative overhead.

### Revise IRCC Settlement Program contribution agreement requirements

The next round of IRCC settlement contribution agreements should include a requirement for organizations receiving over \$500,000 annually to demonstrate partnerships with Indigenous organizations in their service regions, with evidence of Indigenous co-design in the orientation curriculum for permanent residents as well as any other materials informing the realities of Canada. This does not require legislative change. It requires a policy decision within IRCC's existing administrative authority, which can be implemented more swiftly than changes requiring legislative amendments.

## Conduct an interdepartmental fiscal alignment review between IRCC and ISC

The Office of the Auditor General (OAG) has documented a persistent "implementation gap" where federal appropriations fail to reach Indigenous communities. As noted in the October 2025 Follow-up Report on Programs for First Nations, despite an 80% increase in ISC spending since 2019, the socio-economic outcomes have not significantly improved because federal delivery models remain tethered to bureaucratic procedures that do not align with Indigenous community operations.<sup>105</sup> Significant funding often remains unspent because of "capacity constraints," not because the communities do not have needs. The administrative complexity that current application and reporting requirements reinforce is identified as a barrier to self-determination for Indigenous communities who operate differently.

Simultaneously, IRCC manages multi-billion-dollar settlement programming aimed at integrating newcomers into regional labour markets. This occurs in a policy silo, lacking formal coordination with ISC's Indigenous economic development mandates or the 2026-27 Departmental Plan goals for Indigenous procurement and business participation.<sup>106</sup> The result is a budget synchronization that helps the two departments with overlapping territorial responsibilities produce superior outcomes with Canadian tax money for the country and its people.

An interdepartmental fiscal alignment review would identify these structural overlaps. It would pinpoint where funding is bottlenecked by application-capacity constraints rather than a lack of demand and create coordination mechanisms to redirect existing appropriations. This is not an argument for spending reductions; it is a spending alignment argument that can increase the efficiency of federal spending for everyone. Money is already budgeted, and it can reach the people for whom it was intended in full.

## 8.2 Medium-Term (2–5 Years)

---

<sup>105</sup> Office of the Auditor General, *Follow-up on Programs for First Nations-Indigenous Services Canada. Report 5.* (Ottawa: Office of the Auditor General, October 2025).

<sup>106</sup> Indigenous Services Canada, *Indigenous Services Canada's 2026-2027 Departmental Plan*, (Ottawa: Indigenous Services Canada, 2026). Available at: <https://www.sac-isc.gc.ca/eng/1767990598033/1773090600238>

- Amend the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act to require regional immigration planning processes to include formal consultation with Indigenous Nations in affected territories, with a defined consent-seeking standard consistent with UNDRIP Article 19.
- Restructure IRCC's Settlement Program to create a dedicated Indigenous co-governance funding stream separate from urban Indigenous programming in which Indigenous organizations participate as co-designers with governance authority over regional integration strategy.
- Develop and implement a territorial impact assessment methodology for all new regional immigration programs, based on co-design with Indigenous Nations in pilot regions.
- Revise IRCC's immigration promotional materials, settlement guides, and citizenship study materials to distinguish Indigenous nationhood from multicultural diversity and introduce newcomers to treaty relationships and Indigenous governance structures, consistent with TRC Calls to Action 93 and 94.
- Pilot campus-level three-way integration frameworks at UBC (MST territories), University of Calgary (Treaty 7), and Lakehead University (Robinson Superior Treaty territory).

### 8.3 Long-Term (5–10 Years)

The following long-term recommendations assume sustained political will and institutional development that the current political environment does not yet guarantee. They are presented as the full scope of what the framework's logic requires, not as predictions of what the next decade will deliver.

- Incorporate immigration governance provisions into modern treaty negotiations and treaty renegotiation processes, i.e., provisions establishing Indigenous Nations' co-governance authority over labour programs and regional immigration planning in their territories.

- Develop a national Indigenous economic development-immigration alignment strategy that connects federal immigration levels and pathway design with Indigenous economic development plans across regions.
- Establish permanent data collection infrastructure tracking the impact of immigration on Indigenous communities, disaggregated by treaty territory and reported annually alongside standard immigration statistics.
- Extend the three-way integration framework to campus-level governance across all post-secondary institutions on treaty or unceded territories with international student enrollment above 5,000.

## 9. What Remains to Be Done

The research gaps identified in this section are not qualifications added after the analysis. They are structural features of a practitioner framework that has reached the boundary of what one researcher, without Indigenous scholarly collaboration, without constitutional law expertise, and without empirical case study data, can legitimately claim. Each gap named below corresponds to a specific analytical move in the preceding sections where the argument rests on an assumption that requires empirical testing or expert validation before the framework can function as a government-ready policy proposal. They are named here so that future collaborators can identify precisely where their contribution begins.

### 9.1 The Legal Analysis

The most important single research gap is a constitutional law analysis applying the duty-to-consult jurisprudence (*Haida Nation* (2004), *Taku River* (2004), *Tsilhqot'in* (2014), and *Kebaowek* (2025 FC 319)) to specific immigration governance instruments. Does IRCC's regional level-setting process meet the duty to consult? Does the TFWP program design in regions with treaty-protected lands meet it? Does the settlement funding application process meet it? A legal opinion answering these questions with specificity would be one of the most significant contributions to both immigration law and Indigenous rights scholarship in recent years.

### 9.2 Direct Engagement with Indigenous Scholars and Governance Practitioners

The next development step requires direct engagement with Indigenous scholars and governance practitioners to evaluate whether the institutional design proposals are consistent with the governance principles they work from and whether the framework's specific mechanisms would function as designed from an Indigenous governance

perspective. This cannot be done by the author alone.<sup>107</sup> It requires collaborative research relationships that respect Indigenous intellectual sovereignty and are conducted under Indigenous research ethics frameworks.

### 9.3 A Practical Implementation Guide

The framework needs a companion document: a practical implementation guide written for settlement organizations, regional economic development bodies, Indigenous governance staff, and provincial immigration officials – people who may not have political science training but who are in positions to initiate or support the governance mechanisms the framework proposes. That document should be short, specific, and written in plain language. It is a separate project from this analysis.

### 9.4 Empirical Case Study

Although the multiple vantage points of the author are valuable, this framework lacks empirical ground. It would be crucial to study whether the framework can be applied to explain specific cases of problems where immigration and reconciliation intersect in real life. After some empirical studies are undertaken and conclusions are drawn, supported by evidence, suggestions for improvements to the framework and further research areas should be identified.

---

<sup>107</sup> The author acknowledges that the analysis of Indigenous governance rights in this work is solely grounded in the published work of Coulthard, A. Simpson, and L.B. Simpson, from a non-Indigenous point of view, requiring Indigenous perspectives from scholars self-identifying as Indigenous in Canada.

# Bibliography

## Primary Legal and Government Sources

Calder v. British Columbia (Attorney General). [1973] SCR 313. Supreme Court of Canada.

Canada Energy Regulator (CER). *2023–24 Annual Report of the Commission of the Canada Energy Regulator*. Calgary: CER, 2024.

- ———. “Market Snapshot: Canada Sets New Record in Crude Oil Production in 2024 and First Half of 2025.” Ottawa: CER, 2025. <https://www.cer-rec.gc.ca/en/data-analysis/energy-markets/market-snapshots/2025/market-snapshot-canada-sets-new-record-in-crude-oil-production-in-2024-and-first-half-of-2025.html>

Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation (CMHC). “Canada’s Housing Supply Shortages: Estimating what is needed to solve Canada’s housing affordability crisis by 2030.” *The Housing Observer*, June 22, 2022. <https://www.cmhc-schl.gc.ca/observer/2022/canadas-housing-supply-shortage-restoring-affordability-2030>

- ———. *Canada’s Housing Supply Shortages: Moving to a New Framework*. Ottawa: CMHC, 2025.
- ———. “Housing Starts Up 5.6% in 2025 from 2024.” News release, January 16, 2026, Ottawa: CMHC. <https://www.cmhc-schl.gc.ca/media-newsroom/news-releases/2026/housing-starts-december-2025>
- ———. “Beyond Toronto and Vancouver: Housing Affordability Challenges in Canada.” *CMHC Observer*, February 25, 2026. <https://www.cmhc-schl.gc.ca/observer/2026/beyond-toronto-vancouver-affordability-challenges-spread-across-canadian-cities>

Canadian Multiculturalism Act. RSC 1985, c 24 (4th Supp).

Centre for Canadian Language Benchmarks (CCLB). *Canadian Language Benchmarks: English as a Second Language for Adults*. Ottawa: CCLB, 2012. [www.language.ca](http://www.language.ca).

Constitution Act, 1982. Schedule B to the *Canada Act 1982* (UK), 1982, c 11, s 35.

Constitution of the Plurinational State of Bolivia, 2009. Article 1. Oxford University Press Inc. [https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Bolivia\\_2009](https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Bolivia_2009)

Council of Australian Governments (COAG). *National Agreement on Closing the Gap*. Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2020.  
<https://www.closingthegap.gov.au/national-agreement>

Crown-Indigenous Relations and Northern Affairs Canada (CIRNAC). “Appearance before the Standing Senate Committee on Aboriginal Peoples: Bill C-15, An Act Respecting the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.” Ottawa: Standing Senate Committee on Aboriginal Peoples, 2021.  
<https://www.rcaanc-cirnac.gc.ca/eng/1624906622343/1624906649093#chp11>

Delgamuukw v. British Columbia. [1997] 3 SCR 1010. Supreme Court of Canada.

Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests). [2004] 3 SCR 511, 2004 SCC 73.

Homelessness Programs and Point-in-Time Counts. Ottawa: Government of Canada, 2023.

- ———. *Homelessness Data Snapshot: The National Shelter Study 2023 Update*. Last modified November 29, 2024.  
<https://housing-infrastructure.canada.ca/homelessness-sans-abri/reports-rapports/data-shelter-2023-donnees-refuge-eng.html>

Immigration and Refugee Protection Act. SC 2001, c 27.

Immigration Services Agency of Japan. *Statistics on Foreign Residents*. Tokyo: ISA, July 2025.

Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (IRCC). *Canada-Ontario Immigration Agreement 2005*. Ottawa: IRCC, 2005.

- ———. *2023 Annual Report to Parliament on Immigration*. Ottawa: Government of Canada, 2024.
- ———. *Public Opinion Research on Canadians’ Attitudes Towards Immigration*. Deputy Minister Transition Binder. Ottawa: Government of Canada, 2024.
- ———. “Notice — Supplementary Information for the 2025–2027 Immigration Levels Plan.” October 24, 2024. Ottawa: Government of Canada.  
<https://www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/news/notices/supplementary-immigration-levels-2025-2027.html>
- ———. *2025 Annual Report to Parliament on Immigration*. Ottawa: Government of Canada, 2025.
- ———. *Public Opinion Research on Canadians’ Attitudes Towards Immigration*. Minister Transition Binder. Ottawa: Government of Canada, May 2025.

- ———. “SOI — 2026–2028 Immigration Levels Plan.” November 17, 2025. Ottawa: Government of Canada. <https://www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/corporate/transparency/committees/soci-nov-17-2025/levels.html>

Indigenous Services Canada (ISC). *An Update on the Socio-Economic Gaps Between Indigenous Peoples and the Non-Indigenous Population in Canada: Highlights from the 2021 Census*. Ottawa: ISC, 2023.

- ———. *Indigenous Services Canada’s 2026–2027 Departmental Plan*. Ottawa: ISC, 2026.

Kebaowek First Nation v. Canadian Nuclear Laboratories. FC 319. Federal Court of Canada, 2025.

Korea Development Institute (KDI). *Long-Term Population Projection for Korea*. Seoul: KDI, 2023.

Korea Legislation Research Institute, *Act on the Employment of Foreign Workers*, Act No. 6967 of 2003, last amended 2022. Republic of Korea. [https://elaw.klri.re.kr/eng\\_service/lawView.do?hseq=60984&lang=ENG](https://elaw.klri.re.kr/eng_service/lawView.do?hseq=60984&lang=ENG)

Ministry of Employment and Labor (Republic of Korea). *Employment Permit System Annual Report 2023*. Seoul: MOEL, 2024.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Republic of Korea). *Overseas Koreans Act*. Act No. 5955. 1999. last amended 2022.

Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (Japan). *Vital Statistics of Japan 2023*. Tokyo: MHLW, 2024.

Ministry of Justice (Republic of Korea). *Korea Immigration Service Statistics 2023*. Seoul: MOJ, 2024.

National Human Rights Commission of Korea (NHRCK). “Report on the Human Rights Situation of Migrant Workers.” Seoul: NHRCK, 2022.

New Zealand Parliament. *Immigration Policy Review*. Parliamentary Debates. Wellington: New Zealand Parliament, 2022.

Office of the Auditor General of Canada. “Report 1 — Immigration Processing.” *2023 Reports of the Auditor General of Canada*. Ottawa: Office of the Auditor General, 2023.

- ———. “Report 5 — Follow-up on Programs for First Nations — Indigenous Services Canada.” *2025 Reports of the Auditor General of Canada*. Ottawa: Office of the Auditor General, 2025.

Office of the Parliamentary Budget Officer. *The Evolution of Canada’s Social Housing Stock*. Ottawa: Office of the Parliamentary Budget Officer, 2025. <https://www.pbo-dpb.ca/en/additional-analyses--analyses-complementaires/BLOG-2425-008--evolution-canada-social-housing-stock--evolution-parc-logements-sociaux-canada>

Presidential Committee on Ageing Society and Population Policy (Republic of Korea). *Annual Reports 2006–2023*. Seoul: Government of the Republic of Korea.

R v. Sparrow. *R v. Sparrow*. [1990] 1 SCR 1075.

Standing Committee on Human Resources, Skills and Social Development (HUMA). *A Way Forward: Toward an Improved Temporary Foreign Worker Program*. 44th Parliament, 1st Session. Ottawa, 2022–23.

Standing Committee on Official Languages (LANG). *Francophone Immigration in Minority Communities: An Urgent Need to Act*. 44th Parliament, 1st Session. Ottawa, 2022.

Statistics Bureau of Japan. *Population Estimates*. Tokyo: Statistics Japan, 2024.

Statistics Korea (KOSTAT). *Long-Term Population Projection: 2020–2070*. Seoul: KOSTAT, 2021.

- ———. *2024 Birth Statistics*. Seoul: Statistics Korea, February 2025.

Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada. *Calls to Action*. Winnipeg: TRC of Canada, 2015.

Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columbia. 2014 SCC 44, [2014] 2 SCR 256.

United Nations. *United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples Act*. SC 2021, c 14.

Waitangi Tribunal. *He Tangata, He Whenua: The Citizenship Report (Wai 3513)*. Pre-publication copy. Wellington: Waitangi Tribunal, October 2025.

Yahey v. British Columbia. 2021 BCSC 1287.

## Statistical and Survey Sources

Abacus Data. “Thresholds and Tensions: Unmasking Public Unease with Canada’s Immigration Goals.” Survey conducted November 9–12, 2023. Ottawa: Abacus Data, 2023.

- ———. “Canadians’ Views on Immigration Remain Largely Unchanged from Last Year and Overly Negative.” Survey conducted October 24–29, 2025. Ottawa: Abacus Data, 2025. <https://abacusdata.ca/canadians-views-on-immigration-remain-largely-unchanged-from-last-year-and-overly-negative/>

Angus Reid Institute. “Concern over Immigration Quadruples over Last 24 Months.” Survey conducted August 29–September 3, 2024.

Assembly of First Nations and Centre for the Study of Living Standards. *Closing the First Nations Education Gap in Canada: Assessing Progress and Estimating the Economic Benefits — An Update*. Ottawa: AFN/CSLS, 2022.

- ———. *Closing the First Nations Education Gap in Canada: 2021 Census Update*. Ottawa: AFN/CSLS, 2024.

Conference Board of Canada. *The Cost of Doing Nothing: The Economic Impact of an Unequal Canada*. Ottawa: Conference Board of Canada, 2022.

- ———. *The Leaky Bucket 2025: Retention Challenges in Highly Skilled Immigrants and In-Demand Occupations*. Ottawa: Conference Board of Canada, 2025. <https://forcitizenship.ca/the-leaky-bucket/>

Engineers Canada. *Engineers Canada’s Operational Imperative 9: Indigenous Access to Engineering*. Ottawa: Engineers Canada, 2019.

- ———. *Indigenous Engineering in Canada*. Ottawa: Engineers Canada, 2021. <https://engineerscanada.ca/reports/indigenous-engineering-in-canada>

Environics Institute for Survey Research. *Focus Canada: Canadian Public Opinion About Immigration and Refugees – Fall 2024*. Toronto: Environics Institute, 2024. <https://www.environicsinstitute.org/projects/project-details/canadian-public-opinion-about-immigration-and-refugees---fall-2024>

- ———. *Canadian Public Opinion About Immigration and Refugees — Fall 2025*. Toronto: Environics Institute, 2025. Conducted September 8–21, 2025. <https://www.environicsinstitute.org/projects/project-details/canadian-public-opinion-about-immigration-and-refugees---fall-2025>

Fédération des communautés francophones et acadiennes. *Bilan 2021–2022 de l’immigration francophone hors Québec*. Ottawa: FCFA, 2022.

Habitat for Humanity Canada. *2024 Affordable Housing Survey*. Toronto: Habitat for Humanity Canada, 2024.

Human Rights Watch. “Caught in a Web: Migrant Workers Under South Korea’s Employment Permit System.” New York: HRW, 2023.

Singer, Colin R. “Canada Welcomed 393,750 New Immigrants in 2025.” March 18, 2026. <https://immigration.ca/canada-welcomed-393750-new-immigrants-in-2025/>

Korea Economic Institute of America. “South Korea’s Population Crisis.” *KEI Policy Brief*. Washington, D.C.: KEI, 2023.

Korea International Trade Association. *Korean Business Communities in Southeast Asia: Economic Status and Challenges*. Seoul: KITA, 2022.

LIPdata.ca. “Permanent Residents Arrivals 2015 to July 2025.” 2025. <https://lipdata.ca/indicator/newpermanentresidentsarrivals2015tojuly2025/>

National Indigenous Economic Development Board. *National Indigenous Economic Progress Report*. Ottawa: NIEDB, 2019.

- ———. *National Indigenous Economic Progress Report*. Ottawa: NIEDB, 2024.

OECD. *International Migration Outlook 2023*. Paris: OECD Publishing, 2023.

- ———. *Pensions at a Glance 2023: OECD and G20 Indicators*. Paris: OECD Publishing, 2023.
- ———. *Settling In 2023: Indicators of Immigrant Integration*. Paris: OECD Publishing, 2023.
- ———. *Family Database: “SF2.1: Fertility Rates.”* Paris: OECD, 2024. [www.oecd.org/els/family/database.htm](http://www.oecd.org/els/family/database.htm).
- ———. *Recruiting Immigrant Workers: Japan 2024*. Paris: OECD Publishing, 2024.

- ———. *Society at a Glance 2024: OECD Social Indicators*. Paris: OECD Publishing, 2024.
- ———. *OECD Economic Surveys: Canada 2025*. Paris: OECD Publishing, 2025. <https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/oecd-economic-surveys-canada-2025/28f9e02c-en.html>
- ———. “Urban Population by City Size.” OECD Data. Last accessed on April 9, 2026. <https://www.oecd.org/en/data/indicators/urban-population-by-city-size.html>

Sharpe, Andrew, and Jean-François Arsenault. *Investing in Aboriginal Education in Canada: An Economic Perspective*. CSLS Research Report 2010-03. Ottawa: Centre for the Study of Living Standards, 2009.

Statistics Canada. *A Canada–U.S. Comparison of the Economic Outcomes of STEM Immigrants*. Catalogue no. 11F0019M – No. 453. Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 2020.

- ———. *Immigration and Ethnocultural Diversity: Key Results from the 2021 Census*. Catalogue No. 98-200-X2021001. Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 2022.
- ———. *Immigrants in the Canadian Labour Force: Recent Trends from 2006 to 2021*. Catalogue No. 71-606-X2022001. Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 2022.
- ———. *The Contribution of International Students to the Canadian Economy, 2022*. Catalogue No. 71-607-X. Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 2023.
- ———. “Earnings of Immigrants and Canadian-Born Workers.” *The Daily*, April 2023. Ottawa: Statistics Canada.
- ———. “The Daily — Canadian Income Survey, 2021.” Catalogue no. 11-001-X. Released May 2, 2023. <https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/daily-quotidien/230502/dq230502a-eng.htm>
- ———. “The Daily — Canadian Income Survey, 2022.” Catalogue no. 11-001-X. Released April 26, 2024. <https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/daily-quotidien/240426/dq240426a-eng.htm>
- ———. *GDP per Capita: Perspectives on the Return to Trend. Economic and Social Reports*, April 2024. Ottawa: Statistics Canada.
- ———. “Nearly Half of Canadians Report That Rising Prices Are Greatly Impacting Their Ability to Meet Day-to-Day Expenses.” *The Daily*, August 15, 2024. Ottawa: Statistics Canada.
- ———. “Housing Challenges Related to Affordability, August 2 to September 15, 2024.” *The Daily*, November 19, 2024. Ottawa: Statistics Canada.
- ———. *Population Estimates, Fourth Quarter 2023*. Table 17-10-0008-01. Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 2024.

- ———. “Canadian and International Tuition Fees by Level of Study (Current Dollars).” Table 37-10-0045-01. Released September 10, 2025. <https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/t1/tbl1/en/tv.action?pid=3710004501>
- ———. *Estimates of the Components of Demographic Growth, Annual*. Table 17-10-0008-01. Released September 24, 2025. <https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/t1/tbl1/en/cv.action?pid=1710000801>
- ———. “Gross Domestic Product, Income and Expenditure, Fourth Quarter 2025.” *The Daily*, February 27, 2026. Ottawa: Statistics Canada. <https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/daily-quotidien/260227/dq260227a-eng.htm>
- ———. “Estimate of the Number of Non-Permanent Residents (January 1, 2026).” *Immigrants and Non-Permanent Residents Statistics*. Ottawa: Statistics Canada. Date Modified March 18, 2026. [https://www.statcan.gc.ca/en/subjects-start/immigration and ethnocultural diversity/immigrants and nonpermanent residents](https://www.statcan.gc.ca/en/subjects-start/immigration%20and%20ethnocultural%20diversity/immigrants%20and%20nonpermanent%20residents)

United Nations. *World Population Prospects: The 2022 Revision*. New York: United Nations, 2022.

## Academic and Policy Sources

Anderson, Benedict. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. London: Verso, 1983.

Ansell, Chris, and Alison Gash. “Collaborative Governance in Theory and Practice.” *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory* 18, no. 4 (2008): 543–71.

Bakvis, Herman, and Luc Juillet. *The Horizontal Challenge: Line Departments, Central Agencies and Leadership*. Ottawa: Canada School of Public Service, 2004.

Bankes, Nigel. “The Duty to Consult and the Legislative Process: But What About Reconciliation?” *ABLAWG*, December 20, 2016. <https://ablawg.ca/2016/12/21/the-duty-to-consult-and-the-legislative-process-but-what-about-reconciliation/>

Bauder, Harald. “Perspectives on Immigration Policy in Canada’s Provinces.” In *Canadian Immigration Policy for the 21st Century*, edited by Ryan Baber. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2007.

- Berkes, Fikret. "Evolution of Co-Management: Role of Knowledge Generation, Bridging Organizations and Social Learning." *Journal of Environmental Management* 90, no. 5 (2009): 1692–1702.
- Besco, Randy, and Natasha Goel. "Who Changed Their Minds? Two Shifts in Canadian Public Opinion on Immigration: 1995–2005 and 2023–24." Centre of Excellence on the Canadian Federation. Montreal: Institute for Research on Public Policy, January 29, 2026. <https://centre.irpp.org/research-studies/canadian-opinion-immigration/>
- Bourdieu, Pierre. *Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984.
- Business Council of Alberta. "It's Not Just You. The Canadian Economy Isn't Doing as Well as It Looks." *Economic Insights*, July 2024.
- Business Council of British Columbia. "Canada's Post-Pandemic Economic Recovery Was the 5th Weakest in the OECD." *Insight*, 2024.
- Cardoso, Fernando Henrique, and Enzo Faletto. *Dependency and Development in Latin America*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979.
- Castles, Stephen. "Why Migration Policies Fail." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 27, no. 2 (2004): 205–27.
- CBC News. "Canada Is Getting Poorer When Compared to Its Wealthy Peers, Data Shows." September 12, 2024. <https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/canada-gdp-per-capita-rich-1.7318989>
- C.D. Howe Institute. *How We Subverted Our Skills-Based Immigration System*. Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute, December 2025. <https://cdhowe.org/publication/how-we-subverted-our-skills-based-immigration-system/>
- Chin, Rita. *The Guest Worker Question in Postwar Germany*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.
- Collins, Patricia Hill. *Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness, and the Politics of Empowerment*. 2nd ed. New York: Routledge, 2000.
- Coulthard, Glen Sean. *Red Skin, White Masks: Rejecting the Colonial Politics of Recognition*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2014.

- Fanon, Frantz. *The Wretched of the Earth*. Translated by Constance Farrington. New York: Grove Press, 1963.
- Fassin, Didier. *Humanitarian Reason: A Moral History of the Present*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012.
- Frank, André Gunder. *Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America*. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1967.
- Fraser, Nancy. "Expropriation and Exploitation in Racialized Capitalism." *Critical Historical Studies* 3, no. 1 (2016): 163–78.
- Geddis, Andrew, and Miriam Lips. "Māori and Immigration Policy." In *New Zealand and International Law*, edited by Joanna Mossop and Tony Angelo. Wellington: VUW Press, 2022.
- Gustafson, Bret. *New Languages of the State: Indigenous Resurgence and the Politics of Knowledge in Bolivia*. Durham: Duke University Press, 2009.
- Harvey, David. *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.
- Herbert, Ulrich. *A History of Foreign Labor in Germany 1880–1980*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1990.
- Hollifield, James F. "The Emerging Migration State." *International Migration Review* 38, no. 3 (2004): 885–912.
- Imai, Shin. "The Duty to Consult and Accommodate: Procedural Justice as Aboriginal Rights." *Canadian Journal of Administrative Law and Practice* 30 (2017): 1–37.
- Ito, Kenji. "Integration Without Multiculturalism: Japan's Approach to Immigration Governance." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 48, no. 12 (2022): 2891–2908.
- Jones, Randall S. "Korean Policies to Reverse the Decline in the Fertility Rate Part 1: Balancing Work and Family." *The Peninsula*. Korea Economic Institute. June 22, 2023. <https://keia.org/the-peninsula/korean-policies-to-reverse-the-decline-in-the-fertility-rate-part-1-balancing-work-and-family/>
- Kasinitz, Philip, John Mollenkopf, Mary Waters, and Jennifer Holdaway. *Inheriting the City: The Children of Immigrants Come of Age*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008.

- Kymlicka, Will. *Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995.
- Lawrence, Rebecca, Gunnar Åberg, and Rasmus Koss Hartmann. "Revitalizing the Indigenous, Integrating into the Colonized? The Banal Colonialism of Immigrant Integration in Swedish Sápmi." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 43, no. 16 (2020): 1–19.
- Lie, John. *Multiethnic Korea? Multiculturalism, Migration, and Peoplehood Diversity in Contemporary Korea*. Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, 2014.
- Liddle, Hannah. "Budget Cuts International Student Permit Targets by 49 Per Cent in 2026." *University Affairs*, November 4, 2025. <https://universityaffairs.ca/news/budget-cuts-international-student-permits-by-65-per-cent-in-2026/>
- Mills, Albert J., Gabrielle Durepos, and Elden Wiebe. "Most Different Systems Design." In *Encyclopedia of Case Study Research*, 571–72. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, 2010. <https://doi.org/10.4135/9781412957397.n211>
- Missing Middle Initiative. "Canada vs. the World: The Worst Record on Housing Affordability Since 2004." November 3, 2025. <https://www.missingmiddleinitiative.ca/p/canada-vs-the-world-the-worst-record>
- Na, Hye-Sim. "South Korean Nurses to West Germany: Reassessing the Role of the State in Postwar Global Labour Migration." *Histoire Sociale / Social History* 52, no. 105 (2019). <https://doi.org/10.1353/his.2019.0009>
- Nakache, Delphine, and Paula J. Kinoshita. "The Canadian Temporary Foreign Worker Program: Do Short-Term Economic Needs Prevail over Human Rights Concerns?" *IRPP Study* 5. Montreal: IRPP, 2010.
- Newman, Dwight. *The Duty to Consult: New Relationships with Aboriginal Peoples*. Saskatoon: Purich Publishing, 2009.
- Niagara Independent. "A Look at Canada – by the Numbers." March 2026. <https://niagaraindependent.ca/a-look-at-canada-by-the-numbers/>
- Ong, Aihwa. *Neoliberalism as Exception: Mutations in Citizenship and Sovereignty*. Durham: Duke University Press, 2006.

Ostrom, Elinor. *Governing the Commons*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.

Parkin, Andrew. "Five Public-Opinion Trends to Watch in 2025." *Policy Options*, December 30, 2024.

Pasternak, Shiri. *Grounded Authority: The Algonquins of Barriere Lake Against the State*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2017.

Phelan, John. "The Frozen North: Canada's Economic Stagnation." *The Daily Economy*, April 3, 2025.

Picard, Maryse. *From Exclusion to Shared Prosperity: The Vital Role of First Nations in Canada's Economic Future*. Montreal: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 2025. <https://centre.irpp.org/research-studies/first-nations-canada-economic-future/>

Portes, Alejandro, and Rubén Rumbaut. *Legacies: The Story of the Immigrant Second Generation*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001.

Putnam, Robert D. "E Pluribus Unum: Diversity and Community in the Twenty-First Century." *Scandinavian Political Studies* 30, no. 2 (2007): 137–74.

RBC Economics. "Stagnating Income Threatens Wealth Gains for Young Canadians." November 2025.

Rumbaut, Rubén G. "The Crucible Within: Ethnic Identity, Self-Esteem, and Segmented Assimilation Among Children of Immigrants." *International Migration Review* 28, no. 4 (1994): 748–94.

Sassen, Saskia. *Expulsions: Brutality and Complexity in the Global Economy*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2014.

Seifert, Wolfgang. "Social and Economic Integration of Foreigners in Germany." In *Paths to Inclusion: The Integration of Migrants in the United States and Germany*, edited by Peter Schuck and Rainer Münz. New York: Berghahn Books, 1998.

Sharma, Nandita. *Home Rule: National Sovereignty and the Separation of Natives and Migrants*. Durham: Duke University Press, 2020.

Sieder, Rachel, ed. *Multiculturalism in Latin America: Indigenous Rights, Diversity and Democracy*. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002.

- Simpson, Audra. *Mohawk Interruptus: Political Life Across the Borders of Settler States*. Durham: Duke University Press, 2014.
- Simpson, Leanne Betasamosake. *As We Have Always Done: Indigenous Freedom Through Radical Resistance*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2017.
- Smith, Linda Tuhiwai. *Decolonizing Methodologies: Research and Indigenous Peoples*. London: Zed Books, 1999.
- Standing, Guy. *The Precariat: The New Dangerous Class*. London: Bloomsbury, 2011.
- Taylor, Charles. *Reconciling the Solitudes: Essays on Canadian Federalism and Nationalism*. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1993.
- TD Economics. "Mind the Gap: Canada Is Falling Behind the Standard-of-Living Curve." Toronto: TD Bank Financial Group, 2023.
- ———. "Popping Canada's Population Bubble: The Shift from Labour to Capital." *Economics Report*, January 2025. <https://economics.td.com/ca-popping-population-bubble>
- Tino, Stephen. *Labour Market Power, Firm Productivity, and the Immigrant-Native Pay Gap*. CLEF Working Paper No. 88. Waterloo: Canadian Labour Economics Forum, 2025.
- Todd, Zoe. "An Indigenous Feminist's Take on the Ontological Turn." *Journal of Historical Sociology* 29, no. 1 (2016): 4–22.
- University of Waterloo Trust Research Network. *Trust in Canada: Recent Trends in Measures of Trust*. Waterloo: University of Waterloo, 2024.
- Vogel, Isabel. *Review of the Use of "Theory of Change" in International Development*. London: UK Department for International Development, 2012.
- Vogt, Gabrielle. "Japan's Immigration Policy: Stagnation or Transformation?" In *Immigration and Integration in East Asia*, edited by Erin Aeran Chung and Saadia Pekkanen. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2021.
- Wallerstein, Immanuel. *The Modern World-System, Vol. 1*. New York: Academic Press, 1974.
- Weinfeld, Morton. *Like Everyone Else But Different: The Paradoxical Success of Canadian Jews*. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 2001.

Wilson, Shawn. *Research Is Ceremony: Indigenous Research Methods*. Halifax: Fernwood Publishing, 2008.

Wolfe, Patrick. "Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native." *Journal of Genocide Research* 8, no. 4 (2006): 387–409.

YYC Policy. "Struggling to Keep Up with the Cost of Living: Young Canadians Under Pressure." March 2026.